SECU
N.B. Th
UPGF

(N.B. The grading of this jacket must be the same as that of the highest graded document contained in it. The appropriate upgrading slip must be affixed whenever necessary.)

FC 4420

CONFIDENTIAL

CPS 517

Contents checked for transfer to DRO

(Sgd.) .....

Date .....

YEAR STAMP 1971

H.M. DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

DEPT. or POST NEAR EASTERN (52-133)

FILE No. NEQ 3/548/1 **(Part** B. **)**

TITLE: POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED KINGDOM AND IRAQ

S 308

REFER TO			REFER TO			REFER TO		
NAME (and dept, where necessary)	TO SEE:	DATE	NAME (and dept, where necessary)	TO SEE:	DATE	NAME (and dept, where necessary)	TO SEE:	DATE

1134-0

FCO

[redacted]

Registry Address

DO NOT RETAIN FILES AND PAPERS UNNECESSARILY
RETURN THEM TO REGISTRY FOR B.U. Or P.A.

FILE No. NEQ 3/548/1 PART B

SECURI
N.B. The gi
UPGRA

(N.B. The grading of this jacket must be the same as that of the highest graded document contained in it. The appropriate upgrading slip must be affixed whenever necessary.)

CONFIDENTIAL

CPS 517

YEAR STAMP 1971

Stock No.FC4420

52

FLASH CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT A

BAGHDAD 010525Z

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR COPY

TO FLASH FCO TELNO 1196 OF 1 DECEMBER 71.

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
-1 DEC 1971
NEQ 3/5

ANGLO / IRAQI RELATIONS.

1. I HAVE NOT YET BEEN SUMMONED TO BE FORMALLY TOLD OF THE BREAK IN RELATIONS WHICH IS CARRIED ON BOTH BAGHDAD RADIO AND PRESS.

2. AS TO THE CHOICE OF A PROTECTING POWER (SHOULD THIS PROVE NECESSARY) THE SWEDES DID AN EXCELLENT JOB LAST TIME AND I SUGGEST WE ASK THEM AGAIN DESPITE THEIR MEAGRE STAFF. THE FRENCH, WHO ARE BETTER PLACED FOR MANPOWER, ALREADY LOOK AFTER WEST GERMAN INTERESTS, AND THE BELGIANS AFTER U S INTERESTS.
THE DUTCH AMBASSADOR IS AWAY.

BALFOUR PAUL

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

NED
P & C D
PSD
POD

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 010735Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP COPY 53

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 -1 DEC 1971

NEA 3/5481

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 1200 OF 1 DEC 71. INFO IMMEDIATE TO BAHRAIN RESIDENCY, DUBAI, UKMIS NEW YORK, TEHRAN, PRIORITY TO ABU DHABI, KUWAIT, JEDDA, BEIRUT, CAIRO, WASHINGTON, DOHA, MUSCAT, TRIPOLI, ALGIERS, ROUTINE TO KHARTOUM, TUNIS, RABAT, AND AMMAN.

(52)

MY TELEGRAM NO 1196 TO FCO ONLY : IRAQ AND THE ISLANDS.

1. DURING YESTERDAY AFTERNOON AND BEFORE THE BREAKING OFF OF RELATIONS WAS ANNOUNCED BY THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL, THE MFA SUMMONED HEADS OF ALL DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS.

2. THE MINISTER SAW HEADS OF ARAB MISSIONS (AND IS SAID TO HAVE DISCUSSED MEASURES TO BE TAKEN) AND AMBASSADORS OF USSR, CHINA AND FRANCE. THE UNDER SECRETARY (WHO ALSO SAW ME AND THE IRANIAN) RECEIVED THE OTHERS. THEY WERE ALL HANDED NOTES, OF WHICH THE BURDEN WAS ANGLO/IRANIAN COLLUSION, AND WERE APPARENTLY ASKED TO URGE THEIR GOVERNMENTS BOTH TO DEMAND IRANIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ISLANDS AND TO TAKE SUPPORTING ACTION AT THE UNITED NATIONS, (THOUGH HE ADMITTED THAT NO DECISION HAD YET BEEN TAKEN TO RAISE THE MATTER THERE).

3. IN THIS MORNING'S PRESS THE RCC SPOKESMAN IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT IRAQ, ''INVITES THE UNITED NATIONS'' TO STOP THIS VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AGGRESSION AGAINST ARAB SOIL '' WHICH CARRIES ALONG WITH IT THE MOST THREATENING DANGERS AGAINST THE PEACE OF THE AREA''. AFTER ANNOUNCING THAT THE RCC HAD DECIDED TO SEVER RELATIONS WITH IRAN AND BRITAIN THE SPOKESMAN SAID IRAQ HOPES ''SISTERLY ARAB GOVERNMENTS WOULD TAKE THE MEASURES IMPOSED'' BY THE NEED TO CONFRONT THIS AGGRESSION. THE GOVERNMENT DAILY IN IT'S EDITORIAL CALLS ON ARAB GOVERNMENTS TO FOLLOW IRAQ'S EXAMPLE ON BREAKING RELATIONS.

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

BALFOUR PAUL

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

NED
P & C D
PERSONNEL (SERVICES) D
PERSONNEL (OPS) D
UND
UN (ODA)
OIL D

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10
1 DEC 1971
NEQ 3/548/1

FLASH
OTHER CAT A
FM BAGHDAD Ø11120
CONFIDENTIAL
TO FLASH F.C.O. TELNO 120Ø OF 1/12 INFO IMMEDIATE STOCKHOLM
PRIORITY TEHRAN AND BEIRUT.

MY TEL NO 1196: (52)

TOP COPY

SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS.
AT 123Ø HOURS (LOCAL) I EVENTUALLY SAW D.G. OF PROTOCOL. HE HANDED ME A NOTE IN ARABIC CONVEYING DECISION TO RUPTURE RELATIONS FROM 1 DECEMBER. SINCE IT WAS FILLED OUT WITH OFFENSIVE REFERENCES TO COLLUSION , ETC, I DECLINED TO ACCEPT IT.

2. HE THEN GAVE ME FOLLOWING DETAILS ORALLY:
(A) EMBASSIES AND CONSULATES HERE AND IN LONDON ARE TO CLOSE.
(B) IRAQ IS ASKING AFGHANISTAN TO LOOK AFTER HER INTERESTS AND PROPOSES TO ATTACH AN INTERESTS SECTION COMPRISING THREE DIPLOMATS (THE SENIOR TO BE SECOND SECRETARY) AND TWO ADMINISTRATION STAFF. NO ARMED SERVICES ATTACHES, BUT COMMERCIAL AND CULTURAL SECTIONS UNAFFECTED.
(C) WE MAY FOLLOW THE SAME PATTERN.
(D) BRITISH COUNCIL TO BE CLOSED.
(E) I AM TO LEAVE IN 1Ø DAYS (THOUGH HE AGREED I COULD STICK TO MY EXISTING ARRANGMENTS TO FLY HOME ON 12 DEC IF I WANTED). REMAINING STAFF - OTHER THAN THOSE SELECTED UNDER (B) -AND BRITISH COUNCIL PERSONNEL TO LEAVE IN 14 DAYS, I.E. BY 15 DEC.
(F) MY OFFICIAL CONTACTS FROM NOW ON ARE LIMITED TO HIMSELF.

3. WHEN ASKED TO CLARIFY 2(B) HE EXPLAINED THAT IRAQI COMMERCIAL AND CULTURAL ATTACHES IN LONDON WERE NOT MEMBERS OF THEIR FOREIGN SERVICE AND WAS UNABLE TO SAY WHAT THE EFFECT OF HIS GOVT'S DECISION WAS ON MY OWN COMMERCIAL SECTION. I SAID I WOULD REQUIRE CLARIFICATION IN THE LIGHT OF INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOU.

/4.

4. I POINTED OUT THE ILLOGICALITY OF EXPELLING THE BRITISH COUNCIL, PARTICULARLY SINCE IT WAS NOT PART OF OUR EMBASSY. I ALSO DREW HIS ATTENTION TO OUR ELTI EXPERT, WHOSE FUNDING WAS DEPENDENT ON THE BRITISH AMBASSADORS' SIGNATURE. HE TOOK NOTES.

5. I OBTAINED ASSURANCES ABOUT PROTECTION AND THE CONTINUATION OF PERSONAL PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES PENDING DEPARTURE. (THE HOSTILE DEMONSTRATION FORECAST FOR MIDDAY FAILED TO MATERIALIZE, BUT BAGHDAD RADIO HAS NOW ANNOUNCED A MAMMOTH ONE FOR 1500 HOURS WE HAVE OF COURSE BATTENED DOWN THE HATCHES)

6. BRITISH COMMUNITY WARDENS HAVE BEEN GIVEN NECESSARY WARNINGS.

BALFOUR PAUL

FCO/WH DISTRIBUTION

NED

THE TIMES

Cutting dated 1 DEC 1971. 19

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10
-1 DEC 1971
NEQ 3/548/1

Iraq breaks its links with Britain

Iraq decided last night to break off diplomatic relations with Britain and Iran because of yesterday's occupation by Iranian troops of islands in the Persian Gulf, according to a Baghdad radio broadcast heard in London.

The radio denounced the "flagrant aggression of Iran, in collusion with Britain" directed against the Greater and Lesser Tunb islands. Britain, it said, had guaranteed to preserve the "Arab character" of the islands.

Our Diplomatic Correspondent writes: The islands, in the Straits of Hormuz, have long been in dispute between Iran and Ras al-Khaimah, one of the seven Trucial Shaikhdoms. With British support Ras al-Khaimah maintained a small police force on Greater Tunb.

According to a Government spokesman in Teheran, the local police opened fire on Iranian troops who landed on Greater Tunb early yesterday. They killed an Iranian naval officer, a sergeant and a soldier and wounded another soldier. The Iranians fired back killing four island policemen and injuring five other people.

Iran has thus in the end settled her claim by force just before Britain's treaties of protection with the Trucial Shaikhdoms were due to end with the formation tomorrow of the Union of Arab Emirates by six of the Shaikhdoms. Technically, therefore, Britain was still responsible for the defence of Greater Tunb at the time of the landing.

The loss of life was deeply regretted by a Foreign Office spokesman yesterday, but it is fair to say that Shaikh Sakr, the Ruler of Ras-al-Khaimah, has only himself to blame. He had declined many opportunities to settle the dispute on much the same lines as the settlement announced on Monday between Iran and Sharjah over the island of Abu Musa.

He had also been repeatedly warned by Sir William Luce, Britain's special adviser for policy in the Gulf, that Iran would seize the islands if no settlement was reached; and he had been told that the British Government would terminate the treaty of protection with Ras al-Khaimah today.

Nothing is being said for the present of further British contacts with the Ruler. A spokesman in London said, however, that the British Government could hardly be expected to exercise their treaty responsibilities on their final day.

IMMEDIATE

PHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 301620Z

CONFIDENTIAL DESKBY 010900Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 1195 OF 30/11 INFO IMMEDIATE BAHRAIN RES., DUBAI, KUWAIT, TEHERAN. JEDDA. CAIRO, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK AND PRIORITY ABU DHABI, DOHA, BAHRAIN EMB., MUSCAT, BEIRUT, TRIPOLI, ALGIERS.

DESKBY 010900Z FCO.

DESKBY FIRST CONTACT 1/12 BAHRAIN RES., DUBAI, KUWAIT, TEHERAN, JEDDA, CAIRO, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK.

GULF ISLANDS.

1. I WAS SUMMONED THIS AFTERNOON BY THE UNDER SECRETARY. HE SAID:

(A) THE SURRENDER OF HALF ABU MOUSA TO THE IRANIANS, AS ANNOUNCED BY SHAIKH KAALID ON 28 NOVEMBER, WAS REJECTED BY THE IRAQ GOVT AS TOTALLY ILLEGAL IN THE LIGHT OF THE 1892 AGREEMENT, UNDER WHICH THE RULER BOUND HIMSELF NOT TO CEDE TERRITORY EXCEPT TO BRITAIN.

(B) THE OCCUPATION OF THE TUNBS BY IRAN, AS ANNOUNCED BY THE IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER THIS MORNING IN PARLIAMENT, WAS BAREFACED AGGRESSION. BRITAIN, WHICH WAS STILL LEGALLY RESPONSIBLE FORTHEIR PROTECTION, HAD BETRAYED THE ARABS ONCE AGAIN.

2. HE REQUESTED ME TO CONVEY TO YOU HIS GOVT'S REFUSAL TO ACCEPT EITHER DEVELOPMENT AND ITS STRONG PROTEST AT THE MANNER IN WHICH HMG HAD ACTED OR FAILED TO ACT.

3. I SAID THAT IN VIEW OF THE WAY I HAD BEEN MISREPORTED IN THE IRAQI PRESS THE LAST TIME HE HAD CALLED ME IN ON THIS SUBJECT (SEE MY TELNO 1077), I PREFERRED NOT TO COMMENT, BEYOND REPEATING WHAT I HAD SAID LAST TIME I WOULD SIMPLY REPORT TO YOU WHAT HE HAD SAID.

4. HE

4. HE THEN HANDED ME TWO LONGISH NOTES IN ARABIC , WHICH (HE DECLARED) SIMPLY REPEATED WHAT HE HAD ALREADY SAID. ON CURSORY EXAMINATION THEY PROVED DISTINCTLY MORE INTEMPERATE, CHARGING US WITH YET ANOTHER PIECE OF IMPERIALIST PLOTTING AS BLACK AS THE BALFOUR DECLARATION. I TOLD HIM I COULD NEITHER ACCEPT THEIR REASONING NOR ASSURE HIM THAT I WOULD NOT BE OBLIGED, AFTER STUDYING THEM FURTHER, TO SEND THEM BACK.

5. THOUGH THERE IS NO MENTION OF THIS IN THE NOTE JAMALI SAID HIS GOVT WOULD ''PROBABLY'' TAKE BOTH ISSUES TO THE UN OR THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THEY HAD NOT YET DECIDED WHETHER OR IN WHAT FORM TO PROTEST TO THE IRANIANS. THE HELD HMG RESPONSIBLE, IN PARTICULAR TO COUNTER IRANIAN OCCUPATION OF THE TUNBS.

6. TRANSLATION OF NOTES WILL FOLLOW.

7. IT IS OF SOME INTEREST THAT IN TODAY'S BAGHDAD PAPERS THE ATTITUDE ON ABU MOUSA IS THAT THE RULER'S SURRENDER OF HALF THE ISLAND IS ''UNILATERAL'' (I.E. NOT AGREED BY OTHER ARAB GOVTS.) AND IT IS ON THIS COUNT THAT IRAQ HAS DEMANDED THE TABLING OF THE MATTER AT THE CURRENT MEETING OF DEFENCE MINISTERS.

BALFOUR PAUL

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
ARAB D
N EAST D
N AFR D
DEF D
OIL D
UND
UN ODA
NEWS D
MOD INTERNAL

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
U A E

FFFFF

NEQ 3/54/1
56

TOP COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

FLASH
CYPHER/CAT A

FM F C O 011030Z

CONFIDENTIAL.
TO FLASH STOCKHOLM TELNO 197 OF 1 DECEMBER INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK.

BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NO 1196 (WHICH WE ARE REPEATING TO THE RECIPIENTS OF THIS TELEGRAM).

1. GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD ASK THE SWEDES URGENTLY, BUT INFORMALLY AT THIS STAGE, WHETHER THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO ACT AS OUR PROTECTING POWER IN BAGHDAD IF RELATIONS ARE IN FACT BROKEN. IN PUTTING THIS TO THEM, YOU COULD THANK THEM ONCE AGAIN FOR THE EXCELLENT JOB THEY DID IN 1967-68.

2. GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD REPLY BY IMMEDIATE TELEGRAM OR TELEPHONE.

3. GRATEFUL IF BAGHDAD WOULD REPEAT ALL FUTURE TELEGRAMS ON THIS SUBJECT TO STOCKHOLM.

DOUGLAS-HOME

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
NED
WED
ARABIAN DEPT:
NEWS DEPT:
POD
PPD

CONFIDENTIAL

57

TOP COPY

FLASH CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A

FM F C O Ø1175ØZ

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FLASH STOCKHOLM TELNO 199 OF 1 DECEMBER INFO IMMEDIATE

56 BAGHDAD TEHRAN BEIRUT WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK. 54

FCO TELNO 197 TO YOU AND BAGHDAD TELNO 1202: SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS.

1. GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD NOW ASK THE SWEDES FORMALLY WHETHER THEY WOULD AGREE TO ACT AS OUR PROTECTING POWER. DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS WILL HAVE TO BE MADE LATER WHEN WE HAVE WORKED OUT ANSWERS TO THE POINTS RAISED IN BAGHDAD TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE.

DOUGLAS-HOME

NNNN

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:

NED
PROT & CONF DEPT
PERS OPS DEPT
SECURITY DEPT
CRD
COMMS DEPT
ASD
NEWS DEPT
OIL DEPT
WED
RES DEPT (W EUR SEC)

&&&& CONFIDENTIAL

TOP COPY

58

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
- 2 DEC 1971
NEQ 8/548/1

FLASH
CYPHER CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

FM STOCKHOLM 012010Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FLASH F C O TELNO 361 OF 1 DECEMBER INFO FLASH BAGHDAD
AND IMMEDIATE TEHRAN BEIRUT WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

57

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 199. : SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS .

1. AS ALREADY REPORTED BY HEAD OF CHANCERY TO RESIDENT CLERK THE SWEDES HAVE AGREED TO ACT AS OUR PROTECTING POWER IN IRAQ. THEY WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR URGENT INFORMATION ABOUT THE SIZE AND NATURE OF THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION WE SHALL BE LEAVING IN BAGHDAD. WILL THEY REMAIN IN THE CHANCERY OFFICES OR BE BROUGHT UNDER THE UMBRELLA OF THE SWEDISH EMBASSY ?

2. SWEDISH EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD WILL BE INFORMED AT APPROXIMATELY 1000 A.M. BAGHDAD TIME TOMORROW 2 DECEMBER OF SWEDISH PROTECTION OF UK INTERESTS.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

MILLARD

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N EAST D
PROT & CONF D
PERSONNEL OPS D
PERSONNEL SERVICES D
SECURITY D
CRD
COMMUNICATIONS D
DWS
A & S D
ARAB D
OIL D
WED
N AFR D
CONSULAR D
CONS EMERG UNIT
NEWS D
RESEARCH D (W E SECT)

CONFIDENTIAL

NEQ 3/5481

58 A

IMMEDIATE
CYPHER/CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP COPY

FM FCO 011750Z

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 020400Z

TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NUMBER 1271 OF 1 DECEMBER INFO IMMEDIATE STOCKHOLM, TEHRAN, BEIRUT, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 1202. SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS.

1. WE WOULD SEE ADVANTAGE IN RETAINING A PRESENCE IN BAGHDAD ALONG THE LINES INDICATED BY THE DG OF PROTOCOL.

2. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD OBTAIN CLARIFICATION OF THE FOLLOWING POINTS FROM THE IRAQIS:
(A) WE WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO THE IRAQIS RETAINING THREE DIPLOMATS, TWO ADMINISTRATION STAFF PLUS THEIR COMMERCIAL AND CULTURAL SECTIONS IN LONDON, PROVIDED WE CAN DO THE SAME IN BAGHDAD. ARE THE IRAQIS THEREFORE PREPARED TO ALLOW OUR COMMERCIAL SECTION AND BRITISH COUNCIL STAFF TO REMAIN IN BAGHDAD?
(B) WE TAKE IT THAT THE IRAQIS REMAINING IN LONDON WILL BE OPERATING FROM THE IRAQ EMBASSY AND NOT (NOT) FROM THE AFGHAN EMBASSY IN LONDON. IF SO, THOSE OF OUR STAFF WHO REMAIN IN BAGHDAD CAN, WE PRESUME, CONTINUE TO OPERATE FROM THE CHANCERY BUILDING. WE ALSO ASSUME THAT, ON THE BASIS OF RECIPROCITY, THE IRAQI STAFF IN LONDON AND BRITISH STAFF IN BAGHDAD WILL ENJOY DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND PROTECTION AS THEY WILL BE OPERATING UNDER AFGHAN/SWEDISH PROTECTION (SUBJECT TO CONFIRMATION FROM STOCKHOLM).
(C) WE SHOULD ALSO LIKE TO KNOW WHETHER WE MAY RETAIN ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS SECURE COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES.

3. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR VIEWS ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS:
(I) THE STRUCTURE AND STAFFING OF THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION: WHO SHOULD REMAIN IN BAGHDAD?
(II) SHOULD THE COMMERCIAL OFFICE IN THE SOUK BE CLOSED AND ALL RESIDUAL STAFF OPERATE FROM CHANCERY?

pmk 9/12

(III) WHAT ARE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS ABOUT THE RETENTION OR RELINQUISHMENT OF OUR PROPERTY (INCLUDING PLANS FOR THE NEW RESIDENCE)?
(IV) HAVE YOU ANY COMMENTS ON THE POSITION OF THE IPC? ARE THE IRAQIS LIKELY TO TAKE ACTIONS AGAINST THEM? WE ARE IN TOUCH WITH THEM HERE. THEY HAVE INDICATED THAT IF THEY ARE NO LONGER ABLE TO USE OUR TELEGRAPH SYSTEM, THEY WOULD PROBABLY PREFER TO COMMUNICATE WITH MILNE VIA THE DUTCH RATHER THAN VIA THE SWEDES.

4. WE SPOKE TO THE IRAQ CHARGE D' AFFAIRES HERE (DAUD DID NOT (NOT) ARRIVE THIS AFTERNOON) AND GAVE HIM THE GIST OF PARAS 2(A),(B),(C) AND (E) OF YOUR TEL UNDER REFERENCE. HE CLAIMED TO HAVE HEARD NOTHING FROM BAGHDAD ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES FOR HIS STAFF OF SEVERANCE, AND WE BELIEVE THIS IS TRUE.

DOUGLAS-HOME

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:

NED
PROT & CONF DEPT
PERS OPS DEPT
SECURITY DEPT
CRD
COMMS DEPT
ASD
NEWS DEPT
OIL DEPT
WED
RES DEPT (W EUR SEC)

&&&&

59

IMMEDIATE
CIPHER CAT A
FM BAGHDAD Ø2Ø52ØZ
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP COPY

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
- 3 DEC 1971
NEQ 3/548/1

TO IMMEDIATE F.C.O. TELNO. 1203 OF 2/12.

MY TELNO 1202: SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS.

PROTOCOL RANG LAST NIGHT TO SAY CLOSURE OF BRITISH COUNCIL HAD BEEN CANCELLED. DO YOU OR COUNCIL HQ AGREE TO ITS STAFF REMAINING? THEY THEMSELVES ALL WANT TO. SINCE IRAQI'S HAVE 3 CULTURAL ATTACHES IN LONDON (WHOM THEY WISH TO STAY) I COULD DEMAND THAT SPRINGFORD AND HIS TWO BRITISH ASSISTANTS BE GIVEN DIPLOMATIC STATUS WITHIN OUR INTERESTS SECTION, IF YOU CONSIDER SUCH PROTECTION NOW NECESSARY. SPRINGFORD WOULD PREFER TO CONTINUE ON PRESENT INDEPENDENT BASIS. I THINKHE IS RIGHT.

2. PROTOCOL ALSO SAID THEY WANTED ENGLISH LANGUAGE TEACHING INSTITUTE TO GO AHEAD AND SHAW (ITS BRITISH EXPERT) TO REMAIN. SHAW WANTS TO DO SO AND HAS POINTED OUT THAT HE IS CONTRACTED TO IRAQI MINISTRY OF EDUCATION. AS FOR FUNDING, I HAVE ALREADY AGREED TO FIRST YEAR ALLOCATION OF ID 4,2ØØ TO CURRENT ACCOUNT. WHAT HAPPENS WHEN THIS IS EXHAUSTED CAN BE DECIDED LATER.

BALFOUR PAUL

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

NED
ARAB D
POD
POD (WELFARE)
CRD
PSD
P & C D
OIL D
N AFR D
A & S D
SECURITY D
CONS D
CONS EMERGENCY UNIT
NEWS D
FINANCE D

CONFIDENTIAL

60

TOP COPY

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 -3 DEC 1971
NEQ 3/548/1

IMMEDIATE
CYPHER CAT A
FM BAGHDAD 020655Z
CONFIDENTIAL
TO IMMEDIATE F.C.O. TELNO. 1204 OF 2/12 INFO IMMEDIATE STOCKHOLM, TEHRAN, BEIRUT, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 1271: SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS.

1. PROTOCOL CONFIRMED LAST NIGHT THAT PRESENT EMBASSY OFFICES MAY CONTINUE TO BE USED BY INTERESTS SECTION UNDER FLAG OF PROTECTING POWER.

2. COMPOSITION OF INTERESTS SECTION WILL THEREFORE DEPEND ON WHETHER DWS COMMUNICATIONS ARE MAINTAINED (SEE PARAGRAPH 6) AND IF SO WHAT PROTECTION FOR THIS YOU WOULD DEEM NECESSARY IN TERMS OF MANPOWER.

3. IF DWS CLOSE DOWN, I RECOMMEND COMPOSITION OF INTERESTS SECTION SHOULD BE:

(A) DIPLOMATS.

(1) V1) SECOND SECRETARY LEWTY (WHOSE WIFE IS CLEARED AS CONFIDENTIAL SECRETARY).
(2) CONSULAR ATTACHE RAE.
(3) ADMINISTRATION OFFICER VOYSEY WITH ATTACHE STATUS.

(B) NON DIPLOMATS

(A) SMITH (WHOSE WIFE IS ONE OF OUR CONFIDENTIAL SECRETARIES) AS ASSISTANT AO AND ARCHIVIST.
(2) ONE OF OUR SECURITY OFFICERS (HARRIS OR VALENTINE) UNLESS VISA SECTION PROVES TO NEED SOMEONE IN ADDITION TO RAE. THIS DEPENDS ON ANSWER AWAITED FROM PROTOCOL ABOUT RETENTION OF LOCAL STAFF.

4. IF DWS REMAINS IN OPERATION, ABOVE COMPOSITION WOULD HAVE TO BE AMENDED TO MAKE WAY FOR CBO MANSFIELD AS ONE OF THREE PERMITTED DIPLOMATS. IF NO POLITICAL COVERAGE IS NEEDED, LEWTY COULD PERHAPS BE STOOD DOWN. ALTERNATIVELY, VOYSEY WOULD HAVE TO DO WITHOUT MUCH-NEEDED DIPLOMATIC /STATUS.

STATUS. IF TWO SECURITY OFFICERS WERE DEEMED NECESSARY, SMITH WOULD HAVE TO BE DROPPED. BUT EITHER LEWTY OR SMITH APPEAR ESSENTIAL BECAUSE OF THEIR SECRETARIAL WIVES.

5. PARAGRAPHS 3 AND 4 ABOVE BOTH EXCLUDE COMMERCIAL SECTION SINCE IRAQIS HAVE SAID THEY WANT THEIR OWN COMMERCIAL SECTION TO CONTINUE UNAFFECTED. THEIR LIST SHOWS ONLY ONE COMMERCIAL ATTACHE BUT I PRESUME I SHOULD PRESS FOR THE RETENTION OF AT LEAST SECOND SECRETARY CARTWRIGHT AND THIRD SECRETARY WRIGHT. IF AS WE WOULD RECOMMEND, FIRST SECRETARY HAMILTON (WHO LEAVES LATER THIS MONTH) IS STILL TO BE REPLACED BY DTI OFFICER OF EQUIVALENT GRADE, LATTER WOULD HAVE TO ACCEPT THAT HE WOULD BE ONLY IN CHARGE OF COMMERCIAL OFFICE. PENDING YOUR INSTRUCTION, I AM TRYING TO CLEAR RETENTION OF ALL THREE OFFICERS IN PRINCIPLE WITH PROTOCOL, AS WELL AS LOCAL COMMERCIAL STAFF. FINAL VIEWS ON YOUR PARAGRAPH 3 (II) WILL DEPEND ON OUTCOME, BUT PROVISIONALLY I RECOMMEND RETAINING COMMERCIAL OFFICE IN SOUK.

6. ON PROS AND CONS OF RETAINING DWS MY VIEWS DEPEND ON:

(A) WHAT PROTECTION IN TERMS OF MANPOWER YOU JUDGE ESSENTIAL. THIS ASSUMES THAT IRAQIS WILL NOT AGREE TO ADDITIONAL NON-DIPLOMATIC STAFF, ON WHICH I AM CHECKING.

(B) WHAT ALTERNATIVE FACILITIES FOR IPC THE DUTCH OR POSSIBLY THE SWEDES COULD OFFER. DISCREET ENQUIRIES ARE UNDER WAY.

(C) VIEWS OF MILNE OF IPC. HE IS COMING TO DISCUSS IN A FEW MINUTES.

7. ANSWERS YOUR PARAGRAPH 2 AS FOLLOWS:

(A) ON BRITISH COUNCIL SEE MY TELEGRAM NO 1203. ON COMMERCIAL SECTION SEE PARAGRAPH 5 ABOVE.

(B) SUBJECT TO CONFIRMATION FROM PROTOCAL ON THE FIRST SENTENCE, ANSWER IS AFFIRMATIVE THROUGHOUT.

/8.

8. I WILL REPLY TO UNANSWERED QUERIES IN YOU PARAGRAPH 3 SEPARATELY.

BALFOUR PAUL

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
NED
P & CD
POD
PSD
SECURITY D
CRD
COMMS D
DWS
A & SD
OIL D
WED
RESEARCH D (W E SECTION)

V

FCO 500 E 810/2
LKS 105/82

00 DEFCOMCEN

RR BEIRUT

GR 276

CYPHER CAT A
FM BAGHDAD 020725Z
RESTRICTED

FXA 020725Z DEC 71.

FOR MODUK IMMEDIATE INFO ROUTINE JSBC CYPRUS AND BEIRUT.
DEFCOMMCEN PASS TO JSBC CYPRUS.

FOR SAAS FROM DEFAT. BREAK OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.
PROPOSE FOLLOWING ACTION FOR WITHDRAWAL OF SERVICE ATTACHE
STAFF.

1. ASSUMPTIONS:
(A) THAT ATTACHE TRANSPORT WHICH ARE ALL BOYCOTT AFFECTED AND
UNSALEABLE HERE SHOULD MOVE TO BEIRUT FOR SUBSEQUENT DISPOSAL
IN ACCORDANCE YOUR FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS.
(B) THAT PASSAGE THROUGH SYRIA WILL BE PERMITTED.
(C) THAT WITHDRAWAL MUST BE COMPLETE BY 15 DECEMBER.

2. STAFF WILL DRIVE TO BEIRUT AS FOLLOWS WITH PLANNED
EMBASSY CONVOY:
(A) COL HARROD IN VEHICLE [illegible].
(B) WG CDR WILLS IN VEHICLE [illegible].
(C) MAJOR HAY IN VEHICLE [illegible].

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10
-3 DEC 1971
NEQ 3/548/1

0853

61

DISTRIBUTED TO
SENT M.O.D. 24
HD. OF DEFENCE DEPT.
HD. OF P.U.S.D.
P.U.S.D.
PERSONNEL OPS. DEPT.
HD. OF COMMNS. DEPT.
EXAMINERS
FILE R K 129

Hd. NED

1. ASSUMPTIONS:
(A) THAT ATTACHE TRANSPORT WHICH ARE ALL BOYCOTT AFFECTED AND UNSALEABLE HERE SHOULD MOVE TO BEIRUT FOR SUBSEQUENT DISPOSAL IN ACCORDANCE YOUR FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS,
(B) THAT PASSAGE THROUGH SYRIA WILL BE PERMITTED,
(C) THAT WITHDRAWAL MUST BE COMPLETE BY 15 DECEMBER.

2. STAFF WILL DRIVE TO BEIRUT AS FOLLOWS WITH PLANNED EMBASSY CONVOY:
(A) COL HARROD IN VEHICLE 08FJ38.
(B) WG CDR WILLS IN VEHICLE 33AM32.
(C) MAJOR HAY IN VEHICLE 56FG66.
(D) WOII BASSOM IN VEHICLE 32FJ71.
(E) SGT MCNAUGHTON IN VEHICLE 32FJ71.
(F) SGT CLARKIN IN VEHICLE 96AA83.
AND WILL THEN FLY TO CYPRUS FOR ONWARD MOVE BY RAF.

3. THIS IS NOT A SUITABLE JOURNEY FOR WIVES AND SMALL CHILDREN AND FOLLOWING FAMILIES SHOULD MOVE BOAC FLT 203 ON 12 DECEMBER, MRS HARROD AND MISS DIXON, MRS WILLS, MRS BASSOM PLUS M8 M6, MRS MCNAUGHTON PLUS M2, MRS CLARKIN PLUS M5 F2.

4. AIR FREIGHT. YOU WILL APPRECIATE THAT SUDDEN MOVE LIKE THIS WILL CAUSE MAJOR UPHEAVAL. PROPOSE THEREFORE THAT YOU AUTHORISE EACH HUSBAND 300 LBS EXCESS BAGGAGE BEIRUT - CYPRUS AND THEN SUBSEQUENTLY BY RAF TO UK.

5. SUBJECT YOU AGREEMENT AM GRANTING SIX WEEKS COMBINED DISEMBARKATION AND PRIVILEGE LEAVE TO ALL CONCERNED. LEAVE ADDRESSESS AND WARRANT REQUIREMENTS WILL BE NOTIFIED SEPERATELY. OFFICERS WILL OF COURSE BE AVAILABLE FOR DEBRIEFING AS REQUIRED.

6. FURTHER ACTION. PLEASE ARRANGE CANCELLATION OF ALL SCHOOL CHILDRENS VISITS. REQUESTS FOR PERSONAL MESSAGES FOLLOW.

7. GRATEFUL YOUR AGREEMENT THESE PROPOSED MEASURES SOONEST.

BALFOUR PAUL

NNNN

62

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP COPY

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 020710Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE F.C.O. TELNO. 1205 OF 2/12 INFO PRIORITY TEHRAN, KUWAIT AND BEIRUT.

RECEIVED
REGISTRY No. 10
- 2 DEC 1971

MIPT (NOT TO KUWAIT): SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS - NUTS AND BOLTS. G1

1. GRATEFUL FOR EARLY INSTRUCTIONS ON FOLLOWING POINTS:

A. DISPOSAL OF EMBASSY TRANSPORT WHICH CANNOT BE SOLD LOCALLY OWING TO BOYCOTT RULES, I.E. DAIMLER, ZEPHYR AND 2 LANDROVERS ON CHANCERY CHARGE.

B. SHOULD COOK OF DOE PROCEED TO UK OR BE RE-LOCATED ELSWHERE IN AREA, EG KUWAIT OR TEHRAN. HE HAS ALREADY PUT ENQUIRY TO HIS AREA OFFICE IN TEHRAN.

C. IN CASE OF STAFF WISHING (OR COMPELLED BY DIFFICULTIES OF QUICK SALE) TO TAKE THEIR CARS, CAN THEY BE SHIPPED FROM BEIRUT AT PUBLIC EXPENSE? AND WOULD BEIRUT CONFIRM READINESS TO HELP ON THIS? WE HAVE ASKED SYRIAN CHARGE ABOUT VISAS FOR THOSE TRANSITTING TO BEIRUT AND ARE AWAITING RESPONSE

D. IS CURRENT TA PROGRAMME TO CONTINUE? BRITISH COUNCIL WOULD BE PROCESSING AND DESPATCHING ABOUT 6 BENEFICARIES NEXT WEEK.

E. FOR THOSE LEAVING BY AIR, WHAT WILL BE MAXIMUM AIR FREIGHT ALLOWANCE?

2. I AM CHECKING TODAY WHETHER QM WILL BE ADMITTED THIS WEEK AND NEXT AND WILL REPORT SOONEST. WE WANT HIM IF POSSIBLE.

IMMEDIATE

EN CLAIR

FM BEIRUT 021405Z

UNCLASS

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
-3 DEC 1971

NEQ 3/54/1

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 563 DATED 2/12/71 INFO IMMEDIATE TO BAGHDAD

BAGHDAD TEL NO 1205 : /SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS - NUTS AND BOLTS/

1. PARA 1. C. COUNT ON US FOR THIS AND ANY OTHER HELP WE CAN GIVE

2. PARA 3. C AND D. NOTED

WRIGHT

F I L E S

NED
POD
POD (WELFARE SECT)
PSD
A & TD
MR PARSONS

NNNNN

CONFIDENTIAL



Mr Parsons

12.

SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS WITH IRAQ

1. As instructed at your meeting this afternoon, I telephoned the Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires. He gave a very convincing show of not having received any instructions whatsoever from Baghdad about the break of relations decided on by his Government.

2. I then summarised for him Sub-paragraphs (a), (b), (c)
A and (e) of Paragraph 2 of Baghdad telegram No 1202. When he suggested that as Head of Mission he should leave in ten days' time, I said I though this would be appropriate, though Mr Balfour Paul would not be flying home until 12 December.

3. He asked whether Administrative Staff working for Iraqi Service Attachés might be included in the two administrative officials to be attached to the Interests Section. I said I thought this would be inappropriate, but in the last resort it was for his Government to decide what particular interests their residual section should serve. In reply to his question, I said that I thought that the Iraqi Military and Air Attachés should leave this country by 15 December.

4. He then asked me whether it was HMG's wish that the Iraq Embassy here should be reduced to the pattern set out in Paragraph 2(b) of Baghdad telegram No 1202. I said that this pattern, and indeed the whole proposal to break relations, emanated from his Government. We much regretted the Iraqi decision to break relations, since we saw no need for it. If the Iraqis were determined to go ahead, we had no option but to ask them formally to reduce their Embassy as they had proposed, on the basis of reciprocity.

5. He asked whether I would put this message in writing, but I said he could take my telephone call as a formal communication. Our Ambassador in Baghdad would be seeking clarification of certain points from the Iraq Foreign Ministry, and if there was any need, I would get in touch with him again, either orally or in writing. He asked me several times to let him know if I heard anything more from Baghdad.

6. Mr Hancock of Century House rang a few minutes later to inform me that the Iraq Embassy here were completely without instructions about the severance of relations. They were planning to move their Defence Attachés to Brussels. Their Commercial and Cultural Sections were quite large, and the latter contained several important Baathists.

1 December 1971

S L Egerton
Near Eastern Department

Copies: Mr Evans Miss Beckett
Mr Acland Mr Stow Miss Dooley

NOTE TO PRESS OFFICERS

GULF DEVELOPMENT

The following may be used this afternoon with correspondents on recent developments in the Gulf area.

IRAQ

We may confirm on the record that Mr Glen Balfour Paul HM Ambassador Baghdad, was called in by the Director-General of Protocol at the Iraq Ministry of Foreign Affairs this morning and informed that Iraq was severing diplomatic relations with Britain. As an on-the-record reaction to this news you may say:

"HMG regrets that the Iraq Government has decided to sever relations over this matter. We do not consider this action to be justified."

Also on the record you may make the following points:

(a) The Embassy have been given 14 days to evacuate.

(b) When handed a note during his meeting with the Director-General of Protocol which included similar allegations of collusion with the Iranians to those carried on Baghdad radio, HM Ambassador refused to accept it.

(c) The refusal to accept this note amounts to a rejection of the allegation of collusion contained in it.

Unattributably you may say that the Iraq Government proposes to attach an interests section to another Embassy in London and has invited Britain to do the same in Baghdad. This means that there will be a residual representation for each country in each other's capital but we are not in a position yet to indicate what size that representation will be.

You may also confirm that the Iraq Ambassador-designate to Britain, Mr Mahmoud Ali Daoud, was due to arrive in Britain this afternoon. We do not at this stage know whether he is on the aeroplane he was scheduled to arrive upon.

If correspondents ask whether the Iraq action came as a surprise to us you may say unattributably that the Iraq Government's action was not a complete surprise, as they have employed the device of breaking diplomatic relations before. (You may recall that relations were broken on 8 June 1967 during the June was and re-established on 1 May 1968.)

More generally you may point out unattributably that our own view on ruptures of diplomatic relations is well-known. HMG believe that regardless of differences of opinion it is important that Governments should maintain diplomatic contact with each other. Indeed it can be argued that this contact is even more valuable at times of disagreement than when views are in harmony.

BRITISH INTERESTS IN IRAQ

It would be wrong for people to assume at this stage that British interests in Iraq will necessarily be adversely affected by the rupture of diplomatic relations. You can point out to correspondents that unlike the last occasion on which the Iraq Government severed relations, they have indicated that they wish to maintain an interests section in London and have invited us to do the same. These interests sections would possibly be able to maintain consular and commercial functions at more or less their present level (although it is important to emphasise that technically the functions would be carried out in the name of the countries looking after British and Iraqi interests). There are approximately 1000 people in Iraq, British, Commonwealth and others, for whom we have consular responsibility. Our principal commercial interest is of course the Iraq Petroleum Company and its subsidiaries, which have a substantial investment in the oil industry both in the south of Iraq and in the north around Kirkuk and Mosul. It has not been suggested by the Iraq Government that the operations of IPC will be affected by the deterioration in relations between our two countries.

/...

LOWER GULF

At the 12.30 conference this morning I made several points on the record:

(a) The Secretary of State ~~hopes~~ plans to make a statement on the Gulf in the House of Commons in the next few days; he hopes to make it tomorrow.

(b) HMG have now received a communication from the Ruler of Ras-al-Khaimah ~~which protested~~ protesting at the Iranian action in occupying the Tunbs.

(c) I gave an outline of the proposed arrangements for the termination of the special treaty relationship with the seven Trucial States (given below) but pointed out that in view of the uncertain situation in the area at the moment I could not guarantee that everything would go exactly according to plan. (The proposed arrangements are that Sir Geoffrey Arthur, HM Political Resident, should today visit each ruler in turn in their capitals to terminate the existing treaty relationships ~~with each~~. After the establishment tomorrow of the UAE in Dubai, HM Political Resident would sign a Treaty of Friendship with the UAE similar to those signed with Bahrain and Qatar.)

(d) In answer to a question I made it clear that no new treaty would be signed with Ras-al-Khaimah, pointing out that it was HMG's hope that Ras-al-Khaimah would at a future date join the UAE (and would as a result of that enter into a new treaty relationship with HMG).

If asked about disturbances in the northern Trucial States you may confirm that we have received reports from our representatives in the area stating that there has been some civil disturbance in Ras-al-Khaimah and elsewhere; ~~but~~ there has been no reported injury to British subjects, ~~and~~ although ~~that~~ there has been some damage to property.

NEWS, FCO.

J.W.
1.12.71

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
DEC 1971
NEQ 3/548/1

Mr. Egerton
Miss Rectée.

Copy to each

65

R.E.

7.12.

Mr Aspin (Personnel Policy Department, CG 204)

Mr Day (Personnel Operations Department, CG 015)

Mr Youde (Personnel Services Department, CG 008)

Mr Evans (Near Eastern Department, W 94)

BREAK OF DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR RELATIONS WITH IRAQ

1. According to our information there are some 800 British subjects in Iraq (not subject to UK immigration control). About two-thirds of this total live in the Baghdad area and the majority are concerned with business of one sort or another.

2. If, as I understand, we may be allowed to leave residual staff in Baghdad, to assist the Swedes in their duties as protecting power, I would hope very much that it might be possible for one of the remaining officers to be someone with consular as well as commercial experience.

Grace Thornton →

Dr Grace Thornton
Consular Department
CL 601 MA 366

2 December 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference PC 19/359/1

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10
-3 DEC 1971
NEQ 3/568/1

66

Mr Egerton (Near Eastern Dept)

c c Mr Reddaway
Mr Goulden (Planning Staff)

SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS WITH IRAQ

1. I have now seen a copy of your minute to Mr Parkinson of 1 December and also a minute by Miss Dooley recording what was said, so far as the British Council is concerned, at your meeting yesterday.

2. I fully agree that an attempt should be made to persuade the Iraqis to let the British Council remain at full strength and that we should try so to maintain it there, provided local conditions permit.

3. But if the Iraqis prove unco-operative and will not permit more than one member of the staff to remain as a quid pro quo for their Cultural Attaché here (the British Council Representative in Baghdad does not of course at present enjoy diplomatic status), I do not feel that we should attach too much importance to our cultural role. It may be that ideally our cultural and educational contacts with Iraq are important but they can only be effective if conditions permit them to be developed uninterruptedly over a long period. Earlier, when after the return of the Embassy following the last break in diplomatic relations it was urged that the Council should expand their effort in Iraq, I pointed out on advice from the Council here that conditions in Iraq were not conducive to their activities; on account of the nature of the regime many of the Iraqis with whom the Council Representative would like to have established contact (and with whom to be effective he should have established contact) appeared reluctant to have any dealings with something which, at a sudden whim of the regime, could be used as a pretext against them. This was really not the sort of climate in which the British Council can be regarded as an effective ~~institution~~ instrument of long-term British policy. Now we have another break in relations which may well prove to put the Council back to square one again - six months is quite long enough to do this. While, therefore, suspending judgement for the moment, I do not think that we should delude ourselves about the value in Iraq of Council operations under the conditions which have prevailed over the last few years. Until the psychology of the present regime changes, or a new and more sensible regime succeeds it, the plain fact is that, however much we should like to develop cultural and educational links with the Iraqis, the circumstances are not propitious for

DD 896639 140609 500M 7/71 GM 3643/2

doing so. As there are other countries in the world where a need for such links is just as great but where the circumstances for cultivating them are more propitious and where there are greater guarantees for uninterrupted long-term action, shall we be justified in spending on Iraq money which could be more profitably spent elsewhere? This is, I know, a view which the Council themselves would endorse.

C C B Stewart
Cultural Relations Department

2 December 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

67

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER CAT A

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
-3 DEC 1971
NEQ 3/5481

TOP COPY

FM STOCKHOLM Ø2Ø93ØZ

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 362 OF 2 DECEMBER INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD INFO PRIORITY TEHRAN BEIRUT WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

58

MY TELEGRAM NO 361: SEVERANCE RELATIONS.

1. ACTING POLITICAL DIRECTOR HAS NOW TELEPHONED ME TO SAY THAT ON CONSULTING THEIR FILES THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS HAVE REALIZED THAT ASSUMPTION OF THE PROTECTION OF INTERESTS BY SWEDEN REQUIRES THE CONCURRENCE OF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT. UNTIL THIS HAS BEEN OBTAINED THE SWEDES CANNOT ISSUE A PRESS RELEASE AS THEY WOULD WISH TO DO, ANNOUNCING THAT THEY HAVE AGREED TO ACT AS PROTECTING POWER.

2. INSTRUCTIONS ARE BEING SENT TO THE SWEDISH EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD URGENTLY TO SEEK THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT'S CONCURRENCE. THE SWEDISH MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS WILL LET US KNOW AS SOON AS THE REPLY IS RECEIVED BUT THERE MAY BE SOME DELAY OWING TO COMMUNICATIONS DIFFICULTIES.

MILLARD

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

NED	N AFR D
ARAB D	NEWS D
POD	A & SD
POD (WELFARE SECT)	SEC D
PSD	CONS D
OIL D	CONS EMER UNIT

CONFIDENTIAL

FFFFF

pm 6/12

DEPARTMENT [redacted]

reach addressee(s) Desk by 0700 (Baghdad time) 2 Dec

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	PRIORITY MARKINGS
~~Top Secret~~ ~~Secret~~ ~~Confidential~~ Restricted ~~Unclassified~~	~~Flash~~ Immediate * ~~Priority~~ ~~Routine~~

PRIVACY MARKING
In Confidence
En Clair. *Code* *Cypher*

Draft Telegram to:—
Baghdad

No. .....

(Date) .....

And to:—

Repeat to:—
Immediate
Stockholm
Tehran
Beirut
Washington
UKMIS New York

Saving to:—

Distribution:—
Departmental
NED P&CD POD PSD
Security D CRD
Communications D
A&SD
News Dept Oil D
~~Mr Goldsmith~~
WED
Mr Parsons
Mr Le Quesne
Mr Graham-Harrison.
Mr Evans
Mr Parsons

Despatched .....

(Date) .....

[*Security classification —if any*] CONFIDENTIAL

[*Privacy marking —if any*]

[*Codeword—if any*] .....

Addressed to BAGHDAD

telegram No. .....*(date)* .....

And to .....

repeated for information to IMMEDIATE: STOCKHOLM TEHRAN BEIRUT WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK

Saving to .....

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 1202: SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS

1. We would see advantage in retaining a presence in Baghdad along the lines indicated by the DG of Protocol. ~~by Iraqi standards these proposals seem surprisingly mild.~~

2. We should be grateful if you could obtain clarificat of the following points from the Iraqis:

a) We would have no (no) objection to the Iraq retaining three diplomats, two administration staff plus their commercial and cultural sections in London, provide we can do the same in Baghdad. Are the Iraqis therefore prepared to allow our Commercial Section and British Coun staff to remain in Baghdad?

b) We take it that the Iraqis remaining in London will be operating from the Iraq Embassy and not (n from the Afghan Embassy in London. If so, those of our staff who remain in Baghdad can, we presume, continue to operate from the Chancery Building. We also assume that

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

on the basis of reciprocity, the Iraqi staff in London and British staff in Baghdad will enjoy diplomatic privileges and protection as they will be operating under Afghan/Swedish protection (subject to confirmation from Stockholm).

c) We should also like to know whether we may retain on a reciprocal basis secure communications facilities.

3. We should be grateful for your views on the following points:

i) The structure and staffing of the British interests Section: who should remain in Baghdad?

ii) Should the Commercial Office in the Souk be closed and all residual staff operate from Chancery?

iii) What are your recommendations about the retention or relinquishmnent of our property (including plans for the new Residence)?

iv) Have you any comments on the position of the IPC? Are the Iraqis likely to take action against them? We are in touch with them here. They have indicated that if they are no longer able to use our telegraph system, they would probably prefer to communicate with Milne via the Dutch rather than via the Swedes.

4. We spoke to the Iraq Chargé d'Affaires here (DAVID did not (not) arrive this afternoon) and gave him the gist of paras 2 (A), (B), (C) and (E) of your Tel under reference. He claimed to have heard nothing from Baghdad about the consequences for his staff of severance, and we believe this is true.

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS MARGIN
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

(10383 D&S9300) 154m (77 sets) 1/68 C.W.H.Ltd. (Cp.863

(69) Destroyed.
Duplicate of (72)

(68)

STOFCO ØØ4/Ø2
OO FCO
OO BAGHDAD
PP TEHRAN
PP BEIRUT
PP WASHINGTON
PP UKMIS NEW YORK

NO DISTRIBUTION
(Correction will be incorporated)

ADVANCE COPIES
PS
PS to Mr Goulden
PS to PUS
Mr. Le Quesne
Mr Parsons
Hd of D
Hd PUSD
Hd PSD
Hd PSD
Hd - NEWS D
Hd - WED

(10)

GPS 4Ø

FM STOCKHOLM Ø21Ø45Z

CYPHER CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 363
OF W2 DECEMBER INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD INFO PRIORITY TEHRAN
BEIRUT WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TEL NO 362: SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS

1. PLEASE AMEND LAST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 1 TO READ AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE UNTIL THIS HAS BEEN OBTAINED THE SWEDES CANNOT ISSUE A PRESS RELEASE AS THEY WOULD WISH TO DO ANNOUNCING THAT THEY HAVE AGREED TO ACT AS PROTECTING POWER. UNQUOTE.

2. ERROR REGRETTED.

MILLARD

NNNN

SENT AT Ø3/113ØZ MR
RCVD AT Ø3/113ØZ JHA

Mr Egerton
put 8/12 Miss Bedwell.
R.E. 7.12.

FOLIO 69

DESTROYED

FCO 652/E017/3
WKS 134/3

OO DTI/CREDA

RR DTI/ESBOT

GR 110

CYPHER CAT A
FM BAGHDAD 030728Z
COMMERCIAL IN CONFIDENCE
TO IMMEDIATE D.T.I.(COMMERCIAL RELATIONS AND EXPORTS DIV)
TELNO CREDA 119 OF 3/12 INFO D.T.I. (EXPORT INTELLIGENCE AND SERVICE DIR).

FOR ASHWOOD.

BREAK IN RELATIONS:
1. THE SITUATION IS NOT CLEAR AT PRESENT BUT WE ARE HOPING THAT WE SHALL BE ABLE TO CONTINUE WITH A COMMERCIAL SECTION EVEN IF ON A REDUCED SCALE.

2. WOULD YOU PLEASE WARN ANY ENQUIRERS THAT IT MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR US TO MAKE ENQUIRIES ON THEIR BEHALF IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES BUT WE SHALL DO WHAT WE CAN TO HELP IN IMPORTANT CASES.

3. HAMILTON WILL BE ARRIVING IN LONDON ON SUNDAY 5 DECEMBER AND WILL CONTACT YOU AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER HIS ARRIVAL.

BALFOUR PAUL

NNNN

NO 10 DOWNING ST

R 129.
→NED
EPD
TPD.

RESTRICTED

TOP COPY 71

CYPHER CAT A

FM TEHRAN 020500Z

RESTRICTED

TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TEL NO 33 OF 2 DECEMBER INFO FCO.

[TO FCO]

YOUR TEL NO 1202: SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS.

54

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10

NED 3/5/68

DR CLEMENT, ONE OF A GROUP OF SURGEONS DUE TO VISIT IRAQ AS BRITISH COUNCIL SPECIALIST TOURISTS HAS DELAYED HIS DEPARTURE FROM HERE (WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN TODAY) ON OUR ADVICE. GRATEFUL TO KNOW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WHAT WE SHOULD TELL HIM AND IN DUE COURSE WHAT ADVICE WE SHOULD GIVE TO OTHER INTENDING VISITORS, WHETHER OFFICIAL OR TOURISTS

RAMSBOTHAM

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:

NED
ARABIAN DEPT
CRD
CONSULAR DEPT
CONS EMERG UNIT
PERS OPS DEPT
NEWS DEPT

pwb 6/12

&&&&&&

RESTRICTED

71 (A)

IMMEDIATE CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A

FM F C O 021810Z (NED)

CONFIDENTIAL
TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TELNO 1275 OF 2 DECEMBER.
YOUR TELNO 1203. (59)
SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS.
1. WE HAVE CONSULTED THE COUNCIL WHO AGREE THAT STAFF SHOULD REMAIN.
2. THEY HAVE CONSIDERED YOUR AND SPRINGFORD'S RECOMMENDATION THAT DIPLOMATIC STATUS SHOULD NOT BE SOUGHT BUT CHAIRMAN INSISTS THAT THIS PROTECTION, WHICH IT MIGHT BE DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN LATER IF NEEDED SHOULD BE DEMANDED NOW AND REPRESENTATIVE AND HIS TWO ASSISTANTS BE BROUGHT WITHIN INTERESTS SECTION.
3. FOR THE PRESENT COUNCIL WOULD NOT SEND BACK UNDERWOOD (ELO) NOW HOME ON LEAVE NOR TAKE FURTHER STEPS TO RECRUIT ANOTHER ASSISTANT,
4. WE AGREE THAT SHAW SHOULD REMAIN. SINCE, HOWEVER, WE UNDERSTAND HE IS PAID OUT OF INSTITUTE ACCOUNT ON WHICH THERE MAY BE OTHER DEMANDS, WE ARE NOT CLEAR HOW LONG HE COULD REMAIN WITHOUT IT BEING NECESSARY TO CONSIDER WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT FURTHER DRAWINGS. GRATEFUL FOR COMMENTS

DOUGLAS-HOME

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
NED
CRD

COPIES TO:
MR PHILLIPS, BRITISH COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

9/12

FCO ~~688/E047/3~~

~~KS 140/03~~

00 DEFCOMCEN

GR 270

CYPHER CAT A
FM BAGHDAD 030910Z
CONFIDENTIAL

DISTRIBUTED TO
SENT M.O.D.
HD. OF DEFENCE DEPT. (2)
HD. OF P.U.S.D.
P.U.S.D.
N.E.D.
PERSONNEL OPS. DEPT.
HD. OF COMMNS. DEPT.
EXAMINERS
FILE R K 129

IMMEDIATE

TO MODUK, [redacted] HQNEAF (DEFENCE COMMCEN PASS TO HQ NEAF.
FXA/HAQ/HBC/HBM 030900Z

FROM BRITAIRAT.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10
-6 DEC 1971
NEQ J/581

1. SUBJECT TO ANY DECISION YOU MAY BE CONSIDERING IN RESPONSE DEFAT SIGNAL FXA 020725Z DEC 71 (NOTAL) (AND SHOULD YOU DECIDE THAT SERVICE CARS SHOULD BE RETAINED FOR TIME BEING AT BAGHDAD) YOU MAY ALTERNATIVELY WISH TO INVESTIGATE FEASIBILITY OF AIR-LIFTING SERVICE ATTACHES WITH FAMILIES AND BAGGAGE FROM BAGHDAD TO CYPRUS FOR ON MOVE TO UK BY ASC SCHEDULED FLIGHT.
2. IRAQI REACTION TO THIS SUGGESTION MAY NOT BE UNFAVOURABLE IN VIEW OF A REQUEST FROM THEM SINCE BREAK IN RELATIONS FOR ENTRY VISAS FOR 15 OFFICERS AND NCOS (CREW OF AN12 MILITARY TRANSPORT) TO VISIT UK. ALSO WE RECENTLY MANAGED TO OBTAIN CLEARANCE FOR OVERFLIGHT THROUGH SYRIA, LANDING AT BAGHDAD, FOR THREE BRITISH PILOTED AIRCRAFT OF THE ABU DHABI DEFENCE FORCE.

3. APART FROM AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY, JUSTIFICATION FOR FLIGHT WOULD PRESUMABLY DEPEND ON POSSIBLE SAVING IN CIVIL AIR FARES AND FREIGHT CHARGES, BUT INCIDENTAL ADVANTAGES WOULD BE ABILITY TO TAKE OUT SERVICE EQUIPMENT AND SENSITIVE EMBASSY MATERIAL, AND OPPORTUNITY TO TEST FEASIBILITY OF FLYING RAF AIRCRAFT INTO BAGHDAD.

4. THE AIRLIFT WOULD CONSIST OF 13 ADULTS (7 FEMALE) AND 5 CHILDREN. FCO STAFF WOULD NOT BE INVOLVED.

FROM BRITAIRAT.

REGISTRY No. 10
-6 DEC 1971
NEQ J/5681

1. SUBJECT TO ANY DECISION YOU MAY BE CONSIDERING IN RESPONSE DEFAT SIGNAL FXA ØØØ725Z DEC 71 (NOTAL) (AND SHOULD YOU DECIDE THAT SERVICE CARS SHOULD BE RETAINED FOR TIME BEING AT BAGHDAD) YOU MAY ALTERNATIVELY WISH TO INVESTIGATE FEASIBILITY OF AIR-LIFTING SERVICE ATTACHES WITH FAMILIES AND BAGGAGE FROM BAGHDAD TO CYPRUS FOR ON MOVE TO UK BY ASC SCHEDULED FLIGHT.

2. IRAQI REACTION TO THIS SUGGESTION MAY NOT BE UNFAVOURABLE IN VIEW OF A REQUEST FROM THEM SINCE BREAK IN RELATIONS FOR ENTRY VISAS FOR 15 OFFICERS AND NCOS (CREW OF AN12 MILITARY TRANSPORT) TO VISIT UK. ALSO WE RECENTLY MANAGED TO OBTAIN CLEARANCE FOR OVERFLIGHT THROUGH SYRIA, LANDING AT BAGHDAD, FOR THREE BRITISH PILOTED AIRCRAFT OF THE ABU DHABI DEFENCE FORCE.

3. APART FROM AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY, JUSTIFICATION FOR FLIGHT WOULD PRESUMABLY DEPEND ON POSSIBLE SAVING IN CIVIL AIR FARES AND FREIGHT CHARGES, BUT INCIDENTAL ADVANTAGES WOULD BE ABILITY TO TAKE OUT SERVICE EQUIPMENT AND SENSITIVE EMBASSY MATERIAL, AND OPPORTUNITY TO TEST FEASIBILITY OF FLYING RAF AIRCRAFT INTO BAGHDAD.

4. THE AIRLIFT WOULD CONSIST OF 13 ADULTS (7 FEMALE) AND 5 CHILDREN. FCO STAFF WOULD NOT BE INVOLVED. IF ALL PERSONAL BAGGAGE WERE INCLUDED THIS WOULD NOT EXCEED 10,000 LBS, BUT FOR PRACTICAL REASONS (EG LOADING) IT IS ASSUMED THAT MOST OF THE LATTER WOULD HAVE TO REMAIN FOR LAND/SEA SHIPMENT. EARLIEST PRACTICAL DATE FOR FLIGHT WOULD BE PM 12 DECEMBER WITH ABSOLUTE DEADLINE OF 15 DEC.

5. FOR HQNEAF. GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD ADVISE MOD OF LIKELY AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY. MEANWHILE I WILL INVESTIGATE FEASIBILITY OF IRAQI CLEARANCE FOR BAGHDAD INTERNATIONAL.

BALFOUR PAUL

SENT TO ... C.

NNNN

IMMEDIATE S E C R E T

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 030930Z

SECRET

RECEIVED
REGISTRY No. 16
-CDE: 1772
NEQ 3/548/1

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 1221 OF 3 DEC 71.

TOP COPY

(60)

MY TELEGRAM NO 1204 : SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS.

1. PARAGRAPH 6 AND YOU TELEGRAM NO 1271 PARAGRAPH 3 (IV).

(A) NEITHER MILNE NOR I EXPECT ANY ACTION AGAINST IPC.

(B) AS REGARDS THEIR COMMUNICATIONS, THE DUTCH HAVE NO DIPLOMATIC WIRELESS AND I SHOULD BE SURPRISED IF THEIR CYPHER TRAFFIC THROUGH THE IRAQI TELEGRAPH SYSTEM ESCAPES SOVIET ATTENTIONS. THE SWEDES HAVE WIRELESS FACILITIES BUT I SUSPECT WOULD NOT WELCOME THIS COMMITMENT (THOUGH I HAVE OF COURSE NOT ASKED THEM.

(C) MILNE HIMSELF WOULD PREFER THE FRENCH CHANNEL IF OUR SERVICE MUST STOP. AS TO THAT, I AM AWAITING RESPONSE OF DG OF PROTOCOL. PROMISED FOR YESTERDAY AFTERNOON.

(D) IF IRAQIS AGREE ON RECIPROCAL BASIS, WE SHOULD HAVE TO DECIDE WHAT SYSTEM TO MAINTAIN IN LIGHT OF YOUR ANSWER TO PARAGRAPH 6(B) OF MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. ALTERNATIVES WOULD SEEM TO BE:-

(1) REDUCE OPERATION TO TRANSMISSION OF TRAFFIC ENCYPHERED AS FAR AS IPC ARE CONCERNED BY THEMSELVES (WHICH WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO MILNE).
WE COULD THEN REMOVE ALVIS EQUIPMENT AND MINIMISE PROTECTION ARRANGEMENTS. WE COULD PRESUMABLY STILL USE NOREEN IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES.

(2). RETAIN PRESENT FACILITIES WITH MORE ADEQUATE PROTECTION. THIS WOULD PRESUMABLY MEAN SOMEONE SLEEPING IN THE EMBASSY ALL NIGHT IF THE IAS SYSTEM IS TO PROVIDE ANY SAFEGUARD AT ALL. THIS WOULD HAVE OBVIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STAFFING OF THE RESIDUAL MISSION.

See 73B Para 6 6/12

2. GRATEFUL YOUR VIEWS URGENTLY.

BALFOUR PAUL

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
NED
COMMS D
DWS
OIL D
PUSD
SECURITY D

RESTRICTED

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER CAT A

FM BEIRUT Ø3Ø955Z

RESTRICTED

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
-6 DEC 1971
NEQ 3/548/1

TOP COPY

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 565 OF 3 DECEMBER INFO IMMEDIATE
TO BAGHDAD AND AMMAN.

BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NO 12Ø5 (NOT TO AMMAN)

SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS - NUTS AND BOLTS.

=.1. IT APPEARS THAT A FAIR NUMBER OF VEHICLES, OFFICIAL ON FCO AND MINISTRY OF DEFENCE CHARGE (SEE BAGHDAD DEFENCE ATTACHE'S TELEGRAM FXA/Ø2Ø725Z TO MOD UK -SAAS), AS WELL AS PRIVATE, WILL HAVE TO TRAVEL FROM BAGHDAD TO BEIRUT VIA JORDAN AND SYRIA. WE HAVE NO INDICATION THAT THE SYRIANS WOULD PUT ANY DIFFICULTIES IN THE WAY, BUT THEY ARE UNPREDICTABLE. THERE IS ALSO THE POSSIBILITY OF HEAVY RAIN WHICH COULD MAKE THE JOURNEY DIFFICULT, IF THEROUTE THROUGH JORDAN WERE CLOSED FOR ANY REASON.

2. YOU MAY WISH TO CONSIDER WHETHER WE SHOULD CHARTER A FREIGHT AIRCRAFT FROM TMA, WHO WOULD PROBABLY GIVE US A FAVOURABLE RATE. ANY CORNERS COULD BE TAKEN UP BY THE AIR FREIGHT BAGGAGE OF MEMBERS OF THE STAFF.

3. PLEASE INSTRUCT US IF YOU WISH US TO MAKE ANY APPROACH TO TMA.

WRIGHT

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

NED	CRD
FOD	POD (WELFARE SECT)
PSD	CONS D
A & S D	CONS EMER UNIT
COMMS D	NEWS D
DWS	ARAB D
SEC D	N AFR D
A & T D	OIL D

PSD have dealt pm 6/12

FFFFF

RESTRICTED

NEQ 3/548/1

TOP COPY

RESTRICTED

PRIORITY
CIPHER/CAT A.

FM F C O 031230Z

RESTRICTED.
TO PRIORITY BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NUMBER 1278 OF 3 DECEMBER INFO BOMBAY AND TEHRAN.

1. DTI TELL US THAT BRITISH CHAMBER OF SHIPPING HAVE REPORTED A RUMOUR CURRENT IN BOMBAY THAT BRITISH FLAG VESSELS (EG P AND O) WILL NOT BE ALLOWED, AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE BREACH OF RELATIONS, TO CALL AT BASRA.

2. GRATEFUL FOR ANY CLARIFICATION YOU CAN GET OF THE POSITION.

DOUGLAS-HOME

FILES
N.E.D.
M. & T.D.

COPIES TO
MR SUNDERLAND DTI

RESTRICTED X1854

836-1207

Parker
8/12

NEQ 7/54M

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT A

FM FCO Ø315Ø5Z

CONFIDENTIAL
TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TELNO 128Ø OF 3 DECEMBER INFO IMMEDIATE STOCKHOLM TEHRAN BEIRUT PRIORITY WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK.

60 69

YOUR TELEGRAMS NOS 1234 AND 1221: SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS.

1. AS WE SEE IT, ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERESTS SECTION WILL BE THE HANDLING OF SENSITIVE IPC TRAFFIC. IPC HERE WOULD PREFER US TO DO THIS RATHER THAN THE FRENCH OR SWEDES. THE SECTION WILL ALSO HAVE A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF ADMINISTRATIVE WORK (EG LOOKING AFTER OUR PROPERTY) AND CONSULAR WORK, BUT WE DO NOT (NOT) THINK POLITICAL REPORTING WILL BE OF FIRST IMPORTANCE IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, OUR VIEW IS THAT PRESENT DWS FACILITIES SHOULD BE RETAINED. PARA 1(2) OF YOUR TELNO 1221 NOT (NOT) TO RETAIN THE EXISTING EQUIPMENT WOULD IN ANY CASE INVOLVE US IN CONSIDERABLE EXPENSE WHEN THE TIME CAME TO REINSTALL IT.

2. THUS FOR THE TIME BEING THE DIPLOMATIC STAFFING OF THE INTERESTS SECTION SHOULD WE THINK BE:

1. LEWTY (QUA ARABIST AND GENERAL CO-ORDINATING OFFICER)
2. RAE
3. MANSFIELD.

3. THE DWS EQUIPMENT MUST OF COURSE BE GUARDED, WHICH WILL NECESSITATE A SECURITY GUARD SLEEPING ON THE PREMISES. THIS MEANS THAT TWO SECURITY GUARDS MUST BE RETAINED IN THE INTERESTS SECTION. IF THE IRAQIS AGREE TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF NON-DIPLOMATIC OFFICERS WHICH WE MAY RETAIN (YOUR PARA 4A) THE NON-DIPLOMATIC STAFF OF THE INTERESTS SECTION COULD CONSIST OF:

1. SMITH
2. HARRIS
3. VALENTINE

IF THE IRAQIS WILL NOT AGREE TO AN INCREASE, SMITH WILL HAVE TO BE DROPPED, UNLESS THE SECOND SECURITY GUARD COULD BE INCLUDED IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF OF THE COMMERCIAL SECTION.

4. GRATEFUL TO KNOW WHETHER A DTMS OFFICER WILL BE ABLE TO COME TO BAGHDAD FROM BEIRUT IN THE EVENT OF A BREAKDOWN OF EQUIPMENT.

5. WE CONFIRM YOU SHOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR THE RETENTION OF WHICHEVER AND AS MANY COMMERCIAL OFFICERS YOU CONSIDER SHOULD REMAIN, AND AGREE THAT THE SOUK OFFICE SHOULD BE RETAINED.

6. PERSONNEL OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT ARE TELEGRAPHING SEPARATELY ABOUT SOME OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ABOVE PROPOSALS.

DOUGLAS-HOME

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:

NED
P & C D
OIL DEPT
CRD
A & T D
A & S D
SECURITY DEPT
COMMS DEPT
CONSULAR DEPT
M & V D

&&&&

COPIES TO:

CCL. GRIFFITH, POD
MR. LONG, POD
WELFARE SECTION, POD
TRAVEL SECTION, POD
MR. ROBINSON, PSD
MR. HILLIER-FRY, ODA.

NEQ 3/54/1

TOP COPY 73

IMMEDIATE CONFIDENTIAL
CYPHER/CAT A
FM FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE 031506Z

CONFIDENTIAL.

DESKBY 040800 LOCAL
TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NUMBER 1281 OF 3 DECEMBER INFO IMMEDIATE STOCKHOLM TEHRAN BEIRUT PRIORITY WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK AND KUWAIT.

62 63

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 1205 AND BEIRUT TELEGRAM NO 563: SERVERANCE OF RELATION - NUTS AND BOLTS

1. ACCOMMODATION AND SERVICES DEPARTMENT ARE REPLYING SEPARATELY ON YOUR PARAS 1(B) AND 4 (ON WHICH THEY AWAIT YOUR FURTHER TELEGRAM). THEY WILL BE RAISING VARIOUS OTHER ACCOMMODATION CONSIDERATIONS.

2. ON YOUR OTHER POINTS, OUR VIEWS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

I DISPOSAL OF EMBASSY TRANSPORT : WE SUGGEST THAT YOU KEEP AS MANY CARS (?THREE) AS YOU THINK THE RESIDUAL MISSION WILL NEED. THE REST SHOULD IF POSSIBLE BE DRIVEN TO BEIRUT.

II. CARS AND HEAVY BAGGAGE: THE NORMAL RULE IS, AS YOU KNOW, THAT THESE SHOULD BE STORED IN SITU UNTIL THE NEXT POSTINGS OF THE OFFICERS CONCERNED ARE DECIDED. EFFECTS SHOULD THEN BE SHIPPED DIRECT TO THE POSTS CONCERNED. AN EXCEPTION CAN HOWEVER BE MADE IF THE CARS AND/OR EFFECTS ARE IN IMMEDIATE DANGER OF LOSS, THEFT OR SERIOUS DAMAGE. ON THIS WE WILL HAVE TO CONSIDER YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS. ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT YOU WOULD RECOMMEND FORWARDING THEM TO BEIRUT(AS THE MOST CONVENIENT POST IN THE AREA) IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO KNOW IF BEIRUT COULD STORE CARS AND EFFECTS AND IN WHAT QUANTITIES.

III. CURRENT TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME: ALL CONCERNED HAVE AGREED THAT THIS SHOULD CONTINUE AT THE PRESENT LEVEL.

IV. AIR FREIGHT ALLOWANCE : 60 KILOS OF UNACCOMPANIED AIR FREIGHT BAGGAGE PER HEAD. THIS SHOULD BE CONSIGNED FROM THE POINT WHERE THE INDIVIDUAL BOARDS THE AIRCRAFT.

V. DAIMLER EXPERT AND DTMS OFFICER DENT HAVE BEEN STOPPED. WE SHALL BE TELEGRAPHING BEIRUT LATER WITH INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT WHERE TO SEND MISS CHAPLIN.

VI. PASSAGES OF EMBASSY CHILDREN HAVE BEEN CANCELLED.

3. GRATEFUL TO KNOW :

I. WHAT IS THE FUTURE OF THE EMBASSY LAUNCH ?

II. WHAT, IF ANY, ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE MADE FOR MEETING QMS IN FUTURE ?

III. HOW MUCH CLASSIFIED PAPER ARE YOU PROPOSING TO BURN ? WILL YOU WISH TO RETURN SPECIFIC FILES BY QM FOR RETENTION IN LONDON ?

4. YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT THOSE MEMBERS OF STAFF WHO LEAVE DURING THE COURSE OF THIS MONTH WILL BE ABLE TO DRAW THEIR OVERSEAS ALLOWANCES FOR ONE MONTH FROM 1 DECEMBER (WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ANY OFFICER WHO WAS IN ANY CASE DUE TO LEAVE IN DECEMBER).

DOUGLAS-HOME

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:

NED
P & C D
OIL DEPT
CRD
A & T D
A & S D
SECURITY DEPT
COMMS DEPT
CONSULAR DEPT
M & V D

COPIES TO:

COL GRIFFITH, POD.
MR. LONG, POD
WELFARE SECTION, POD
TRAVEL SECTION, POD
MR. ROBINSON
MR. HILLIER-FRY, ODA

&&&&

74

TOP COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED
REGISTRY No. 10
- 6 DEC 1971
NEQ 3/5481

CRD have replied pr 8/12

IMMEDIATE
CYPHER CAT A
FM BAGHDAD 040900Z
CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 1226 OF 4 DEC 71.

71 A

YOUR TELNO 1275 : SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS / BRITISH COUNCIL.

1. IF THE COUNCIL HEADQUARTERS ARE ADAMANT, I WILL APPROACH THE CHIEF OF PROTOCOL TO REQUEST THAT SPRINGFORD AND SPILLER (LIBRARIAN) SHOULD BE GIVEN DIPLOMATIC STATUS. (SINCE YOU RIGHTLY NOTE IN YOUR PARAGRAPH 3 THAT UNDERWOOD IS ON LEAVE AND THE ASSISTANT REPRESENTATIVE SLOT UNFILLED, THE SECOND ''ASSISTANT'' IN YOUR PARA 2 PRESUMABLY REFERS TO SHAW : THERE CAN BE NO QUESTION OF HIS HAVING DIPLOMATIC STATUS SINCE HE IS AN EMPLOYEE OF THE IRAQI MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND NOT OF THE BRITISH COUNCIL). THE IRAQIS MIGHT OR MIGHT NOT AGREE.

2. HOWEVER, THE REPRESENTATIVE IS RELUCTANT THAT I DO SO FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS, WHICH I ENTIRELY ENDORSE :

A. THE CHAIRMAN APPEARS TO DEMAND THIS STEP FOR REASONS OF ''PROTECTION''. I AM BY NO MEANS CONVINCED THAT THE ACQUISITION OF EITHER DIPLOMATIC CAR NUMBER-PLATES, OR A DIPLOMATIC IDENTITY CARD AFFORD ANY ADDITIONAL PROTECTION IN BAGHDAD - INDEED, IN A REAL JAM, THE FORMER WOULD MERELY ATTRACT UNWELCOME ATTENTION. MOREOVER, THE SEPARATE STATUS AND LOCATION OF THE COUNCIL MAKES IT LIKELY THAT IT WILL NOT (NOT) ATTRACT THE SAME ATTENTION AS THIS EMBASSY: ON THE CONTRARY, TO FORMALISE THE LINKS BETWEEN THE TWO WOULD BE MERELY TO INVITE ANY POSSIBLE ACTIONS AGAINST HMG TO BE DIRECTED EQUALLY TOWARDS THE COUNCIL.

B. THE MOVE WOULD PREJUDICE THE COUNCIL'S LINE THAT IT IS AN INDEPENDENT BODY AND MAKE FUTURE REVERSION TO ITS PRESENT STATUS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT. THIS STATUS IS RESPECTED IN BAGHDAD AND IS OF REAL VALUE: THE COUNCIL HAS ENJOYED VASTLY EASIER ACCESS TO IRAQI GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES AND TO /INDIVIDUAL

INDIVIDUAL IRAQI PROFESSIONALS OF ALL SORTS THAN HAS THIS EMBASSY. MORE SERIOUSLY, IF FORMALLY PART OF THE INTERESTS SECTION, THE COUNCIL WOULD ONLY BE ABLE TO OPERATE THROUGH THE SWEDISH EMBASSY : AND THERE IS EVERY SIGN THAT SINCE THE SWEDES ARE CORRECTLY FORMAL ABOUT PROTECTION, THIS WOULD HAMPER THE COUNCIL'S ACTIVITIES VERY CONSIDERABLY.

3. IF IT WOULD MEET THE PROTECTION POINT, THE REPRESENTATIVE IS PERFECTLY PREPARED TO SEEK A WRITTEN ASSURANCE FROM THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES. THAT, SINCE THE COUNCIL MIGHT BE THOUGHT IN SOME WAYS TO BE A MORE OBVIOUS TARGET OF POPULAR DISAPPROVAL THAN BRITISH COMMERCIAL FIRMS (EG MACDONALDS OR EVEN POSSIBLY IPC), THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO GUARANTEE SPECIAL VIGILANCE AND PROTECTION.

4. AS TO PARAGRAPH 3 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE, THERE IS NO REASON AT ALL TO ASSUME THAT COUNCIL ACTIVITIES WILL LESSEN - ESPECIALLY SINCE YOU HAVE NOW AGREED THAT THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME MAY CONTINUE. ENGLISH LANGUAGE CLASSES HAVE ALREADY RESUMED : AND HEAVY PRESSURES WILL BE THROWN ON THE EXISTING STAFF, ESPECIALLY IF UNDERWOOD DOES NOT RETURN ON EXPIRY OF HIS LEAVE. THE REPRESENTATIVE TRUSTS (AND AGAIN I SHARE HIS VIEWS) THAT UNDERWOOD WILL RETURN. I ALSO AGREE WITH HIM THAT IT MIGHT BE SENSIBLE TO SUSPEND A DECISION ON THE POSTING (UNDERLINED) OF A NEW ASSISTANT REPRESENTATIVE UNTIL WE HAVE A BETTER IDEA OF THE CLIMATE HERE : BUT THAT STEPS AT LEAST TO SELECT (UNDERLINED) A SUITABLE CANDIDATE FOR THE POST SHOULD CONTINUE.

5. YOUR PARAGRAPH 4. FUNDS HAVE BEEN VOTED (ABOUT ID 42,000) TO KEEP THE IDELTI AFLOAT UNTIL DECEMBER 1972. SHAW'S EMOLUMENTS FOR THE YEAR ARE THEREFORE ENSURED. LETTER FOLLOWS ON INVESTMENT OF FUNDS AND FUTURE DRAWINGS. /6.

6. IT WOULD, INCIDENTALLY, BE USEFUL FOR US TO KNOW EXACTLY HOW MANY IRAQIS, WITH OR WITHOUT DIPLOMATIC STATUS, WORK IN THEIR CULTURAL SECTION IN LONDON. PARA 6 OF EGERTON'S MINUTE OF 1 DECEMBER SUGGESTS THAT IT MAY BE QUITE A FEW.

BALFOUR PAUL

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

NED
CRD

COPY TO: MR PHILLIPS
BRITISH COUNCIL

FLASH CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD Ø41Ø35Z

CONFIDENTIAL

LOP COPY

TO FLASH FCO TELNO 1228 OF 4 DEC 71. INFO IMMEDIATE STOCKHOLM INFO PRIORITY TEHRAN BEIRUT WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10
-6 DEC 1971
NED 3/548/1

1. SWEDISH AMBASSADOR GERRING, WHO HAS SPENT MOST OF HIS LIFE PROTECTING SOMEBODY, TOLD ME LAST NIGHT HE THOUGHT IT IMPROBABLE THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD SANCTION THE MAINTENANCE OF OUR DWS CYPHER TRAFFIC IN AS INTERESTS SECTION UNDER HIS FLAG.

2. I CAN MAKE LITTLE PROGRESS WITH COMPOSITION OF INTERESTS SECTION UNTIL THIS VITAL ISSUE IS CLEARED UP.

3. THE QUESTION CLEARLY ARISES AS TO WHETHER SWEDES CAN BE TOLD THAT WE HANDLE IPC TRAFFIC. (WE SHOULD HAVE TO TELL THEM EVENTUALLY IF THE SERVICE IS MAINTAINED). IT IS RELEVANT THAT GERRING TELLS ME THAT, UNDER THE NORMAL SWEDISH PROTECTION RUBRIC, THE ONLY MATTERS FOR WHICH HE WOULD BE ABLE TO ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY VIS-A-VIS THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT ARE THOSE DEFINABLE AS ADMINISTRATIVE OR HUMANITARIAN.

4. I HAVE HELD UP DESPATCH OF THIS TELEGRAM PENDING ANSWER FROM DG OF PROTOCOL AS TO WHETHER MAINTENANCE OF OUR DWS IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE IRAQIS. AT MY SESSION WITH HIM THIS MORNING HE INSISTED THAT THE IRAQI EMBASSY IN LONDON HAS NO COMPARABLE FACILITIES: BUT SINCE THEY HAD BEEN THINKING OF INSTALLING THEM, THE ANSWER TO MY ENQUIRY MIGHT STILL BE AFFIRMATIVE. HE PROMISED TO GIVE ME A FINAL ANSWER QUICKLY. IN CASE THERE IS FURTHER DELAY ON THIS, YOU MAY THINK ENQUIRIES SHOULD BE MADE FROM THE SWEDES REGARDING PARA 1 WITHOUT WAITING.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

BALFOUR PAUL

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
NED
COMMS D
DWS
OIL D
SECURITY D

CONFIDENTIAL

Reply sent on IPC on 7/12. See also tel to Stockholm [illegible] 8/12

IMMEDIATE CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT A
FM BAGHDAD Ø411ØØZ
CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10
-6 DEC 1971
NEQ 3/5481

76

TOP COPY

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 1231 OF 4 DEC 71 INFO PRIORITY QTOCKHOLM TEHRAN BEIRUT WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

71 D

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 128Ø : SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS.

1. SINCE SECTION WILL, AS YOU SAY, HAVE A GREAT DEAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE AND ACCOUNTING WORK- ESPECIALLY FOR FIRST FEW MONTHS - IT IS FRANKLY IMPOSSIBLE TO EXCLUDE VOYSEY AS YOU PROPOSE.
MOREOVER HE HAS THE SPECIAL MERIT OF HAVING HAD THIS TASK BEFORE - IN CAIRO AFTER THE 1967 BREAK.

2. USEFUL IF I COULD BE TOLD URGENTLY ACTUAL IRAQI STRENGTH (DIPLOMATIC AND NOT) OF THEIR COMMERCIAL AND CULTURAL SECTIONS IN LONDON. I MIGHT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO MAKE GOOD USE OF THIS IN ARGUING WITH DG OF PROTOCOL (WHO PROFESSES NOT TO KNOW) IN CONNEXION WITH YOUR PARAGRAPH 5. HIS REPLY AT THIS MORNING'S SESSION WAS THAT HE THOUGHT ALL OUR COMMERCIAL STAFF EXCEPT THE COUNSELLOR COULD STAY, BUT HE CAN STILL NOT GIVE ME FINAL ANSWER.

3. IF DWS ARE MAINTAINED (ON WHICH SEE MY TELEGRAM NO 1228), WE COULD ONLY AFFORD TWO SECURITY GUARDS BY CUTTING OTHER STAFF BELOW DESIRABLE MINIMUM. SLEEPING GUARD DUTY ON PREMISES CAN BE MAINTAINED BY MEMBERS OF SECTION IN ROTATION - AT ANY RATE FOR INITIAL PERIOD. IT IS ALSO ESSENTIAL THAT RESIDUAL STAFF SHOULD BE JACKS OF AS MANY TRADES AS POSSIBLE.
THUS SMITH (WHOME YOU SUGGEST MIGHT BE DROPPED) CAN DO SUNDRY JOBS INCLUDING GUARD DUTY. GUARDS CANNOT DO LIKE-WISE
(AND THEY HAVE UNION RULES ABOUT WORKING HOURS). IN MY VIEW ONE (ONE) OF THE LATTER MUST BE ACCEPTED AS MAXIMUM IN CIRCUMSTANCES.

See later tels pr 6

4. I POINTED OUT TO DG OF PROTOCOL THAT UNLESS OUR ALLOWANCE OF DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL IS INCREASED WE MAY BE UNABLE TO PROVIDE VISA FACILITIES, AND ABOUT 8000 VISAS HAD BEEN ISSUED THIS YEAR ..... I HAVE ALSO RENEWED MY REQUEST FOR ONE OR TWO MORE NON-DIPLOMATS. AGAIN HE PROMISED AN EARLY ANSWER.

5. I AM TELEGRAPHING SEPARATELY ABOUT LOCAL STAFF. APART FROM STRONG MORAL OBLIGATION TO LOOK AFTER THEM, SINCE NOT OTHER EMPLOYER WILL RISK TAKING THEM ON, THERE IS A REASONABLE CHANCE OF EARLY RENEWAL OF RELATIONS.

BALFOUR PAUL

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:

NED
PCD
OIL DEPT
CRD
ATD
ASD
COMMS DEPT
CONS DEPT
MVD
POD
PSD
WELFARE SECTION

COPIES TO:

MR. HILLIER-FRY, ODA.

&&&&

NEQ 3/548/1

(76) (A)

FLASH

ENCYPHER CAT.A.

CONFIDENTIAL

(NE)

FM F C O 041305Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO F L A S H STOCKHOLM TELEGRAM NO 200 OF 4 DECEMBER INFO

IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD

(75)

BAGHDAD TELNO 1228: DWS FACILITIES

PLEASE ASK SWEDES URGENTLY WHETHER THEY WOULD SANCTION MAINTENANCE OF OUR DWS CYPHER TRAFFIC UNDER THEIR FLAG PROVIDED IRAQI AUTHORITIES HAVE NO OBJECTION.

DOUGLAS-HOME

NNNN

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:

NED
WED
COMMS DEPT

&&&&&

CONFIDENTIAL

77

TOP COPY

FLASH
CYPHER CAT A

FM STOCKHOLM 041625Z

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
-6 DEC 1971
NEQ 3/548/1

TO FLASH BAGHDAD TELNO 02 OF 4 DECEMBER INFO FLASH F C O.

PLEASE TRANSMIT FOLLOWING MESSAGE FLASH TO SWEDISH AMBASSADOR GERRING.

BEGINS. FOR SWEDISH AMBASSADOR GERRING, BAGHDAD FROM GIRON M F A .

1. WITH REFERENCE TO THE INSTRUCTIONS WHICH WE DESPATCHED TO YOU ON 1 DECEMBER AND THE LIMITED CAPACITY OF THE MEANS OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN STOCKHOLM AND YOURSELF, THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN STOCKHOLM HAS KINDLY OFFERED US THE POSSIBILITY OF COMMUNICATING WITH YOU BY WAY OF LONDON AND THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD. TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THIS OFFER I NOTE THAT WE HAVE UP TO NOW NOT (REPEAT NOT) RECEIVED YOUR ANSWER WITH THE IRAQI REACTIONS TO THE INSTRUCTIONS JUST REFERRED TO.

2. DUE TO THE URGENCY OF THE MATTER I WOULD ASK YOU TO SEND YOUR ANSWER THROUGH THE BRITISH IF YOU DEEM THIS TO SPEED UP OUR RECEIPT OF THE ANSWER IN COMPARISON WITH IT BEING SENT DIRECTLY TO STOCKHOLM.

3. THE QUESTION HAS ALSO BEEN RAISED BY THE BRITISH WHETHER THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT IN ITS CAPACITY OF PROTECTING POWER WOULD BE AGREEABLE TO APPROVE OF THE REMAINING BRITISH STAFFIN BAGHDAD BEING ALLOWED TO SEND CODED MESSAGES TO LONDON.

pmh 8/12

4. WE HAVE ASKED FOR SOME CLARIFICATION ABOUT THIS TO ENABLE US TO TAKE A DECISION. I HAVE ASKED THAT THE MATTER BE PRESENTED TO YOU BY THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD AND WOULD REQUEST YOU TO GIVE YOUR COMMENTS IF ANY BY RETURN OF CABLE EITHER THROUGH THE BRITISH OR DIRECTLY.
ENDS.

FCO PLEASE REPEAT AS NECESSARY.

MILLARD

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
NED
WED
COMMS D
SECURITY D
DWS

FLASH

CIPHER CAT A

FM STOCKHOLM 041655Z

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
-6 DEC 1971
NEQ 3/5481

78

TO FLASH F C O TELNO. 366 OF 4 DECEMBER INFO FLASH BAGHDAD.

76 (A)

YOUR TELNO 200 : DWS FACILITIES.

YOU HAVE SEEN FROM MY TELNO 02 TO BAGHDAD THAT SWEDES ARE CONSULTING THEIR AMBASSADOR AND HAVE ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION FROM US.

2. THEY WOULD LIKE TO HAVE CLARIFIED :
A. WHETHER CODED MESSAGES WILL BE SENT DIRECT BY DWS TO FCO.
B. WHETHER SUCH MESSAGES WILL BE CONFINED TO CULTURAL, COMMERCIAL AND CONSULAR AFFAIRS.
C. WHETHER SUCH MESSAGES WOULD BE SUBJECT TO APPROVAL OR MONITORING BY SWEDISH AMBASSADOR.

3. HEAD OF CHANCERY COMMENTED, DRAWING ON GRIFFITH'S EXPERIENCE IN KHARTOUM, THAT FOLLOWING OTHER QUOTE SOFT BREAKS UNQUOTE IN MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES PROTECTING POWERS DID NOT RESTRICT CONTENT OR MONITOR INDIVIDUAL MESSAGES BUT WERE KEPT GENERALLY INFORMED OF ACTIVITIES OF INTERESTS SECTIONS.

4. GRATEFUL URGENT CONFIRMATION THAT KHARTOUM STYLE ARRANGEMENT IS WHAT YOU HAVE IN MIND OR WHETHER YOU ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT ANY CONDITIONS SWEDES MAY WISH TO IMPOSE.

5. GRATEFUL ALSO FOR INFORMATION ON MIDDLE EAST PRECEDENTS ON BRITISH INTERESTS SECTIONS HAVING INDEPENDENT CYPHER AND DWS FACILITIES.

FCO PLEASE REPEAT AS NECESSARY.

Reply sent to Stockholm pkg 9/12

MILLARD

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
NED
WED
COMMS D
DWS

CONFIDENTIAL

NEQ 3/54 78 (A)

CONFIDENTIAL

(NE)

..EDIATE

CYPHER CAT A

FM F C O 050040Z

CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 050730Z
TO IMMEDIATE STOCKHOLM TELEGRAM NUMBER 201 OF 5 DECEMBER.
INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD. (78)
YOUR TEL. NO. 366: DWS FACILITIES.
FOLLOWING CONFIRMS TELEPHONE CONVERSATION MISS HUTCHINSON/MISS BECKETT.
1. THE ANSWERS TO YOUR PARAGRAPH 2 ARE:
A. YES
B. YES (BUT STRICTLY FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION AT THIS STAGE, THE TRAFFIC WILL PROBABLY INCLUDE IRAQ PETROLEUM COMPANY MATERIAL).
C. WE WOULD NOT WISH OUR CODED MESSAGES TO BE SUBJECT TO THE APPROVAL OF THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR: BUT WE MIGHT AGREE TO SOME FORM OF MONITORING IF THE SWEDES MADE THIS A CONDITION OF RETAINING THE DWS EQUIPMENT.
2. YOUR PARAS 3-5: WE CONFIRM THAT WE HAVE IN MIND A KHARTOUM STYLE ARRANGEMENT, ALTHOUGH WE HAVE BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL IN FINDING ANY MIDDLE EASTERN PRECEDENTS SO FAR.
3. PLEASE LET US HAVE SWEDISH REACTIONS SOONEST ON SUNDAY MORNING.

DOUGLAS-HOME

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
NED
WED
COMMS D
DWS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNN

79

TOP COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

FLASH
CYPHER CAT A
FM BAGHDAD 051220Z
CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10
-6 DEC 1971
NEQ 3/5481

TO FLASH STOCKHOLM TEL U/N INFO FLASH TO FCO.
PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING TO SWEDISH M.F.A.
YOUR TELNO 2.

QUOTE.
FOR GIRON FROM GERRING BAGHDAD

1. YOUR INSTRUCTIONS RECEIVED AFTERNOON 2 DECEMBER, I.E. BEGINNING OF MOSLEM WEEKEND. NO SENIOR OFFICIAL AVAILABLE UNTIL SATURDAY, WHEN LETTER TO MINISTER WAS DELIVERED TO UNDER SECRETARY JAMALI. ORAL AGREEMENT GIVEN. WRITTEN CONFIRMATION PROMISED FOR SATURDAY OR SUNDAY.

2. SUNDAY 1430 LOCAL TIME RECEIVED NOTE INFORMING ME THAT 'THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ AGREES THAT ROYAL SWEDISH EMBASSY ASSUME PROTECTION OF BRITISH INTERESTS IN REPUBLIC OF IRAQ'.

3. QUESTION OF CODED MESSAGES WAS SUBMITTED BY BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO IRAQI AUTHORITIES ON 2 DECEMBER, BUT NO ANSWER AS YET. NO OBJECTION FROM THIS EMBASSY.

UNQUOTE
BALFOUR PAUL [REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:
NED
PCD
WED

CONFIDENTIAL

pukg/12

A S H

CYPHER CAT A

FM STOCKHOLM 051450Z

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
-6 DEC 1971

NEQ 3/54/1

TOP COPY

TO FLASH F C O TELNO. 367 OF 5 DECEMBER INFO FLASH BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE TEHRAN BEIRUT WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TELEGRAM NO.2 TO BAGHDAD (NOT TO ALL) : SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS.

1. WHEN WE PASSED GERRING'S REPLY TO GIRON IN SWEDISH MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS LATTER SAID THAT IN THE LIGHT OF SWEDISH AMBASSADOR'S MESSAGE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT WILL ISSUE PUBLIC STATEMENT AT 1730Z TODAY 5 DECEMBER THAT THE ROYAL SWEDISH EMBASSY WILL ASSUME PROTECTION OF BRITISH INTERESTS IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ.

2. ON DWS FACILITIES GIRON SAID THAT MATTER WILL BE CONSIDERED AT A MEETING IN THE MINISTRY TOMORROW MORNING 6 DECEMBER AND THAT HE HAD NOTED WITH SPECIAL INTEREST THAT WE HAD RAISED THE QUESTION WITH IRAQI AUTHORITIES.

MILLARD

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
NED
WED
COMMS D
DWS
SECURITY D
CONSULAR D
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNN

F L A S H CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT A

FM STOCKHOLM 051832Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP COPY

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 -6 DEC 1971

NEQ 3/548/1

TO FLASH F C O TELNO. 368 OF 5 DECEMBER INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD.

MT TELNO. 367 AND TELEPHONE CONVERSATION RESIDENT CLERK/HEAD OF CHANCERY.

1. HEAD OF CHANCERY SPOKE TO ACTING POLITICAL DIRECTOR, HERR GIRON, WHO AGREED TO HOLDUP SWEDISH ANNOUNCEMENT UNTIL SIMULTANEOUS RELEASE COULD BE ARRANGED.

2. AT AN EARLIER STAGE, HERR GIRON HAD SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT SWEDISH REACTION TO OUR REQUEST FOR CYPHER FACILITIES UNDER SWEDISH PROTECTION WOULD BE POSITIVE, PROVIDED THE IRAQIS AGREED. A MEETING IS HOWEVER TO BE HELD AT THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TOMORROW MORNING TO DISCUSS THIS POINT. WE SEE SOME RISK THAT IF THE JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT IS DELAYED BEYOND TOMORROW THE SWEDES WILL SUSPECT THAT OUR REQUEST FOR POSTPONEMENT IS LINKED IN SOME WAY WITH A DESIRE ON OUR PART TO TRANSMIT TRAFFIC OF A SENSITIVE POLITICAL NATURE, AND THAT THIS WILL CAUSE THEM TO MAKE DIFFICULTIES.

3. UNLESS THEREFORE WE WISH TO MAKE THIS QUESTION OF CYPHER FACILITIES, WITH OR WITHOUT SWEDISH MONITORING, A STICKING POINT, I SEE ADVANTAGE IN GETTING THE ANNOUNCEMENT OUT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. ONCE THE ANNOUNCEMENT IS MADE WE SHOULD BE IN A STRONGER POSITION TO DEAL WITH THE SWEDES OVER THE FACILITIES WE REQUIRE.

4. IRAQI AGREEMENT TO DWS FACILITIES, WHICH WE HAVE PASSED ON TO THE SWEDES, SHOULD DISPOSE OF ANY OBJECTIONS HERE BUT WOULD SEEM TO REINFORCE THE CASE FOR AN EARLY ANNOUNCEMENT.

MILLARD

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
NED
WED
COMMS D
DWS
SECURITY D
CONSULAR D
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT

NNNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT A

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
-6 DEC 1971
NEP 3/568/1

82

TOP COPY

FM BEIRUT Ø4Ø9ØØZ

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 568 OF 4 DECEMBER AND ALSO
ADDRESSED IMMEDIATE TO BAGHDAD.

73 C

FCO TELEGRAM NO 1281 OF 3/12 TO BAGHDAD.

SEVERENCE OF RELATIONS - NUTS AND BOLTS.

PARA 2 (I) WE COULD IF NECESSARY SUPPLY 2 OR 3 OF THE LOCAL DRIVERS WHO NORMALLY FERRY CARS TO BAGHDAD FOR OFFICIAL VEHICLES COMING HERE.

PARA 2 (II) WE COULD NOT REPEAT NOT STORE CARS OR EFFECTS ON OUR OWN PREMISES. WE COULD ARRANGE COVERED STORAGE FOR UP TO 3Ø CARS AND 4Ø LIFTVANS OF PERSONAL EFFECTS.
THE LATTER, IF DESPATCHED, SHOULD BE CONSIGNED TO O.D.DEBBAS, FREE ZONE, BEIRUT , C/O BRITISH EMBASSY. COVER WOULD BE

ABOUT £1 PER CAR PER WEEK: PERSONAL EFFECTS PROBABLY FREE FOR FIRST FEW WEEKS. WE SHOULD INCUR HANDLING CHARGES.

WRIGHT

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:

NED
PROT & CONF DEPT
OIL DEPT
CRD
A & T D
A & S D
SECURITY DEPT
COMMS DEPT
CONSULAR DEPT
M & V D
PERS OPS DEPT
PERS SERV DEPT

COPIES TO:

MR. HILLIER FRY, ODA.

pt 8 9/12

RECEIVED UN
REGISTRY No. 10
-6 DEC 1971
NEQ 3/548/1
TOP COPY

FLASH
CYPHER CAT A
FM BAGHDAD 051740Z
CONFIDENTIAL

TO FLASH FCO TELNO 1232 OF 5 DEC 71 INFO FLASH TO STOCKHOLM AND PRIORITY TEHERAN BEIRUT WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

STOCKHOLM TELNO 367 TO FCO : SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS.

1. DIRECTOR GENERAL OF PROTOCOL HAS JUST TELEPHONED GOVERNMENT'S AGREEMENT TO MAINTENANCE OF DWS FACILITIES IN OUR INTERESTS SECTION ON RECIPROCAL BASIS.

2. HE MENTIONED NO (NO) CONDITIONS, E.G. ON SUBJECT MATTER OF TRAFFIC.

BALFOUR PAUL

NNNN

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:

NED
WED
COMMS DEPT
DWS
SECURITY DEPT
CONS DEPT
CONS EMERGENCY UNIT

CONFIDENTIAL

NEQ 3/548/1

IMMEDIATE
CYPHER/CAT A

TOP COPY

FM FCO Ø51Ø43Z
CONFIDENTIAL
TO FLASH BAGHDAD TELNO 129Ø OF 5 DECEMBER INFO FLASH STOCKHOLM

SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS

84

1. YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 1225 : BRITISH COUNCIL.
WE ARE TALKING TO THE CHAIRMAN TODAY AND WILL REPLY TO YOU SOONEST.

2. YOUR TEL NO 1227 : YOU ALREADY HAVE OUR REPLY.

3. YOUR TEL NO 1228 : SEE PARA 6 BELOW.

4. YOUR TELS NOS 1229 AND 1230 : ACCOMMODATION AND SERVICES DEPT WILL REPLY SOONEST TOMORROW.

5. YOUR TEL NO 1231. WE HAVE CONSULTED PERSONNEL OPERATIONS DEPT . WE THINK WE CANNOT USEFULLY COMMENT ON THE STAFFING OF THE SECTION UNTIL THE DWS ASPECT IS RESOLVED (PARA 6 BELOW). MEANWHILE ON YOUR PARA 2, WE HAVE CONFIRMED WITH THE IRAQI EMBASSY THAT THE FIGURES ARE :

COMMERCIAL SECTION: 1 DIPLOMAT PLUS ONE NON DIPLOMATIC SECRETARY. BUT OF COURSE THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT USE OTHER COMMERCIAL OFFICES IN LONDON, EG IRAQI AIRWAYS, IRAQI DATES BOARD AND RAFIDAIN BANK, WHICH COVER A MULTITUDE OF COMMERCIAL AND QUASI POLITICAL ACTIVITIES.

CULTURAL SECTION : 1 DIPLOMAT PLUS 5 NON DIPLOMATIC SUPPORTING STAFF.

6. THE SWEDES DOUBT IF THEY CAN GIVE A FINAL ANSWER TODAY ON THE DWS QUESTION (ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NOW ESTABLISHED THAT, WHEN THE SWISS PROTECTED OUR INTERESTS IN ALGIERS IN 1965-8, WE SENT CODED MESSAGES WHICH WERE NOT SUBJECT TO ANY SWISS APPROVAL OR MONITORING). IT WOULD HELP THE SWEDES ENORMOUSLY IF THEY COULD HAVE A REACTION FROM THEIR EMBASSADOR IN BAGHDAD. CAN YOU STIR HIM UP - REMINDING HIM OF THE ALGERIAN PRECEDENT - AND IF NECESSARY SEND A MESSAGE ON OUR CHANNELS WITH REFERENCE TO STOCKHOLM TEL NO. 2 TO YOU.

DOUGLAS-HOME

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:
NED
P&CD
OIL DEPT:
POD
CRD
A&TD
A&SD
PSD
SECURITY DEPT:
COMMS DEPT:
CONSULAR DEPT:
H & TD
DWS

COPIES TO:
COL. GRIFFITH, POD
WELFARE SECTION

CONFIDENTIAL

NEER 3/5 Vol 1

85

F L A S H CONFIDENTIAL
CYPHER/CAT A (NED)

FM FCO 051806Z

CONFIDENTIAL
TO FLASH BAGHDAD TELNO 1292 OF 5 DECEMBER INFO IMMEDIATE STOCKHOLM TEHRAN BEIRUT WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

STOCKHOLM TELNO 367 AND TELECONS MISS HUTCHINSON/MISS BECKETT: SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS.

1. WE HAVE ASKED THE SWEDES TO POSTPONE THEIR ANNOUNCEMENT UNTIL TOMORROW, TELLING THEM THAT WE SHOULD LIKE TO MAKE A PARALLEL ANNOUNCEMENT.

2. THE MAIN REASON - WHICH HAS NOT BEEN REVEALED TO THE SWEDES - IS THAT WE THINK THERE SHOULD BE NO ANNOUNCEMENT UNTIL THE OUTCOME OF TOMORROW'S MEETING IN THE SWEDISH MINISTRY IS KNOWN. CLEARLY IT WILL HELP THE SWEDES TO DECIDE ON THE CYPHER COMMUNICATIONS QUESTION IF THEY KNOW BEFORE THEIR MEETING WHAT THE IRAQI POSITION IS. ANYTHING FURTHER YOU CAN DO TO ESTABLISH THE IRAQI POSITION (CF PARA 4 OF YOUR TELNO 1228) WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE HELPFUL.

DOUGLAS-HOME

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

NED
P & CD
OIL D
CRD
A & TD
WELFARE SECTION
COMMS D

COPIES TO:

COL GRIFFITH	P O D
TRAVEL SECTION	
MR KEEBLE AND MR LORD	A & SD
MR D ROBINSON	PDS
MR TREWHITT	SECURITY D
DR THORNTON	CONSULAR D
MR MALLETT	M & TD

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNN

86

TOP COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
- 7 DEC 1971
NEQ 1/568/1

IMMEDIATE
CYPHER CAT A

FM BEIRUT 060810Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 573 DATED 6/12/71 AND IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD.

REFERENCE OUR TEL NO.568 OF 4TH DECEMBER.

IN PARA 2 (11) LAST SENTENCE, PLEASE READ ''COST'' FOR ''COVER''.

ERROR REGRETTED

WRIGHT

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
NED
P & CD
OIL D
CRD
ATD
A & SD
SECURITY D
COMMS D
CONSULAR D
M & VD
POD
PSD

COPIES TO:
MR HILLIER-FRY O D A

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNN

pm 8/12

CLAIR
FM KUWAIT 060820Z

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
-6 DEC 1971
NEQ 3/5481

RESTRICTED

TOP COPY

87

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED IMMEDIATE FCO TELEGRAM NO 543 OF 6TH DECEMBER 1971 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO BAGHDAD AND TEHRAN.

BAGHDAD TEL NO 1205 PARA 1 B. [SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS - NUTS AND BOLTS]

1. I SHOULD BE VERY GLAD TO HAVE COOK BASED HERE. THERE IS PLENTY TO BE DONE HERE AND KUWAIT IS NOT A BAD CENTRE FROM WHICH TO COVER OTHER POSTS.

WILTON.

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

NR EAST D
PERS OPS D
PSD
A & SD
COMMS D
DWS
SECURITY D
A & TD
CRD
POD (WELFARE)
CONSULAR D
CONS EMERG UNIT D
NEWS D
ARAB D
NTH AFR D
OIL D

RESTRICTED

V

pm 6/12

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER CAT A

FM STOCKHOLM ø61ø5øZ

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 - 7 DEC 1971
NEQ 3/5681/1

(TOP COPY)

88

Sent to Stockholm

TO IMMEDIATE F C O TELNO. 369 OF 6 DECEMBER INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD.

MY TELEGRAM NO.368 : SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS.

1. THE SWEDES HAVE AGREED TO OUR BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION HAVING DIRECT CYPHER DWS COMMUNICATION WITH THE FCO. AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE GIVEN THE PROTECTING POWER'S GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES AND THE FACT THAT THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION WOULD BE PART OF THE SWEDISH EMBASSY, THEY WOULD LIKE TO BE INFORMED OF THIS TRAFFIC. IN PRACTICE HOWEVER THEY THINK A SATISFACTORY MODUS VIVENDI CAN BE WORKED OUT IN BAGHDAD BETWEEN THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR AND THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION. HERR GIRON THOUGHT THAT SOMETHING ON THE LINES SHICH PREVAILED IN ALGERIA IN 1965-68 WHEN THE SWISS WERE PROTECTING BRITISH INTERESTS WOULD BE THE KIND OF ARRANGEMENT THAT MIGHT BE WORKED OUT.

2. IN CONVEYING THIS INFORMATION THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS STRESSED THAT AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT LEADING TO THIS DECISION HAD BEEN THE ASSURANCES CONVEYED YESTERDAY EVENING BY THE HEAD OF CHANCERY (TELEPHONE CONVERSATION RESIDENT CLERK/ HEAD OF CHANCERY REFERS) THAT THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION WOULD DO NOTHING WHICH COULD IN ANY WAY EMBARRASS THE PROTECTING POWER AND THAT THE TRAFFIC WOULD BE RESTRICTED TO COMMERCIAL/ECONOMIC, CONSULAR AND CULTURAL MATTERS. IN BRIEF AND AS OLD FRIENDS QUOTE WE WOULD TRUST EACH OTHER UNQUOTE.

CONFIDENTIAL

3. HERR GIRON ADDED THAT AS IN 1967 WHEN THE SWEDES PROTECTED OUR INTERESTS IN IRAQ, EVEN IF THE CIRCUMSTANCES ARE DIFFERENT THERE SHOULD BE AN AGREED UK-SWEDISH MEMORANDUM. THE MFA HAVE DUG UP THE MEMORANDUM OF 15 JUNE 1967, OF WHICH UNFORTUNATELY WE HERE HOLD NO COPY, AND ARE BRINGING IT UP TO DATE.

4. THE SWEDES ARE PROPOSING TO REINFORCE THEIR EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD BY A SENIOR AND A JUNIOR OFFICER WHO WILL PROBABLY BE SENT OUT THIS WEEK.

5. HERR GIRON ALSO ASKED WHETHER ANY OF OUR LOCALLY ENGAGED STAFF WOULD CONTINUE TO BE EMPLOYED AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR PAYMENT OF SALARIES, ADMINISTRATION ETC. HEAD OF CHANCERY COMMENTED THAT SHE THOUGHT THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION WOULD MOSTLY BE ABLE TO ADMINISTER ITSELF.

MILLARD

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
NEAR EAST. D
WED
COMMS D
DWS D
SECURITY D D
CONSULAR D D
CONS EMERG UNIT

NEQ 1/548/1

89

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT 'A'

(NE)

FM FCO 061310Z

CONFIDENTIAL
TO FLASH BAGHDAD TELNO 1294 OF 6 DECEMBER
YOUR TELEGRAM NO 1231: SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS
1. WE CANNOT GIVE FINAL ANSWER ON THE STAFFING OF THE INTERESTS SECTION UNTIL WE KNOW HOW MANY NON-DIPLOMATIC STAFF MAY REMAIN IN BAGHDAD. COULD YOU PLEASE PRESS THE D G OF PROTOCOL FOR A REPLY (YOUR PARA 4) - POSITIVE, WE HOPE.

DOUGLAS-HOME

NNNN

F I L E S:
NED
POD
SIR W. LUCE

&&&&

CONFIDENTIAL

90

TOP COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
-7 DEC 1971
NEQ 3/54/1

FLASH

CYPHER CAT A
FM BAGHDAD 06:035Z
CONFIDENTIAL
TO FLASH F.C.O. TELNO 1239 OF 6/12 INFO PRIORITY STOCKHOLM.

YOUR TELNO 1294: SEVERANCE.

1. D.G. OF PROTOCOL HAS AT LAST COME UP WITH THE FOLLOWING:

(A) WE COULD KEEP THE COMMERCIAL COUNSELLOR IF WE WISHED. I SAID WE WERE NOT PRESSING FOR HIM, SINCE HE WAS DEPUTY HEAD OF MISSION AND NOT PURELY COMMERCIAL. (I HAD OF COURSE ONLY MENTIONED HIM ORIGINALLY AS A BARGAINING COUNTER). WHAT ABOUT THE OTHER THREE COMMERCIAL OFFICERS? THEY COULD STAY, HE SAID.

(B) WE COULD HAVE TWO GUARDS (I.E. SECURITY OFFICERS) IN ADDITION TO THE TWO NON-DIPLOMATIC STAFF ALREADY AGREED FOR THE INTERESTS SECTION.

2. I REMINDED HIM THAT I HAD ASKED FOR AN ADDITIONAL DIPLOMAT, SINCE WE WOULD OTHERWISE BE UNABLE TO ISSUE VISAS. (THE CONSULAR OFFICER WOULD BE TOO BUSY WITH OTHER THINGS). HE SEEMED TO HAVE OVERLOOKED THIS POINT. I SAID HE COULD SURELY APPROVE AN EXTRA JUNIOR DIPLOMAT IN LIEU OF THE COMMERCIAL COUNSELLOR. THIS WOULD BE VERY MUCH IN THE IRAQI INTEREST - AND ANYWAY THE NUMBERS PROPOSED AT EITHER END WERE STILL DISTINCTLY OUT OF BALANCE, SINCE THE CULTURAL SECTION OF THE IRAQI EMBASSY CONSISTED OF ONE DIPLOMAT AND 5 NON-DIPLOMATS, WHEREAS OUR EMBASSY HAD NO CULTURAL SECTION. (HE SEEMED SURPRISED AT THE FIGURES FOR THEIR CULTURAL SECTION SO I SAID I WAS QUOTING THE CHARGE D'AFFA ES.)

tel to Baghdad 7/12 pm 9/12

3. HE SAID HE WOULD LET ME KNOW TOMORROW MORNING. I HARDLY THINK THEY CAN OBJECT.

4. ON THE ASSUMPTION

4. ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT ONE ADDITIONAL JUNIOR DIPLOMAT IS APPROVED, MY FINAL PROPOSALS FOR THOSE TO REMAIN HERE ARE:

(A) DIPLOMATS
SECOND SECRETARY LEWTY
CONSULAR ATTACHE AND VISA OFFICER RAE
ADMINISTRATION OFFICER VOYSEY
CBO MANSFIELD

(B) NON-DIPLOMATS
ARCHIVIST AND A.A.O. SMITH
CBO JAMES
SECURITY OFFICER VALENTINE
SECURITY OFFICER HARRIS

(C) COMMERCIAL
FIRST SECRETARY DONOVAN (ASSUMING VISA IS FORTHCOMING)
SECOND SECRETARY CARTWRIGHT
ATTACHE WRIGHT.

5. IF FOURTH DIPLOMAT IS NOT APPROVED, WE CAN MANAGE WITH CBO JAMES ALONE AND MANSFIELD WOULD LEAVE.

BALFOUR PAUL

DEPARTMENTAL
NED
PERSONNEL OPS DEPT:
PERSONNEL SERVICES DEPT:
PROTOCOL & CONFERENCE DEPT:
CONSULAR DEPT:
COMMS DEPT:
OIL DEPT:
C.R.D.
A & TD
A & SD
SECURITY DEPT:
M, & V.D.
WELFARE SECTION, POD.

IMMEDIATE RESTRICTED

91

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD Ø6Ø81ØZ

RESTRICTED

TO IMMEDIATE F.C.O. TELNO. 1236 OF 6/12 INFO PRIORITY BEIRUT

AND SAVING TO TEHRAN.

TOP PART

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
-7 DEC 1971

NEQ 7/5681

23 C

YOUR TELNO 1281: SEVERANCE - NUTS AND BOLTS.

1. EMBASSY TRANSPORT.

WE PROPOSE TO SEND THE DAIMLER (WHICH, AS YOU KNOW, HAS GIVEN TROUBLE) AND ONE LANDROVER (WHICH STILL HAS BRITISH PLATES AND ABOUT WHOSE IMPORT WE WERE STILL ARGUING WITH THE MFA) TO BEIRUT FOR DISPOSAL. BUT THERE IS NO PARTICULAR REASON FOR THE DAIMLER TO LEAVE AT THE SAME TIME AS US, AND IT CAN FOLLOW LATER. WE PROPOSE TO RETAIN:

A. ZEPHYR (AS REPRESENTATIONAL CAR). SINCE IT IS DISTINCTLY AGED, WE HOPE THAT CRESTA ON ORDER WILL STILL BE SENT.
B. VAUXHALL VICTOR (WHICH SIMPLY WILL NOT MAKE THE TRIP TO BEIRUT IN ITS PRESENT STATE).
C. 1 LANDROVER (USEFUL GENERAL PURPOSE VEHICLE)
1 COMMER BUS (ESSENTIAL FOR LOCAL STAFF TRANSPORT)
1 LORRY (ESSENTIAL FOR SHIFTING FURNITURE ETC.).

2. CARS AND HEAVY BAGGAGE.

ASSUME YOU AGREE TO THE PROPOSALS SET OUT IN BEIRUT TELNO 568 TO YOU. IF SO, OUR PRESENT THINKING IS THAT WE SHOULD MOVE ALL HEAVY BAGGAGE, PLUS CARS OF ANY WHO ARE UNABLE TO SELL THEM LOCALLY, TO BEIRUT TO AWAIT DISPOSAL. WE ARE MOST GRATEFUL TO BEIRUT FOR THE OFFER OF TMA CHARTER (THEIR TELNO 565 TO US) BU DO NOT CONSIDER THIS WILL BE NECESSARY.

3. PASSAGES OF CHILDREN.

FUTURE OF MANSFIELDS AND VALENTINES STILL UNCERTAIN. WILL REVERT SOONEST. (DAUGHTER OF LATTER IS ESPECIALLY PRESSING PROBLEM SINCE SHE FINISHES SCHOOL ON FRIDAY, 1Ø DECEMBER AND IS DUE TO FLY HER ON 11 DECEMBER). CARTWRIGHT SEEMS VERY LIKELY TO STAY

PSD have dealt. pm 9/12

AND WOULD LIKE YOU TO RETAIN BOOKINGS FOR HIS TWO CHILDREN JOHN (17) AND PAMELA (15) TO FLY AS PLANNED ON 1Ø DECEMBER FROM MANCHESTER VIA LONDON TO BAHDAD, UNLESS WE INSTRUCTTO THE CONTRARY. (THEY ARE BOOKED TO STAY THAT NIGHT AT AERIALS HOTEL AT HEATHROW AND TO FLY ON HERE BY BOAC ON 11 DECEMBER.)

4. LAUNCH.
WE CONSIDER THAT THE LAUNCH IS ESSENTIAL AS PART OF OUR EMERGENCY PLANNING. (FOR EXAMPLE, OUR SKELETON EMERGENCY STAFF WERE STANDING BY TO ABANDON THE CHANCERY BUILDINGS AND ESCAPE BY LAUNCH ON 1 DECEMBER HAD THE MAMMOTH DEMONSTRATION ATTACKED THE EMBASSY.)

5. QM S.
WE WILL MEET THE QM ON 11 DECEMBER AS USUAL. THEREAFTER, FUTURE OF BAG SERVICE IS STILL UNDER DISCUSSION WITH IRAQIS AND SWEDES, THOUGH FORMER HAVE INDICATED THAT IN PRINCIPLE THEY ARE WILLING FOR SOME FORM OF DIPLOMATIC POUCH SERVICE TO CONTINUE.

6. CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS.
WE BURNED MOST OF OUR CLASSIFIED PAPERS ON 1 DECEMBER WHEN WE KNOW THAT RELATIONS WERE BROKEN AND THAT A MAJOR DEMONSTRATION WAS PLANNED. BUT WE WILL BE RETURNING ANYTHING WE THINK NEEDS TO BE PRESERVED IN LONDON, BY THE QM WHO HAS BEEN DIVERTED TO FLY HOME FROM HERE (RATHER THAN KUWAIT) ON THURSDAY, 9 DECEMBER. DETAILS WILL FOLLOW.

7. ALLOWANCES.
STAFF WERE DISAPPOINTED BY YOUR TEXTBOOK DECISION ON ALLOWANCES. THEY WERE EXPECTING TREATMENT BROADLY SIMILAR TO WHAT THEY BELIEVE WAS AWARDED TO STAFF IN CAIRO IN 1967, NAMELY PAYMENT OF ALLOWANCES UP TO THE END OF THE MONTH FOLLOWING EVACUATION. SERVANTS, FOR INSTANCE, WILL HAVE TO BE PAID FOR A MONTH AFTER EMPLOYERS HAVE LEFT.

8. MOVEMENT OF STAFF BACK TO UK.
UNLESS WE HEAR FROM YOU TO THE CONTRARY WE PLAN TO FLY MOST MEMBERS OF STAFF BACK TO LONDON ON THE BOAC FLIGHT ON SUNDAY 12 DECEMBER (BA 203) BY WHICH I AM TRAVELLING MYSELF. A FEW MAY PREFER TO RETURN BY THE ESPERIA, LEAVING BEIRUT ON 13 DECEMBER. HEAD OF CHANCERY WILL LEAVE ON 15 DECEMBER. DA INTENDS TO LEAD A CONVOY OF HIS STAFF OUT BY ROAD TO BEIRUT (NORTH JORDAN ROUTE) ON 13 DECEMBER. AS SOON AS THE SHAPE OF THE RESIDUAL MISSION IS FINALISED, STAFF WILL COMPLETE EVACUATION FORMS AND WE WILL TELEGRAPH DETAILS. (SYRIAN CHARGE HERE, INCIDENTALLY, HAS ASSURED US THAT THERE WILL BE NO DIFFICULTY OVER OBTAINING TRANSIT VISAS FOR THOSE DRIVING TO BEIRUT.)

/9. AIRFREIGHT.

9. AIRFREIGHT.
THANK YOU FOR INCREASED AIRFREIGHT ENTITLEMENT WHICH IS MOST HELPFUL. CAN YOU ARRANG FOR A REPRESENTATIVE OF THOMAS COOK OR SIMILAR AGENCY TO BE AVAILABLE AT LONDON AIRPORT TO HELP WITH CLEARANCE OF AIRFREIGHT AND ITS ONWARD TRANSMISSION, WHICH WILL BE CARRIED ON BA 203 ON 12 DECEMBER.

10. DENT'S (DTMS) AIRFREIGHT HAS JUST REACHED BAGHDAD (EXCLAMATION MARK). BEFORE WE SEND THIS BACK TO LONDON, GRATEFUL CONFIRMATION THAT DENT WILL NOT BE POSTED ELSEWHERE IN THE AREA.
FCO PASS PARA 1 ONLY SAVING TO TEHRAN (FOR BURRIDGE)

BALFOUR PAUL

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

NED
P & CD
OIL D
CRD
A & TD
A & SD
SECURITY D
POD
WELFARE SECT
COMMS D
CONSULAR D
M & VD

COPIES TO:

MR ROBINSON) O D A
MR HILLIER-FRY)

NNNNN

Enter 91 A

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
10 DEC 1971

NEQ 3/5681.

IMMEDIATE
CYPHER/CATA

CONFIDENTIAL

FM F C O 061900Z

(PC 16/359/1)

CONFIDENTIAL.

TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NUMBER 1299 OF 6 DECEMBER.

YOUR TELEGRAM 1226: SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS/ BRITISH COUNCIL.

1. CHAIRMAN HAS NOW AGREED THAT COUNCIL STAFF SHOULD REMAIN IN BAGHDAD AND THAT DIPLOMATIC STATUS SHOULD NOT (REPEAT NOT) BE SOUGHT. THIS AGREEMENT IS SUBJECT TO SPRINGFORD'S OBTAINING AN UNDERTAKING FROM THE IRAQIS TO GUARANTEE THE COUNCIL SPECIAL PROTECTION (PARAGRAPH 3 OF YOUR TEL UNDER REFERENCE): ALSO TO ASSURANCES THAT, IN THE EVENT OF TROUBLE, THE PROTECTING POWER WILL ACKNOWLEDGE AS MUCH RESPONSIBILITY TOWARDS THE COUNCIL STAFF AND PREMISES AS YOU YOURSELVES WOULD HAVE DONE.

2. COUNCIL AGREE IN PRINCIPLE THAT UNDERWOOD SHOULD RETURN TO IRAQ, BUT PREFER TO MAKE A FIRM DECISION TOWARDS THE END OF HIS LEAVE IN THE UK, IE END JANUARY. THEY WILL CONTINUE TO LOOK FOR SUITABLE PERSON TO FILL ASSISTANT REPRESENTATIVE POST IN DUE COURSE (YOUR PARA 4).

DOUGLAS-HOME.

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
CRD
NED

COPY TO
MR PHILLIPS BRITISH COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

F L A S H CONFIDENTIAL

TOP COPY

92

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 070955Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FLASH F.C.O. TELNO 1244 OF 7/12 INFO FLASH TO STOCKHOLM.

88

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 -7 DEC 1971 NED 3/Sec/1

STOCKHOLM TELEGRAM NO 369 TO FCO,
SEVERANCE AND CYPHER FACILITIES.

1. I HAVE RECEIVED NO REPLY TO THE QUESTION RAISED IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF MY TELEGRAM NO 1228 ABOUT TELLING THE SWEDES WE HANDLE IPC TRAFFIC. MY CONVERSATIONS WITH THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR, WHO IS OUT TO HELP BUT TENDS TO HARP ON THE CYPHER ISSUE, ARE BECOMING DISTINCTLY EMBARRASSING.

2. UNLESS OUR INTENTION IS TO TRY TO BLUR THE ISSUE BY TREATING IPC TRAFFIC AS COVERED BY THE FORMULA IN THE FIRST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 2 OF TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE AND MAKING NO SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO IT IN ADVANCE (WHICH MIGHT IN THE EVENT LAND US IN DIFFICULTIES AND WOULD CERTAINLY BE DECEITFUL), I FEEL I MUST SAY SOMETHIN ON THE SUBJECT AT MY NEXT MEETING WITH HIM. IT WOULD CERTAINLY STRIKE HIM AS DISHONEST IF WE WERE TO AGREE A FORMUALA FIRST AND THEN TELL HIM OF THE IPC TRAFFIC (WHICH IN PRACTICE INEVITABLY CONTAINS SOME POLITICAL MATTER) AFTERWARDS.

3. CAN I AT LEAST SAY THAT WE SEND SOME MESSAGES ON IPC MATTERS, ESPECIALLY WHEN DELICATE NEGOTIATIONS ARE GOING ON BETWEEN THE COMPANY AND THE IRAQIS, AND THAT YOU ARE CHECKING WITH HIS MINISTRY THAT THIS IS COVERED BY GIRON'S FORMULA IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE? (HE HAS NOT YET RECEIVED WORD OF THIS FORMULA HIMSELF FROM STOCKHOLM.)

4. I NEED AT THE SAME TIME SOMETHING TO SAY ABOUT MONITORING, MORE DEFINITE THAN PARA 3 OF STOCKHOLM TEL NO 366. IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO LEAVE IT TO GERRING AND THE INTERESTS SECTION TO ''WORK OUT A MODUS VIVENDI''.

5. GRATEFUL FOR REPLY TODAY.

BALFOUR PAUL /REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

NED	SECURITY D
WED	OIL D
COMMS D	GIPD
DWS	IAD

Tel to Stockholm 7/12 pm 8.9 pm

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNN

(4)

Division for Protecting
British Interests.

Re: Protocols of Transfer.
B. 16 A. 1.7.67

Baghdad, 4th July, 1967.
No. B. 22.
MP 19.

4 enclosures.

Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs
B - Department.

The Swedish Embassy, Division for Protecting British Interests, has the honour to remit to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs the originals of the 4 Protocols of Transfer which have been drafted in connection with the transfer under the Swedish protection of the property for which Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy in Baghdad, The British Consulate General in Basrah, the British Council and the Centre of English Studies in Basrah normally are responsible, to wit:

1. Protocol dated 15/6/67, regarding the British Embassy, Baghdad.

2. Protocol dated 13/6/67, regarding the British Consulate General in Basrah.

3. Protocol dated 17/6/67 regarding the British Council in Baghdad.

4. Protocol dated 13/6/67 regarding the Centre of English Studies in Basrah.

Folke Persson.

4p Encls in original retained by MFA.
2 XEROX COPIES TO EASTERN DEPT
4/7/67

FP/136.

0.840.GB-Alg.-

Comme suite à sa note du 22 mars 1966 concernant l'accord sur la représentation des intérêts britanniques en Algérie, le Département Politique Fédéral a l'honneur de faire tenir en annexe à l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté Britannique les pièces suivantes:

- copie certifiée conforme du texte de la note suisse;
- original de la note de réponse du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire.

Le Département saisit cette occasion pour renouveler à l'Ambassade l'assurance de sa haute considération.

Berne, le 28 mars 1966

Annexes: mentionnées

DEPARTEMENT POLITIQUE FÉDÉRAL

Ambassade de Sa Majesté Britannique

B e r n e

(10221)

No. 42

Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy present their compliments to the Federal Political Department and have the honour to acknowledge with thanks receipt of the Department's Note 0.840.GB-Alg. of the 28th of March and its enclosures, viz:

- a certified copy of the text of the Swiss Note
- the original of the Note sent in reply by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria.

Her Majesty's Embassy avail themselves of this opportunity of renewing to the Federal Political Department the assurance of their highest consideration.

BERNE,

30 March, 1966.

PRESS RELEASE

To be issued at 12.30 News Conference, 6 December 1971

BRITISH INTERESTS IN IRAQ

The Royal Swedish Government have kindly agreed to assume the protection of British interests in Iraq. After the departure of the British Ambassador, the Swedish Embassy will contain a British interests section. This section will operate, under the Swedish flag, in the premises now occupied by the British Embassy.

pub 9/12

CONFIDENTIAL

93

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1

Telephone 01-

Miss P M Hutchinson
STOCKHOLM

Your reference

Our reference NEQ 3/548/1

Date 7 December 1971

SEVERENCE OF RELATIONS

1. Herewith the promised documents. I hope they will be useful. (I have not enclosed the lists and inventories mentioned in the Protocol of 31 March 1966 or the Swiss Note of 7 April 1966).

Veronica Beckett
Near Eastern Department

Copy & encs to :

A C D S MacRae, Esq, Baghdad

Encs

parke
9/12

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy for 1971 file.

Ministère
des Affaires Etrangères

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
-8 DEC 1971
NEQ 3/548/.

REPUBLIQUE ALGERIENNE
DÉMOCRATIQUE ET POPULAIRE

W93

DAE/N° 664582/DAJC/N° 15168

Alger le 21 MARS 1966 196

Le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire présente ses compliments à l'Ambassade de Suisse et a l'honneur de se référer à la note de l'Ambassade de ce jour, dont la teneur est la suivante :

" Il est entendu que les relations consulaires entre le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique et la République Algérienne ne sont pas affectées par la rupture des relations diplomatiques.

En vue de faciliter l'accomplissement des tâches découlant du maintien des relations précitées et qui comprennent également les affaires culturelles, économiques et de coopération technique, il sera constitué auprès de l'Ambassade de Suisse un Service des intérêts britanniques.

La formule "Ambassade de Suisse, Service des intérêts britanniques, Alger" figurera sur les documents et les sceaux utilisés par ce service notamment pour la délivrance de visas, l'établissement de passeports britanniques et la prolongation de leur validité, ainsi que pour des légalisations.

.../...

Sent to Stockholm
Baghdad
Pr 15/10/12.

Il est reconnu à ce service la faculté d'échanger directement avec les Autorités britanniques des messages par radio, des télégrammes chiffrés et des courriers par valise diplomatique.

Il est entendu que cinq diplomates britanniques et huit fonctionnaires administratifs et techniques, dont les noms sont indiqués à l'annexe 1, demeureront à Alger.

Ces agents, qui seront attribués au Service des intérêts britanniques, jouiront des privilèges et immunités reconnus aux agents de l'Ambassade de même catégorie.

A cet effet, les membres du personnel britannique demeurant sur place seront annoncés au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de la République Algérienne et les diplomates inscrits sur la liste diplomatique dans la section réservée à l'Ambassade et sous le sous-titre "Service des intérêts britanniques", avec mention de leur nationalité britannique.

Il sera fait usage pour annoncer le personnel au Ministère et pour l'inscrire, s'il y a lieu, sur la liste diplomatique des formules indiquées à l'annexe 2.

Les membres du personnel britannique demeurés à Alger, pourront en tout temps être remplacés par de nouveaux agents dans les conditions prévues par le droit diplomatique, pour autant que les limites numériques fixées d'un commun accord ne soient pas dépassées.

Les agents diplomatiques britanniques attribués au Service des intérêts britanniques auront le droit d'entretenir, dans les limites de leurs attributions, tout contact avec les fonctionnaires du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères. "

.../...

Le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire a l'honneur de confirmer à l'Ambassade de Suisse son accord sur ce qui précède.

Le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères saisit cette occasion pour renouveler à l'Ambassade de Suisse les assurances de sa haute considération.

AMBASSADE DE SUISSE

- ALGER -

2annexes mentionnées



Annexe 1

M. S.Y. DAWBARN, Conseiller d'Ambassade

M. B.R. PRIDHAM, Premier Secrétaire d'Ambassade

M. R.C. ROBINSON, Premier Secrétaire d'Ambassade

M. K.H. SYRETT, Deuxième Secrétaire d'Ambassade

M. I.C. SLOANE, Troisième Secrétaire d'Ambassade

M. J.G. OLIVER, Comptable

M. M. FROST, Archiviste

M. M. DOEHREN, Archiviste

M. J. WAINER, Opérateur

M. G. MATHER, Opérateur

M. W.W. NUTTELL, Planton

Mlle P.A. NOBLE, Sténodactylo

Mlle A. MOFFAT, Préceptrice

Annexe 2

Formule pour l'inscription d'un diplomate britannique sur la liste diplomatique :

M. Brian Robert PRIDHAM

Premier Secrétaire (britannique)

Mme Pridham

Formule pour annoncer un membre du personnel administratif et technique :

Mlle Patricia Anne NOBLE

Sténoflactylo -(britannique)

Protocole de reprise

A la demande du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique et sur l'acceptation du Gouvernement de la Confédération Suisse, vu l'assentiment du Gouvernement de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire

Monsieur Simon Yelverton Dawbarn, Conseiller de l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté Britannique à Alger

remet à

Monsieur Sigismond Marcuard, Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et Plénipotentiaire de la Confédération Suisse en Algérie

les intérêts britanniques en Algérie.

Les annexes suivantes font partie intégrante du présent protocole :

a) Liste des immeubles de la résidence de l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté Britannique.

b) Inventaire du mobilier de la résidence précitée.

c) Liste du personnel de l'Ambassade.

Tous autres objets qui sont propriété de l'Ambassade britannique, soit loués ou utilisés par elle, et en particulier les bâtiments de la chancellerie de l'Ambassade, 7 chemin des Glycines, le mobilier et les documents qu'ils contiennent, la caisse et la comptabilité de l'Ambassade, ainsi que les voitures de service, sont confiés en gestion directe au Service des intérêts britanniques près l'Ambassade de Suisse. Pour ce motif ils ne sont pas mentionnés dans le présent protocole.

Ce protocole a été fait à Alger le 31 mars 1966, en six exemplaires en langue française.

S Y Dawbarn
.....
Simon Y. Dawbarn
Conseiller d'Ambassade
pour l'Ambassade de
Sa Majesté Britannique

BRITISH EMBASSY

S. Marcuard
.....
Sigismond Marcuard
Ambassadeur de Suisse
en Algérie

AMBASSADE DE SUISSE EN RÉPUBLIQUE ALGÉRIENNE

O.841.GB-Alg. 011

Comme suite à sa note du 28 mars 1966, le Département Politique Fédéral a l'honneur de faire tenir en annexe à l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté Britannique un exemplaire du protocole de reprise des intérêts britanniques, signé le 31 mars 1966.

Les annexes suivantes font partie intégrante du protocole:

a) Liste des immeubles de la résidence de l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté Britannique.

b) Inventaire du mobilier de la résidence précitée.

c) Liste du personnel de l'Ambassade.

Tous les autres objets qui ne figurent pas au protocole précité et en particulier les bâtiments de la chancellerie de l'Ambassade, le mobilier et les documents qu'ils contiennent, la caisse et la comptabilité de l'Ambassade, ainsi que les voitures de service, sont confiés en gestion directe et sous leur responsabilité aux agents britanniques restés à Alger.

Le Département saisit cette occasion pour renouveler à l'Ambassade l'assurance de sa haute considération.

Berne, le 7 avril 1966

Annexe mentionnée (2 exemplaires)

DEPARTEMENT POLITIQUE FÉDÉRAL

Ambassade de Sa Majesté Britannique

Berne

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

PRIORITY

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 -8DEC 1971

NEQ 3/5481

DISTRIBUTED TO
SENT M.O.D.
HD. OF DEFENCE DEPT.
HD. OF P.U.S.D.
P.U.S.D.
PERSONNEL OPS. DEPT.
HD. OF COMMNS. DEPT.
EXAMINERS
FILE R K 129

CYPHER CAT A
FM BAGHDAD 077745Z
RESTRICTED

FXA 077537Z DEC.
DEFCOMCEN PASS JSEC CYPRUS.
ROM DEFAT.
REFERENCES. ALPHA. MOD SIGNAL FXA DATED Ø31Ø25Z DEC.(NOT TO AMMAN9
BRAVO. DA AMMAN SIGNAL MOH/FXA DATED Ø4Ø93ØZ DEC (NOT TO BEIRUT).
MOST GRATEFUL YOUR PROMPT AND ENCOURAGING REPLY. ALL GOES
SMOOTHLY HERE.
ALPHA. ALL WIVES AND CHILDREN TRAVEL 12 DEC BOAC FLT 2Ø3
ETA HEATHROW 1405Z. ONWARD ROUTING AS FOLLOWS.
(1) MRS HARROD TO CAMBERLEY BY CAR. PLEASE INFORM COL W R
TAYLOR, STAFF COLLEGE, OF ETA.
(2) MISS DIXON. LONDON THEN TRAIN TO BOURNEMOUTH.
(3) MRS WILLS. TO COBHAM, WILL TAKE TAXI UNLESS YOU CAN MAKE
CAR AVAILABLE.
(4) FAMILY BASSOM. AIRPORT BUS TO READING THEN TO CARDIFF.
WARRANT REQUIRED READING - CARDIFF.
(5) FAMILY MCNAUGHTON. ULTIMATE DESTINATION PITLOCHRY BUT
REMAIN LIVERPOOL UNTIL ARRIVAL SGT MCNAUGHTON. NOT CLEAR
WHETHER ONE WARRANT WILL DO BOTH JOURNEYS BUT WARRANT REQUIRED
ON ARRIVAL.
(6) FAMILY CLARKIN. OWN ARRANGEMENTS.

BRAVO. MILITARY CONVOY OF FOLLOWING VEHICLES :

COL HARROD	CD 5-21
WG CDR WILLS	CD 23-21
MAJ HAY	CD 17 -. 21
WO BASSOM	32 FJ 71
SGT MCNAUGHTON	32 FJ 71
SGT CLARKIN	CD 28-21.

LEAVES BAGHDAD Ø63ØC 13 DEC. PROPOSED ROUTE AMMAN FOR NIGHT
13/14 DEC, BEIRUT TO ARRIVE P.M. 14 DEC.

CHARLIE. FOR DA AMMAN. GRATEFUL IF YOU CAN ARRANGE ACCOMMODATION
FOR US NIGHT 13/14 DEC AND SECURITY OF LOADED CARS. ALSO

FOR US NIGHT 13/14 DEC AND SECURITY OF LOADED CARS. ALSO GRATEFUL IF FRONTIER POST COULD BE WARNED OF OUR ARRIVAL. WE EXPECT TO HAVE VALID VISAS.

DELTA. FOR DA BEIRUT. GRATEFUL IF YOU CAN ARRANGE ACCOMMODATION FOR US NIGHT 14/15 DEC AND ONWARD MOVE TO CYPRUS 15 DEC WITH UP TO 1,800 LBS ACCOMPANIED EXCESS BAGGAGE. AUTHORITY REF ALPHA. YOU WILL ACQUIRE TWO LEFT HAND DRIVE AUSTINS 1800, ONE RIGHT HAND DRIVE 1800, ONE LONG WHEEL BASE AND ONE SHORT WHEEL BASE LANDROVER.

ECHO. FOR JSBC CYPRUS. PLEASE ARRANGE RECEPTION AT NICOSIA AND ONWARD MOVE TO UK. F IDENT 173 WILL BE REQUIRED ON ARRIVAL. PLEASE ASK JIS(NE) WHETHER THEY WOULD LIKE ANY DEBRIEFING BEFORE I RETURN TO UK. PLEASE ALSO INFORM COL THORNTON COS UNIFICYP AND MAJOR GWINNUTT HQ NELF THAT THIS TIME I HOPE TO ARRIVE IN CYPRUS.

FOXTROT. FOR SAAS. WILL SEND FURTHER SIGNAL ABOUT REQUIREMENT FOR ONWARD ROUTING OF RAOD PARTY ON ARRIVAL UK.

BALFOUR PAUL

NNNN

SENT TO D.C.C.

Copy returned by Hqs Rmt

FCO 688/E047/3

LKS 140/03

OO DEFCOMCEN

GR 270

CYPHER CAT A
FM BAGHDAD 030910Z
CONFIDENTIAL

DISTRIBUTED TO
SENT M.O.D.
HD. OF DEFENCE DEPT.
HD. OF P.U.S.D.
P.U.S.D.
NED
PERSONNEL OPS. DEPT.
HD. OF COMMNS. DEPT.
EXAMINERS
FILE R K 129

TO MODUK, HQNEAD XXXX HQNEAF (DEFENCE COMMCEN PASS TO HQ NEAF.
FXA/HAQ/HBC/HBM 030900Z

FROM BRITAIRAT.

1. SUBJECT TO ANY DECISION YOU MAY BE CONSIDERING IN RESPONSE DEFAT SIGNAL FXA 020725Z DEC 71 (NOTAL) (AND SHOULD YOU DECIDE THAT SERVICE CARS SHOULD BE RETAINED FOR TIME BEING AT BAGHDAD) YOU MAY ALTERNATIVELY WISH TO INVESTIGATE FEASIBILITY OF AIR-LIFTING SERVICE ATTACHES WITH FAMILIES AND BAGGAGE FROM BAGHDAD TO CYPRUS FOR ON MOVE TO UK BY ASC SCHEDULED FLIGHT.
2. IRAQI REACTION TO THIS SUGGESTION MAY NOT BE UNFAVOURABLE IN VIEW OF A REQUEST FROM THEM SINCE BREAK IN RELATIONS FOR ENTRY VISAS FOR 15 OFFICERS AND NCOS (CREW OF AN12 MILITARY TRANSPORT) TO VISIT UK. ALSO WE RECENTLY MANAGED TO OBTAIN CLEARANCE FOR OVERFLIGHT THROUGH SYRIA, LANDING AT BAGHDAD, FOR THREE BRITISH PILOTED AIRCRAFT OF THE ABU DHABI DEFENCE FORCE.

10/12

3. APART FROM AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY, JUSTIFICATION FOR FLIGHT WOULD PRESUMABLY DEPEND ON POSSIBLE SAVING IN CIVIL AIR FARES AND FREIGHT CHARGES, BUT INCIDENTAL ADVANTAGES WOULD BE ABILITY TO TAKE OUT SERVICE EQUIPMENT AND SENSITIVE EMBASSY MATERIAL, AND OPPORTUNITY TO TEST FEASIBILITY OF FLYING RAF AIRCRAFT INTO BAGHDAD.

4. THE AIRLIFT WOULD CONSIST OF 13 ADULTS (7 FEMALE) AND 5 CHILDREN. FCO STAFF WOULD NOT BE INVOLVED. IF ALL PERSONAL BAGGAGE WERE INCLUDED THIS WOULD NOT EXCEED 10,000 LBS, BUT FOR PRACTICAL REASONS (EG LOADING) IT IS ASSUMED THAT MOST OF THE LATTER WOULD HAVE TO REMAIN FOR LAND/SEA SHIPMENT. EARLIEST PRACTICAL DATE FOR FLIGHT WOULD BE PM 12 DECEMBER WITH ABSOLUTE DEADLINE OF 15 DEC.

5. FOR HQNEAF. GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD ADVISE MOD OF LIKELY AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY. MEANWHILE I WILL INVESTIGATE FEASIBILITY OF IRAQI CLEARANCE FOR BAGHDAD INTERNATIONAL.

BALFOUR PAUL

NNNN

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
-8 DEC 1971
NEQ 3/548/1

TOP COPY

96

FLASH
FM CLAIR
FM BAGHDAD 071540Z
UNCLASSIFIED

TO FLASH FCO TELNO 1248 OF 7 DEC 71 INFO PRIORITY STOCKHOLM

90

MY TELNO 1239. : SEVERANCE.

D.G. OF PROTOCOL HAS NOW TELEPHONED AGREEMENT TO ADDITION OF FOURTH DIPLOMAT (IN RANK OF ATTACHE) TO INTEREST SECTION ON RECIPROCAL BASIS.

BALFOUR PAUL

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
NED
POD
PSD
P & C D
CONS D
COMMS D
OIL D
CRD
A & T D
A & S D
SECURITY D
M & V D
WELFARE SECT(POD)

pub 9/2

CONFIDENTIAL

FLASH
CYPHER CAT A
BAGHDAD 080645Z
CONFIDENTIAL
TO FLASH F.C.O. TELNO 1252 OF 8/12 INFO FLASH TO STOCKHOLM.

TOP COPY

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10
-8 DEC 1971

YOUR TELNO 203 TO STOCKHOLM: SEVERANCE AND CYPHER FACILITIES.

1. I SINCERELY HOPE HM AMBASSADOR STOCKHOLM WILL NOT (NOT) FIND IT NECESSARY TO MAKE THE OFFER IN THE LAST HALF OF PARAGRAPH 3B. IN MY VIEW THE ARRANGEMENT THERE SUGGESTED WOULD FALL BETWEEN TWO STOOLS AND MIGHT MAKE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR AND THE HEAD OF OUR INTERESTS SECTION UNWORKABLE.

NEQ 3/548/1

2. A SIMILAR OBJECTION APPLIES, AS I SEE IT, TO THE LAST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 4A. THE SUGGESTION THAT THE SWEDES MIGHT MONITOR ''SOME'' OR A ''SELECTION'' OF THE TRAFFIC SEEMS MORE LIKELY TO AROUSE THATN TO ALLAY SUSPICIONS.

BALFOUR PAUL

[RPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:

NED
W EUR DEPT
OIL DEPT
COMMS DEPT
SECURITY DEPT

&&&&

CONFIDENTIAL

pls 9/12

97

Translation.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Baghdad, 30 November 1971.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq presents its compliments to Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy, Baghdad, and has the honour to state that the agreement which was announced on 29 November 1971 between the Ruler of Sharjah and the Iranian Government concerning the situation in Abu Mousa Island is an agreement which is categorically rejected by the Government of the Republic of Iraq because it affected a part of the Arab homeland and Arab sovereignty. The Government of the Republic of Iraq had already announced, on several occasions, the responsibility of Britain for admitting the Iranian ambitions in these islands and in the islands of Al Tanab al Kubra and Al Sughra which the Government of the Republic of Iraq considers as Arab islands and accept no discussion (concerning them). The attitude of the British Government in the reply made by Sir William Luce and the reply of H.E. the British Ambassador at Baghdad to H.E. the Under-Secretary of State for Britain was that Britain considered these islands as Arab from the legal aspect. Similarly, the British Government is responsible for retaining the present Arab condition therein until the withdrawal of the British Forces from the Arab Gulf area.

The agreement which was announced yesterday was undoubtedly inspired and arranged by Britain and with its consent thereon based on the contents of the Agreement of 1892 which bound the Rulers of the Trucial States with the following text :-

"I will never enter into any agreement or any communication with any State other than the British State without the consent of the British State. I will not permit the residence in my property any agent other than that of the British State at all, and will not surrender, sale, mortgage or give for disposal or occupation in any way any part of my territory to any one excepting the British State. This was done on the 5th day of March 1892%.

This agreement was signed by Shaikhs of the Trucial States, including Shaikh Saqar bin Khalid, the Ruler of Sharjah.

Therefore, this agreement did not give the Ruler of Sharjah the right to conclude any agreement affecting the sovereignty of his territory to other than the British State except with the approval of the British Government. Such being the case, this agreement was reached in fact between Britain and Iran and announced by the Ruler of Sharjah as an agreement between Iran and Shabjah. Therefore, Britain is responsible internationally for the surrender of a part of Arab territory the Arab character of which is admitted by Britain, especially as the measure carried out is inconsistent with the international obligations of Britain in its capacity as a State responsible for the protection of this area. The agreement is also inconsistent with the simplest principles of international law which must be respected. Such being the case, the Government of the Republic of Iraq places upon Britain this international responsibility and places on records its strong protest against this illegal behaviour and considers itself, in its capacity as a responsible Arab party, as not admitting this agreement and disapproving its clauses, and places upon Britain the responsibility for that and the grave complications resulting therefrom.

The Government of the Republic of Iraq, in strongly condemning this imperialist conspiracy, considers this recent measure as ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ an extension of the black record of British imperialist ~~xxxxxxxx~~ policy in this area, since it is a measure similar to that of the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and to the surrender of Palestine to the Zionists. These imperialist conspiracies are no more hidden to any citizen of the Arab people and aim at (threatening) its sovereignty, ~~xxxxx~~ security and independence.

The Ministry avails itself of this opportunity to express its highest consideration and esteem.

Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy,
Baghdad.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq presentsits compliments to Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy at Baghdad and has the honour to state that the Head of the Iranian Government announced to-day the occupation by the Iranian military forces of the Islands of Tanab al Kabir and Tanab al Saghir and a number of casualties as a result of this occupation. In informing the Embassy of this, the Government of the Republic of Iraq places upon the British Government the responsibility of permitting the Iranian forces to occupy these Arab islands the Arab character of which was already announced by the Government of the Republic of Iraq on several occasions through its responsible officials. The British Government had also previously admitted the Arab character of these islands through Sir William Luce and through the reply given by H.E. the British Ambassador at Baghdad to H.E. the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The responsibility of the British Government for this illegal measure which is ~~xx~~ inconsistent with the provisions of the United Nations Character and the principles of international law is plain, since States Members of the United Nations are obliged not to use force or employ force against the safety of the territory of any State or in any other way which disagrees with the intentions of the United Nations, and are obliged not to take any measure calculated to threaten ~~xxx~~ international peace and security to danger. Britain, in its capacity as responsible for these Principalities and their protection under the agreements concluded between Britain and the Arab Principalities on the Arab Gulf was completely neglectful in agreeing to the occupation by Iran of these Arab islands because they are responsible for their protection and for ~~xxxxx~~ their continuing to remain under Arab sovereignty and then to surrender them to their

legitimate/

legitimate owners after their withdrawal from the Arab Gulf area.

The Government of the Republic of Iraq, in protesting strongly against the British Government, places upon them the responsibility for surrendering these Arab islands to Iran and considers that a part of the dirty Imperialist conspiracy against the Arab people in all their territories and a partitioning of a part of the Arab territory and its surrender to a foreign State. This in fact is not less than what Britain did in surrendering Arab Palestine to the Zionists and is a predetermined agreement between Britain and Iran carried out with the consent and inspiration of the British Government. Such being the case, the Government of the Republic of Iraq in recording once more its strong protest against this illegal behaviour which constitutes a violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter and inconsistent with the simplest international obligations of Britain, considers this Iranian measure, which was carried out with the consent of Britain, a matter threatening peace and security in the Arab Gulf area and an illegal action which it does not admit in any form. The Iraqi Government considers these islands as Arab and place upon the British Government the responsibility of resisting the Iranian occupation as an obligation towards their responsibilities for this area before the withdrawal of their forces therefrom.

The Ministry avails itself of this opportunity to express its highest consideration and esteem.

Baghdad,
30 November 1971.

NNNN
BBC B

NE

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10
-8 DEC 1971
NEQ 3/5681

Enter

98

B51. IRAQ FIXES DATES FOR BRITISH AND IRANIAN OFFICIALS TO LEAVE

(BAGHDAD RADIO) THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTRY HAS FIXED NEXT SUNDAY AS THE FINAL DATE FOR THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR, PAUL BALFOUR, AND THE OFFICIAL IN CHARGE OF THE IRANIAN EMBASSY, MAHMUD SABAHI, TO LEAVE IRAQ FOLLOWING THE BREAKING OFF OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS: 16TH DECEMBER WILL BE THE FINAL DATE BY WHICH THE STAFF OF BOTH EMBASSIES MUST LEAVE IRAQ.

END BBC MON 16.13 VR KY 5:12

Mr Gwyn.
Back to me.

The date seems to have slipped by 1 day.

Miss Beckett

Miss Beckett 6/12

RECEIVED
REGISTRY NO. 10
-8 DEC 1971
NEW ZEALAND

Ref our telno 1195

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
-9 DEC 1971
NEQ 3/5681.

With the compliments of

CHANCERY

Near Eastern Department
FCO

BRITISH EMBASSY

BAGHDAD

3 December 1971

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
-8 DEC 1971
NEQ 3/548/1

Reference.....

Entd 99

Stephen

I spoke to Miss Hutchinson about 8.30pm on Sunday and told her she could tell the Swedes in reply to their questions and in preparation for their meeting at 0830Z on 6/12:

a) our diplomats who remain in Baghdad will be under the Swedish flag, and not independent British diplomats;

b) our communications will be restricted to commercial/economic, consular and cultural material. No sensitive political messages would be sent.

On b) Miss Hutchinson said she had already implied to the Swedes that similar conditions would apply as in Algiers in 1965-8 under the Swiss: viz that the protecting power would be kept generally informed, as a matter of courtesy, of important messages. I said I thought this would be OK.

pp D.B. 5/12.

Enter

A

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
-9 DEC 1971
NEQ 3/5481

EMBASSY OF THE
REPUBLIC OF IRAQ
21, QUEEN'S GATE,
LONDON, S.W.7.

W 100

5

Embassy Staff (belonging to Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

Mr. H. Abdul Sattar, Second Secretary
Mrs. Jinan S. S. Faris, Second Secretary
Mr. I. S. Khalil, Attaché
Mr. K. S. Al-Obaidi, Accountant
Mr. A. I. Hussain, Clerk (non diplomatic)

Cultural

Mrs. R. A. W. Al-Khairou, Cultural Attaché
Mr. Raja M. Al-Samarrae, Superintendent (non diplomatic)
Mr. Asad N. Gergees, Accountant
Mr. Awda A. Al-Roubaie, Superintendent
Mrs. Munna Yahya Abdul-Majeed, Research Assistant
Miss Ibtisan Mukhlis, Assistant Superintendent

Commercial

Mr. Faik A. R. Al-Hadithi, Commercial Attaché

Arab League

Mr al-Mudarris (First Sec.).

Handed to
head of NED, 8/xii/71,

6

B

EMBASSY OF THE
REPUBLIC OF IRAQ
21, QUEEN'S GATE,
LONDON, S.W.7.

Locally recruited Iraqi staff

E m b a s s y

Mr. Loui Rahman
Mrs. Raja Al-Najim
Mr. Khalid S. A. Al Sheikh Kadir
Mr. Taha Al-Samarie

C u l t u r a l

Mr. Salah Jamil Mulla Ali
Miss Suhan Sitto
Mr. Ali Jawad Abbas
Mr. Tarik Kroumy

E 87 xii

EMBASSY OF THE
REPUBLIC OF IRAQ
21, QUEEN'S GATE.
LONDON, S.W.7.

C

British subjects

Local Staff (Embassy)

Miss P. Wolfe-Keene
Miss B. Morgan
Mrs. D. Beydoun
Mrs. M. Black
Mr. McCann
Mr. McDonald
Mr. George Overton
Charles Bannerman (? Commonwealth origin)

Miss Dawn Child (Commercial Dept.)

C ultural

Miss V. Claydon
Mr. W. E. C. Barnes
Mrs. M. Siklos
Miss B. Johnston

SE

CONFIDENTIAL

100

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 -8 DEC 1971

NEQ 3/5481/1

2 Tels to Baghdad.

P.W. 8c

Mr Parsons

SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS WITH IRAQ

8/xii

1. Mr Hancock of Century House rang to say that the Iraqi Embassy would be sending us tomorrow (Wednesday) a list of their staff, Baghdad based and locally engaged, whom they expected to continue operating in London after 15 December. I suppose Mr Nafi will bring a copy with him when he calls on you tomorrow.

2. The Iraqis on this list include :

Mr Hikmat Abdul Sattar (Second Secretary, Press)

Mr Shawkat (Second Secretary, Admin)

Mr Khalid Ubeidi (Accountant)

Mr Isam Mas'ud (Typist)

3. Mr Abdul Sattar will probably be nominated Head of the Interests Section. Mr Hancock reminded me, incidentally, that the list of Iraqis shown in the October London Diplomatic List had little or no relation to who was actually here now.

4. Those who plan to leave by 15 December, and their postings, are as follows:

Mr Adib Ahmad Nafi' (Counsellor) : to Tokyo

Mr Isam Tikriti : to Moscow

Mr Fakhri al-Dulaimi : to PDRY

Mr Ghassan Fatah (Attaché) : to North Korea

Mr Muayed Said Hussain (Attaché) : to North Korea.

5. The Military and Air Attachés and their Assistants (if any) are moving to Brussels, and betting on a short formal rupture.

6. We shall be letting you have a piece of paper to give to Mr Nafi tomorrow showing which "slots" (eg his own) we think should be vacated by 15 December. On reflexion, I think that the document we give him should not have any prologue or argumentation in

/writing .....

para

writing laying the responsibility for the breach on the Iraq Government, for the simple reason that Mr Nafi would probably feel bound to refuse to accept such a piece of paper (<u>à la Khalaf</u>).

7. I suggest therefore that you might make the following points to him orally :

a. on 1 December HMA Baghdad was informed by the DG of Protocol in the Iraq MFA, in a note full of unacceptable accusations about HMG's Gulf policy, that relations were broken off forthwith;

b. the Iraqis then proposed that Interests Sections of a certain size should be set up in London and Baghdad, cultural and commercial sections remaining unaffected;

c. the Iraqis also proposed that there should be no Service Attachés at either capital;

d. Mr Balfour Paul has now worked out various staffing and administrative arrangements for our Interests Section under the Swedish flag, details of which will have been conveyed to Mr Nafi' by his Ministry;

e. we think the positions which should be maintained by the Iraqis under the Afghan flag in London are as follows [Hand over list];

f. the Iraqi Interests Section in London is welcome to set up/conduct confidential cypher communications, in accordance with the principles laid down in the Vienna Convention of 1964.

S L Egerton
Near Eastern Department

7 December 1971

Copies to : Mr Evans
Mr Mayall, P&CD
Mr Weait, News Dept
Miss Beckett

101

EN CLAIR

FM FCO 061125Z (NED)

UNCLASSIFIED
DESKBY 061230Z
TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TELNO 1293 OF 6 DECEMBER INFO PRIORITY STOCKHOLM.

1. THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT WILL BE ISSUED BY NEWS DEPARTMENT AT 1230Z:

THE ROYAL SWEDISH GOVERNMENT HAVE KINDLY AGREED TO ASSUME THE PROTECTION OF BRITISH INTERSTS IN IRAQ. AFTER THE DEPARTURE OF THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR, THE SWEDISH EMBASSY WILL CONTAIN A BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION. THIS SECTION WILL OPERATE, UNDER THE SWEDISH FLAG, IN THE PREMISES NOW OCCUPIED BY THE BRITISH EMBASSY.

2. A SIMILAR STATEMENT WILL BE MADE AT THE SAME TIME BY THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT.

DOUGLAS-HOME

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
NED
WED
NEWS D
GIPD
P & G D
CONS D
POD
OIL D
RES D (W E SECT)

Repeated to all Arab posts. Also Washington, UKMIS NY, Moscow, Paris.

pm 6 9/12

NEQ 3/5481

TOP COPY

102

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER/CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

(NED)

FM F C O 071215Z

CONFIDENTIAL

DESK BY 071400Z

TO IMMEDIATE STOCKHOLM TELNO 202 OF 7 DECEMBER INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD.

88

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 369: SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS.

1. WE ARE GRATEFUL TO YOU AND THE SWEDES FOR WORKING SO SPEEDILY ON THIS, AND WE ACCEPT (SUBJECT TO ANY COMMENT FROM H M A BAGHDAD) THE SWEDISH TERMS OUTLINED IN YOUR TELEGRAM. WE ALSO AGREE THAT, ON COMMUNICATIONS, SOME SORT OF MODUS VIVENDI SHOULD BE WORKED OUT IN BAGHDAD BETWEEN THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR AND THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION: WE DO NOT (NOT) THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO LAY DOWN RIGID GUIDELINES AT THIS STAGE. HOWEVER, TO HELP YOU IN ANY DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SWEDES WE ARE SENDING BY TODAY'S BAG COPIES OF NOTES DRAWN UP IN 1966 IN CONNECTION WITH THE SWISS PROTECTION OF OUR INTERESTS IN ALGIERS IN 1966 (COPIES ALSO BY THURSDAY'S BAG TO BAGHDAD).

2. ON YOUR PARAGRAPH 3, WE HAVE DRAWN A BLANK. THE ONLY PAPER ON OUR FILES IS A COPY OF A MINUTE DATED 4 JULY 1967 FROM FOLKE PERSSON IN BAGHDAD TO THE SWEDISH M F A (COPIES ARE BEING SENT BY BAG TO STOCKHOLM AND BAGHDAD). IT SEEMS THAT FOUR PROTOCOLS, ONE OF THEM DATED 15 JUNE 1967, WERE ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL OF THIS MINUTE, BUT WE DEDUCE FROM A MANUSCRIPT COMMENT BY OUR THEN HEAD OF CHANCERY IN STOCKHOLM THAT THESE WERE NEVER SENT TO LONDON. THUS, THE ONLY WAY FOR US TO OBTAIN A COPY WOULD BE FOR YOU TO ASK THE SWEDES, WHICH IS OF COURSE RATHER UNSATISFACTORY, BUT WE SEE NO ALTERNATIVE.

13.

3. NO DOUBT YOU WILL LET US KNOW IN DUE COURSE EXACTLY WHAT KIND OF DOCUMENT(S) THE SWEDES WISH TO DRAW UP, AS WE SHALL HAVE TO LOOK CAREFULLY AT THE WORDING FROM THE LEGAL POINT OF VIEW. WE DO NOT KNOW WHAT URGENCY THE SWEDES ATTACH TO COMPLETING THESE FORMALITIES, BUT YOU MAY LIKE TO KNOW THAT IN 1965-66 FOUR MONTHS ELAPSED BETWEN OUR BREAK IN RELATIONS WITH ALGERIA AND THE COMPLETION OF THE DOCUMENTATION BY THE SWISS.

4. WE SHALL BE SENDING YOU SHORTLY DETAILS OF THE STAFFING OF THE INTERESTS SECTION IN BAGHDAD (BAGHDAD TELNO 1239 REFERS).

5. WE ARE DISCUSSING BAGHDAD TELNO 1244 WITH I P C AND SHALL COMMENT SHORTLY. OUR FIRST THOUGHT IS THAT YOU SHOULD BROACH THIS QUESTION IN STOCKHOLM BEFORE H M A DOES IN BAGHDAD - DO YOU AGREE?

DOUGLAS-HOME

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
NED
ARAB D
WED
P & C D
OIL D
POD
CRD
A & S D
PSD
SECURITY D
COMMS D
CONS D
M & T D
MOD INT

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
UAE

RESTRICTED

102 (A)

/CAT A

FCO 071600Z

(XFG/3591/1)

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
10 DEC 1971
NEQ 3/55/8/

RESTRICTED
TO ROUTINE BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NUMBER 1302 OF 7 DECEMBER

ACCOUNTS

GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD REPORT BEST PRESENT ESTIMATES OF

A) AMOUNT OF CURRENCY LIKELY TO BE RECEIVED FROM STAFF (REFERENCE YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 1222)

B) BALANCE TO BE HANDED OVER TO PROTECTING POWER

C) MONTHLY EXPENDITURE BY PROTECTING POWER ON OUR BEHALF.

2. WE ASSUME THAT YOU INTEND ALL ITEMS HELD IN LOCAL SUSPENSE SHOULD BE CLEARED BY TRANSFER TO FCO IN YOUR FINAL ACCOUNT FOR SUBSEQUENT ADJUSTMENT BY FINANCE DEPARTMENT. THIS COULD BE DONE BY BRINGING TO ACCOUNT AND SHOWING NET AMOUNT TRANSFERRED AS EITHER A CREDIT OR DEBIT ON A SEPARATE SCHEDULE TITLED QUOTE LOCAL SUSPENSE TRANSFERRED TO FCO UNQUOTE. IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO ALSO PROVIDE A STATEMENT OF ALL ITEMS COMPRISING THE SUSPENSE ACCOUNT TOGETHER WITH SUPPORTING VOUCHERS AND WHATEVER INFORMATION IT IS LIKELY WILL BE NEEDED TO EFFECT CLEARANCE OR TO JUSTIFY RETENTION IN SUSPENSE HERE.

3. DO YOU PROPOSE TO CLOSE BANK ACCOUNT OR WILL THIS BE KEPT IN BEING AND OPERATED BY PROTECTING POWER?

4. ARE THERE ANY MATTERS ABOUT WHICH YOU NEED ADVICE CONCERNING ACCOUNTS?

DOUGLAS-HOME

FILES
FINANCE D

COPIES TO:
MR PATERSON PSD
MISS BECKETT NED

RESTRICTED

NEQ 3/5401

103

TOP COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE
CYPHER/CAT A

FM F.C.O. 0720007

CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 0806007
TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NUMBER 1303 OF 7 DECEMBER INFO
IMMEDIATE STOCKHOLM.

(95)

YOUR TELEGRAMS NOS 1248 AND 1249: SEVERANCE/STAFFING.

1. WE APPROVE THE RECOMMENDATIONS IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF YOUR TELEGRAM NO 1239. (90)

2. PARSONS IS SUMMONING THE IRAQ CHARGE AT NOON TOMORROW: HE WILL INFORM NAFI' FORMALLY WHICH POSTS IN HIS EMBASSY MUST BE VACATED. TEXT OF SPEAKING NOTE WILL FOLLOW BY BAG.

3. WE SHALL REPLY TOMORROW TO YOUR TELEGRAM NO 1249.

DOUGLAS-HOME

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:
NED
NEWS DEPT:
COMS DEPT:
SECURITY DEPT:
POD

CONFIDENTIAL

PUBT/12

NEQ 3/5(1).

103

TOP COPY

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER/CAT A

FM FCO 072055Z

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 080500Z BAGHDAD
DESKBY 080800Z STOCKHOLM

TO IMMEDIATE STOCKHOLM TELEGRAM NUMBER 203 OF 7 DECEMBER INFO IMMEIDATE BAGHDAD.

92 104

BAGHDAD TEL NO 1244 AND YOUR TEL NO 373: SEVERANCE AND CYPHER FACILITIES.

1. THE IPC COMMUNICATIONS ASPECT HAS BEEN MUCH ON OUR MINDS AND WE HAVE NOW BEEN ABLE TO DISCUSS IT WITH STOCKWELL. WE JUDGED HOOWEVER THAT THE FIRST PRIORITY WAS TO OBTAIN SWEDISH AGREEMENT TO ACT AS PROTECTING POWER, AND AT THE SAME TIME TO ESTABLISH WHAT IPC'S COMMUNICATIONS PREFERENCES WOULD BE.

2. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION, THE COMPANY HAVE NOW CONFIRMED TO US THAT IF THE SWEDES REFUSE TO LET THE EMBASSY HANDLE IPC TRAFFIC (BECAUSE OF ITS POLITICAL SENSITIVITY, OR FOR WHATEVER REASON), THE IPC WOULD BE PREPARED TO ASK THE FRENCH TO HANDLE THEIR TRAFFIC. THE IPC HAVE ALSO AGREED TO OMIT POLITICAL MATTER FROM MESSAGES SENT ON THE DWS CHANNEL AFTER 14 DECEMBER.

3. YOU SHOULD ACCORDINGLY NOW APPROACH THE SWEDES AS FOLLOWS. NOW THAT THEY HAVE KINDLY AGREED TO ACT AS OUR PROTECTING POWER WE SHOULD, BEFORE HM AMBASSADOR LEAVES BAGHDAD, LIKE TO CLARIFY ONE OR TWO POINTS OF DETAIL ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE FUTURE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION IN BAGHDAD AND THE FCO IN LONDON:-

A. THE IPC HAVE HITHERTO USED OUR SECURE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM FOR PASSING CODED MESSAGES BETWEEN THEIR HEADQUARTERS IN LONDON AND THEIR REPRESENTATIVE IN BAGHDAD. THE MAJORITY OF THESE MESSAGES HAS BEEN OF A COMMERCIAL NATURE, CONCERNING THE TECHNICALITIES OF THE OIL INDUSTRY. WE CAN ASSURE THE SWEDES THAT FROM 15 DECEMBER, AND AS LONG AS THEY ARE ACTING AS OUR PROTECTING POWER, IPC TRAFFIC WILL BE CONFINED TO MESSAGES OF SUCH A NATURE. YOU SHOULD TELL /THE

THE SWEDES THAT WE HOPE THIS ARRANGEMENT WILL BE ACCEPTABLE TO THEM: BUT IF THEY APPEAR UNHAPPY ABOUT IT, YOU SHOULD NOT (NOT) ALLOW ARGUMENT OVER IT TO JEOPARDISE THEIR AGREEMENT TO PROTECT OUR INTERESTS. YOU SHOULD ADD (SEE B. BELOW) THAT THE IPC WOULD HAVE NO (NO) OBJECTION TO THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR IN BAGHDAD SEEING SOME OF THE IPC COMMUNICATIONS:

B. ON THE QUESTION OF MONITORING, YOU HAVE OF COURSE ALREADY OUTLINED TO THE SWEDES WHAT WE UNDERSTAND BY THE ALGERIAN PRECEDENT: I.E. THAT THE PROTECTING POWER SHOULD BE KEPT GENERALLY INFORMED OF TRAFFIC PASSING ON OUR CHANNELS: BUT THAT OUR MESSAGES SHOULD NOT (NOT) BE SUBJECT TO SWEDISH APPROVAL. (SEE PARA 6 OF FCO TEL NO 1290 TO BAGHDAD AND STOCKHOLM TEL NO 369). IF YOU THINK IT WOULD HELP TO ALLAY SWEDISH SUSPICIONS ABOUT THE NATURE AND CONDUCT OF OUR FUTURE COMMUNICATIONS, YOU MAY TELL THEM THAT THE HEAD OF THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION IN BAGHDAD WILL IF THEY WISH SHOW THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR THERE FROM TIME TO TIME - PERHAPS ONCE A MONTH - A SELECTION OF THE MESSAGES PASSING BETWEEN THE SECTION AND THE FCO. WE WOULD NOT (NOT) WISH TO BE MORE SPECIFIC ON THIS POINT AT THIS JUNCTURE (PARA 4 OF BAGHDAD TEL NO 1244).

4. YOUR TEL NO 373, PARA 5. WE SHALL CONFIRM TOMORROW.

DOUGLAS-HOME

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
NED
WED
OIL D
COMMS D
SECURITY D

FFFFF

DESKBY FCO 071600Z

IGY( )D CAT A
FM BAGHDAD 071548Z
STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

DESKBY FCO 071600Z

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 19
10 DEC 1971
NEQ 3/5481

ADVANCE COPY
Mr. Cole
H.P.S.D.
H.P.O.D.
H.N.E.D.

Enter
10B
(Files)

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 1249 OF 7 DEC INFO PRIORITY STOCKHOLM.

SEVERANCE / LOCAL STAFF.

IN GENERAL, SINCE THE SIGNS ARE THAT THE BREAK IN RELATIONS WILL PROBABLY NOT BE LONG AND SINCE THE RESIDUAL MISSION SEEMS LIKELY TO BE UP TO 11 - STRONG, I WOULD PROPOSE TO KEEP ON FOR THE TIME BEING ALL THOSE MEMBERS OF THE LOCALLY-ENGAGED STAFF WHOM WE WOULD WISH TO EMPLOY IN THE EVENT OF A RESTORATION. BY, SAY, THE END OF MARCH WE CAN RE-EXAMINE THE PROSPECTS FOR RESTORATION AND THE STATE OF THE WORK-LOAD AND CONSIDER WHETHER ANY REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE MADE.

2. FOR THE MOST PART, THE ROUTINE TASKS OF THE EMBASSY SEEM LIKELY TO CONTINUE MUCH AS USUAL. THERE WILL BE SOME SLACK IN THE MESSENGER SECTION WHICH CAN BE TAKEN UP IN GUARDING HOUSES IN WHICH FURNITURE IS STORED.

3. I WILL DISCUSS THE FUTURE OF ANY OF THE RESIDENCE STAFF FOR WHOM I HAVE NOT ALREADY FOUND OTHER JOBS, ON MY RETURN. MY HEAD OF CHANCERY WILL BE AVAILABLE TO DISCUSS ANY OTHER LOCAL STAFF QUERIES YOU MAY HAVE.

4. PADIYATH MUST DEFINITELY NOT BE LEFT IN BASRA, SINCE THE QUESTION OF HIS STATUS WAS STILL NOT RESOLVED BEFORE THE BREAK. HOWEVER, WE HAVE ON INSTRUCTION TOLD HIM THAT IF HIS BASRA JOB DISAPPEARED, WE WOULD FIND HIM EMPLOYMENT FOR A YEAR AS A SUPERNUMERARY IN BAGHDAD. THERE SHOULD BE PLENTY OF WORK TO EMPLOY HIS TIME ARISING FROM THE BREAK, AND SUBSEQUENTLY, WHEN VISA PRESSURE BUILDS UP IN THE EARLY SUMMER. HIS FUTURE CAN THEN BE REVIEWED AT THE END OF THE SUMMER.

5. UNLESS I HERE TO THE CONTRARY BY WEDNESDAY NIGHT, 8 DECEMBER I PROPOSE TO INFORM LOCAL STAFF ACCORDINGLY.

BALFOUR PAUL

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE
CYPHER/CAT A
FROM STOCKHOLM 071530Z
CONFIDENTIAL
DESK BY 071700Z

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
-8 DEC 1971
NEQ 3/548.

104

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 373 OF 7 DECEMBER INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD.

(102)

Your telno. 202: Severance of relations.

I agree that it would be best to inform the Swedes here of the question of I.P.C. traffic. In my view it would be best to be frank with them about this to avoid any possibility of subsequent misunderstandings or accusations of bad faith. This would presumably involve telling them that the content of this traffic would be to some extent political. To do this would however involve the risk of the Swedes insisting on seeing the I.P.C. traffic or even on it being passed through their channels. If they did so, you might wish to consider whether the I.P.C. would not be better advised to send their traffic through the Dutch.

2. I would expect that the Swedes would in any case wish to be fairly fully informed about the nature and amount of this traffic.

(92)

3. It would also be helpful to have your guidance about monitoring or at least the extent to which the Swedes would be kept informed of our traffic (Baghdad telegram No. 1244, paragraph 4) so that we may make sure that we say the same thing to the Swedes here as H.M. Ambassador is saying to the Swedish Ambassador in Baghdad.

4. I should prefer to say nothing more to the Swedes about our acceptance of their terms or the modus vivendi to be worked out in Baghdad until we have your instructions on these points.

5. I presume that the maintenance of cypher facilities will involve also confidential bag traffic. Can you please confirm? Done by Comms.

Millard

[Repeated as requested]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.
Arabian Dept
W.E.D.
P.C.D.
Oil Dept
P.O.D.
C.R.D.
A.S.D.
P.S.D.
Security Dept
Communications Dept
Consular Dept
M.T.D.
MOD INTERNAL

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
U A E

pr bag 9/12

CONFIDENTIAL

bbbbb

104 (A)

RESTRICTED

CYPHER CAT A

FM STOCKHOLM 071605Z

TOP COPY

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 10 DEC 1971

NEQ 3/54/1

RESTRICTED

TO ROUTINE F C O TELNO. 374 OF 7 DECEMBER INFO ROUTINE BAGHDAD.

PARAGRAPH 2 OF YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 202 : SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS MEMORANDUM.

1. THE SWEDES HAVE PROVIDED US WITH A COPY OF THE 15 JUNE 1967 MEMORANDUM (TO BE FORWARDED IN WEDNESDAY'S CONFIDENTIAL BAG). THIS HOWEVER DEALS EXCLUSIVELY WITH ACCOUNTING AND ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS. THE MFA HERE WERE UNAWARE OF THE FOUR PROTOCOLS BUT ARE SEARCHING FOR THEM.

2. IF AS WE ASSUME (BUT WE HAVE NOT YET ASKED THE SWEDES) THE STATUS AND FUNCTIONING OF THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION IN THE SWEDISH EMBASSY WILL HAVE TO BE ESTABLISHED IN SOME AGREED DOCUMENT PROBABLY THE ALGIERS PRECEDENT WOULD BE MORE USEFUL. MAY WE THEREFORE HANDOVER TO THE SWEDES COPIES OF THE 1966 ANGLO-SWISS NOTES WITH REGARD TO ALGIERS ?

MILLARD

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
NED
ARABIAN D
W EUR D
P & CD
OIL D
POD
CRD
ASD
PSD
SECURITY D
COMMS D
CONS D
M & TD
MOD (INT)

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
UAE

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10
-9 DEC 1971
NEQ 3/5481

105

IMMEDIATE
CYPHER CAT A
FM BAGHDAD 080800Z
IN CONFIDENCE
TO IMMEDIATE F.C.O. TELNO. 1255 OF 8/12 INFO IMMEDIATE ~~BEIRUT~~.

A TOP COPY

103

YOUR TELNO. 1303: STAFF MOVEMENTS.

1. FOLLOWING ARE DETAILS OF TRAVEL PLANS OF STAFF WHO WILL NOT BE STAYING AS PART OF RESIDUAL MISSION. I SHALL LEAVE BY FLIGHT BA203 ON 12 DECEMBER (ETA 1405) AS PLANNED.

2. YHE FOLLOWING MEMBERS OF THE STAFF AND THEIR FAMILIES WILL ALSO LEAVE BY THIS FLIGHT:

MR AND MRS HUTSON
MISS WADE (MY SOCIAL SECRETARY)
MISS STOTT
MISS BOUTTELL
MR AND MRS THOMPSON
MR AND MRS MITCHELL AND 3 CHILDREN
MR TOWEY

3. THE DEFENCE ATTACHE PLUS HIS STAFF OF 5 WILL BE DRIVING OUT TO BEIRUT VIA NORTH JORDANON 13 DECEMBER. THEY WILL BE FLYING ON FROM BEIRUT AND HAVE CLEARED THEIR PLANS SEPERATELY WITH THE MOD. THEIR WIVES AND FAMILIES (TOTALLING ELEVEN) WILL BE FLYING DIRECT TO LONDON ON THE SUNDAY BOAC FLIGHT WITH PARTY IN PARA 2 ABOVE, THEIR ONWARD TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS FROM LONDON ARE BEING HANDLED BY MOD.

4. MY HEAD OF CHANCERY WILL REMAIN UNTIL 15 DECEMBER. HE WILL FLY BY ME321 TO BEIRUT AND TAKE THE BOAC FLIGHT BA775 ON TO LONDON (ETA 1550). UNLESS WE HEAR FROM YOU TO THE CONTRARY TODAY, WE WILL ASSUME YOU HAVE NO OBJECTION TO HIS FAMILY OF THREE REMAINING TO TRAVEL HOME WITH HIM.

5. MISS BARLOW (S2) WILL ALSO BE ON THE BOAC FLIGHT IF POSTING TO ISLAMABAD DOES NOT MATERIALISE. GRATEFUL FOR EARLY REPLY TO MY TEL 1237.

/6.

Tels to Bdad re meeting arrangements, baggage etc. pls.

6. S.O. SILVESTER. SILVESTER'S PERSONAL EFFECTS IN TRANSIT FROM STOCKHOLM HAVE ONLY REACHED BEIRUT, SO THE FAMILY HAVE NO WINTER CLOTHING. GRATEFUL IF THIS COULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT WHEN DECIDING HIS FUTURE POSTING. HE PROPOSES TO DRIVE HIS PRIVATE CAR TO BEIRUT FOR STORAGE AND HIS FAMILY WILL ACCOMPANY HIM. UNLESS YOU INSTRUCT HIM TO THE CONTRARY. HE AND HIS FAMILY WILL THEN FLY ON TO LONDON. FLIGHT DETAILS TO FOLLOW.

7. COOK. COOK (DOE) HOPES TO DRIVE WITH HIS FAMILY TO TEHRAN ON 11 DECEMBER. WE ARE IN TOUCH WITH TEHRAN DIRECT ABOUT THIS.

8. EVACUATION PRO FORMAS REQUESTED IN POD CIRCULAR SF3/1Ø4/2 OF 1Ø SEPTEMBER 197Ø WILL BE IN CONFIDENTIAL BAG LEAVING 9 DECEMBER (MY TEL 1243). SOME OF THESE SPECIFY HOTEL BOOKING REQUIREMENTS WHICH WILL REQUIRE EARLY ACTION. GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD CONFIRM BY SATURDAY WHAT ARRANGEMENTS YOU HAVE MADE TO INFORM PARTY ON ARRIVAL OF BOOKING DETAILS. GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD ALSO CONFIRM THAT THOS.COOK WILL BE ABLE TO EXTRACT UNACCOMPANIED AIR-FREIGHT AT ONCE SO THAT THOSE UHO ARE TRAVELLING ON TO DESTINATIONS OUTSIDE LONDON CAN TAKE IT WITH THEM.

BALFOUR PAUL

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
NED
POD
SECURITY D
PSD
COMMS D
NEWS D
DEFENCE D

106

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER CAT A

FM STOCKHOLM 080850Z

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN COPY
REGISTRY No. 16
-9DEC 1971
NEQ 3/5/1

TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 375 OF 8 DECEMBER INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD.

96

BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NO 1252: SEVERANCE AND CYPHER FACILITIES

I AGREE WITH THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN BAGHDAD TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. IN APPROACHING SWEDISH MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS I DO NOT THEREFORE PROPOSE TO MAKE THE OFFERS REFERRED TO.

MILLARD

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.
W.E.D.
OIL DEPT
SECURITY DEPT
COMMUNICATIONS DEPT
D.W.S.

CONFIDENTIAL

pub 9/12

RESTRICTED

107

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 -9 DEC 1971

NEQ 3/548

TOP COPY

IMMEDIATE
CYPHER CAT A
FM BEIRUT 080950Z

RESTRICTED

TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TEL NO 111 OF 8 DECEMBER INFO PRIORITY AMMAN AND FCO.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 1236 (91) TO FCO (NOT TO AMMAN).

SEVERANCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS - NUTS AND BOLTS.

1. WE ARE SEEING REPETITIONS OF SIGNALS FROM DA BAGHDAD GIVING VALUABLE INFORMATION ABOUT MOVEMENTS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL AND VEHICLES, AND ARE TAKING NECESSARY ACTION IN LIAISON WITH OUR OWN DEFENCE ATTACHE. IT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL IF WE COULD HAVE SIMILAR INFORMATION FOR THE CIVILIAN ELEMENT MOVING BY ROAD. IN PARTICULAR WE SHOULD LIKE TO HAVE:

A. MAKES AND REGISTRATION NUMBERS OF VEHICLES, WITH NAMES OF DRIVERS AND PASSENGERS.

B. APPROXIMATE E.T.A. (TO NEAREST HALF DAY) AT LEBANESE FRONTIER. IT WOULD EASE OUR PROBLEMS IF ALL VEHICLES, BOTH CIVILIAN AND MILITARY, COULD TRAVEL TOGETHER.

C. REQUIREMENTS FOR ONWARD MOVEMENT OF PERSONS, BAGGAGE AND VEHICLES. LARGE QUANTITIES OF EXCESS BAGGAGE REQUIRE PRIOR ARRANGEMENT.

pnbg 9/12

2. WE DO NOT REPEAT NOT RECOMMEND SALE OF CARS IN BEIRUT. HEAVY IMPORT DUTY IS PAYABLE AND LEBANESE DEALERS WILL QUICKLY REALIZE THAT OWNERS ARE UNDER PRESSURE TO GET RID OF VEHICLES. ACCOMPANIED FREIGHT FOR MEDIUM SIZED CARS (E.G.AVENGER) BY SEA TO NORTH ITALIAN PORT IS ABOUT £30. COST FOR UNACCOMPANIED VEHICLES, TO U.K NOW £75 - £100.

3. WE ASSUME THAT CIVILIAN AS WELL AS MILITARY DRIVERS WOULD REPORT TO HM EMBASSY AMMAN. WOULD AMMAN THEN PLEASE TELEGRAPH E.T.A. LEBANESE FRONTIER, WHERE WE WILL ARRANGE TO MEET VEHICLES.

4. AT THIS TIME OF YEAR THERE IS A POSS IBILITY OF 24 HOUR DELAY BETWEEN THE FRONTIER AND BEIRUT OWING TO SNOW ON THE PASS.

WRIGHT

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

NED
P & CD
OIL D
CRD
A & TD
A & SD
SECURITY D
POD
POD (WELFARE SECTION)
COMMS D
CONS D
M & VD

108

TOP COPY (NED)

FLASH

CYPHER/CAT A

FM F.C.O. 081045Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FLASH STOCKHOLM TELNO 204 OF 8 DECEMBER INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD.

91

BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NO 1252: SEVERANCE AND CYPHER FACILITIES.

WE MUST ACCEPT HMA BAGHDAD'S VIEW THAT IT WOULD AROUSE RATHER THAN ALLAY THE SWEDISH EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD'S SUSPICIONS IF WE OFFERED TO LET THEM SEE SAMPLES OF OFFICIAL AND OIL COMPANY MESSAGES (LAST PARTS OF PARAS 3(A) AND 3(B) OF MY TELNO 203 TO STOCKHOLM).

103 (A)

2. YOU SHOULD ACCORDINGLY NOT (NOT) SUGGEST TO THE SWEDES THAT THEY COULD IF THEY WISHED SEE SAMPLES OF THE TWO TYPES OF TELEGRAPHIC MESSAGES CONCERNED. IF THEY ASK TO SEE SOME OR ALL OF THE TRAFFIC (IN SPITE OF THE ''ALGERIAN PRECEDENT'') YOU SHOULD SAY YOU MUST REFER FOR INSTRUCTIONS.

DOUGLAS-HOME

FILES
NED
ARABIAN D
OIL D

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNN

1258857

12

NEQ 3/54/1.

188 A

MEDIATE CONFIDENTIAL

TOP COPY

CYPHER/CAT A AND BY BAG

FM FCO 081600Z (NED)

CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 090500Z
TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NUMBER 1309 OF 8 DECEMBER INFO
STOCKHOLM INFO SAVING BRUSSELS.
MY TEL NO 1303 (NOT TO BRUSSELS): 103
SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS.
1. THE HEAD OF NEAR EASTERN DEPARTMENT INVITED THE IRAQ CHARGE D'AFFAIRES TO CALL TODAY.
2. EVANS SAID THAT WE REGRETTED THE DECISION OF THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT TO BREAK RELATIONS. WE SAW NO NEED FOR THIS STEP. WE DID NOT, HOWEVER, WISH TO ENTER INTO RECRIMINATIONS ABOUT THE IRAQI ACTION NOW. AS NAFI' SHOULD KNOW, YOU HAD BEEN WORKING OUT ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF PROTOCOL AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. SWEDEN HAD NOW AGREED, WITH THE CONSENT OF THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT, TO ACT AS OUR PROTECTING POWER IN BAGHDAD: HAD AFGHANISTAN CONSENTED TO DO THE SAME FOR IRAQ? NAFI' SAID THAT YOU WOULD BE TOLD BY HIS MINISTRY ABOUT THE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH HAD BEEN MADE. PRESSED TO CONFIRM WHETHER OR NOT HE HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE AFGHANS HERE (THEY ARE OF COURSE EXTREMELY TIED UP WITH THE STATE VISIT OF THE KING), NAFI' WAS EVASIVE AND WE RATHER DOUBT WHETHER HE HAS EVEN CONTACTED THEM.
3. EVANS THEN GAVE NAFI' A BOUT DE PAPIER (TEXT IN MY IFT, NOT TO BRUSSELS) SETTING OUT THE PATTERN OF STAFFING FOR THE IRAQ INTERESTS SECTION TO WHICH WE COULD AGREE (BASING OURSELVES ON RECIPROCITY). NAFI' HANDED OVER THREE LISTS (COPIES BY NEXT BAG) NAMING THOSE MEMBERS OF THE EMBASSY STAFF THE IRAQIS WOULD LIKE TO BE MEMBERS OF THEIR INTERESTS SECTION AFTER 15 DECEMBER. ALL FALL WITHIN THE CATEGORIES SET OUT IN OUR BOUT DE PAPIER.
4. NAFI' CONFIRMED THAT HE HIMSELF WOULD BE LEAVING BY IRAQI AIRWAYS FOR BAGHDAD TOMORROW MORNING. FOUR OTHER JUNIOR DIPLOMATS WILL HAVE LEFT BY 15 DECEMBER, AS WILL THE MILITARY AND AIR ATTACHES AND THEIR STAFFS (WE UNDERSTAND FROM THE BELGIAN EMBASSY HERE THAT FIVE ATTACHES AND ASSISTANT ATTACHES FROM LONDON ARE LIKELY TO JOIN THE STAFF OF THE IRAQ EMBASSY AT BRUSSELS SHORTLY).

5. ON COMMUNICATIONS, EVENS SAID THAT WE WERE CONTENT THAT THE IRAQ INTERESTS SECTION SHOULD ENJOY FACILITIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 27 OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION. WHEN NAFI' SAID THAT HIS MISSION DID NOT (NOT) HAVE DIPLOMATIC WIRELESS, EVANS CONFIRMED THAT THE INTERESTS SECTION WOULD BE FREE TO USE THIS MEANS OF COMMUNICATION AS FAR AS WE WERE CONCERNED.

6. NAFI' THEN ASKED TO BE ALLOWED TO USE THE VIP LOUNGE AT HEATHROW TOMORROW. WHEN ASKED WHETHER HE WOULD RECOMMEND SIMILAR FACILITIES FOR YOU ON 12 DECEMBER, HE SAID HE COULD NOT (NOT) DO THIS, BUT THAT HE WOULD REPORT WHAT HAD BEEN DONE FOR HIM. WE SUBSEQUENTLY ARRANGED WITH BOAC THAT THE LOUNGE SHOULD BE OPENED FOR HIM.

7. WE ARE LOOKING INTO THE PROCEDURE FOR OBTAINING NOTIFICATION THAT THE AFGHANS HAVE AGREED TO ACT AS IRAQ'S PROTECTING POWER. AS A FIRST STEP, WOULD YOU PLEASE ASK THE PROTOCOL DEPARTMENT TO RE-CONFIRM IRAQI INTENTIONS ON THIS POINT ?

DOUGLAS-HOME

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

NED
P & C D
CRD
GIPD
NEWS D
OIL D
POD
CONS D
COMMS D
SECURITY D
PUSD
WELFARE SECT

IMMEDIATE CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT A

FM STOCKHOLM 081115Z

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 081200Z

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 -9 DEC 1971 NEQ 1/5601

TOP COPY

109

TO IMMEDIATE F C O TELNO. 377 OF 8 DECEMBER INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 203 (103 A) AND MY TELEGRAM NO 375 (106) : CYPHER FACILITIES FOR I P C .

1. HEAD OF CHANCERY SPOKE TO HERR GIRON IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 3 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERNCE, SUBJECT TO MY TELEGRAM NO.375. GIRON'S INITIAL REACTION WAS THAT THIS MIGHT PRESENT SOME DIFFICULTIES FOR THE SWEDES. HE ASKED THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS :
A. WERE THE IRAQIS AWARE OF THIS TRAFFIC ? .
B. HOW HEAVY WAS THE TRAFFIC ?
C. HAD THE IPC AT PRESENT THE RIGHT (REPEAT RIGHT) TO SEND ANY MESSAGES THEY LIKED OR WAS THE EXISTING TRAFFIC SUBJECT TO APPROVAL AND/OR MONITORING BY THE BRITISH EMBASSY ?
HEAD OF CHANCERY SAID THAT THE ANSWER TO A. WAS PROBABLY NEGATIVE BUT WAS UNABLE TO COMMENT ON POINTS B AND C.

2. GIRON THEN SAID HE WOULD HAVE TO CONSULT THE SECRETARY -GENERAL OF THE MFA. HIS OWN PERSONAL VIEW HOWEVER WAS THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR THE SWEDES TO AGREE PROVIDED :
A. THE IPC TRAFFIC WAS INCLUDED IN THE GENERAL TRAFFIC OF COMMERCIAL TELEGRAMS,
B. SUCH TELEGRAMS WERE SUBJECT TO THE APPROVAL OF A MEMBER OF THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION,
C. THE IPC DID NOT SEND MESSAGES QUOTE AS A RIGHT UNQUOTE, BUT SUBJECT TO THE CONCURRENCE OF THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION.
D. THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR WAS KEPT QUOTE GENERALLY INFORMED UNQUOTE.

/3. ON

See reply

3. ON THE GENERAL ISSUE OF OUR CYPHER TRAFFIC GIRON REPEATED THE FORMULA IN PARAGRAPH 1 OF MY TELEGRAM NO.369. THE SWEDES HAD TO MAINTAIN THE PRINCIPLE OF BEING INFORMED BUT IN PRACTICE OF COURSE IT WOULD BE IMPRACTICAL FOR THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR TO DELVE INTO EVERY DETAIL. THE KIND OF MODUS VIVENDI HE HAD IN MIND WAS THAT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE QUOTE ALGIERS FORMULA UNQUOTE THE HEAD OF THE BRITISH INTEESTS SECTION (WHO WILL THIS BE ?) SHOULD INFORM THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR EVERY THREE DAYS OR SO OF WHAT WAS GOING ON. GIRON CONFIRMED THAT THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR IN BAGHDAD HAD BEEN INFORMED ABOUT THE ARRAGGEMENTS WITH REGARD TO CYPHER TRAFFIC ADDING THAT DETAILS FOR KEEPING THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR INFORMED WOULD HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT IN BAGHDAD.

MILLARD

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
NED
WED
OIL D
COMMUNICATIONS D
SECURITY D

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER/CAT A

(NED)

FM FCO 081600Z

CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 090500Z
TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NUMBER 1310 OF 8 DECEMBER INFO.
STOCKHOLM.
MY IPT.
SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS.
1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF BOUT DE PAPIER.
WE CAN AGREE TO THE IRAQI INTERESTS SECTION IN THE ROYAL AFGHAN EMBASSY BEING STAFFED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING PATTERN.
DIPLOMATS:
FOUR OFFICERS, THE SENIOR OF WHOM SHOULD NOT BE ABOVE THE RANK OF SECOND SECRETARY.
NON DIPLOMATS:
FOUR IRAQ-BASED OFFICERS
LOCALLY ENGAGED STAFF
CULTURAL ATTACHE (DIPLOMATIC) AND SUPPORTING STAFF
COMMERCIAL ATTACHE (DIPLOMATIC) AND SUPPORTING STAFF
ONE OFFICER SECONDED TO THE ARAB LEAGUE (DIPLOMATIC)

DOUGLAS-HOME

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
NE D
PCD
CRD
GIPD
NEWS
OIL
POD
CONS D
COMMS D
SECURITY
PUSD
WELFARE

CONFIDENTIAL

110

EN CLAIR

FM FCO 081420Z

UNCLASSIFIED

TO IMMEDIATE STOCKHOLM TELEGRAM NUMBER 205 OF 8 DECEMBER INFO ROUTINE BAGHDAD.

YOUR TEL NO 374: 104 A

1. LAST SENTENCE: NO OBJECTION

DOUGLAS-HOME

NNNN

pm 9/12

110 (A)

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CATA
FM FCO 081033Z

(CRD)

CONFIDENTIAL
TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TELNO. 1311 OF 8/12 INFO IMMEDIATE STOCKHOLM

SEVERANCE: BRITISH COUNCIL.
1. OWING TO AN OVERSIGHT, TELEGRAMS ON THIS HAVE NOT BEEN REPEATED TO STOCKHOLM. THIS HAS BEEN RECTIFIED.

2. MEANWHILE, WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR COMMENTS ON THE LAST CLAUSE OF PARA. 1 OF FCO TELNO. 1299 TO YOU. WE ASSUME THAT THE BRITISH COUNCIL REPRESENTATIVE IN BAGHDAD WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION INDEPENDENTLY FROM ANY DIPLOMATIC MISSION, AS AT PRESENT. WE ALSO ASSUME THAT THE ONLY RESPONSIBILITIES WHICH THE SWEDES WOULD HAVE TO ASSUME FOR THE COUNCIL IN BAGHDAD WOULD BE CONSULAR RESPONSIBILITIES, AS FOR ANY OTHER BRITISH SUBJECTS.

3. THE COUNCIL AND THE INTERESTS SECTION COULD OF COURSE CONTINUE TO WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER ON CULTURAL MATTERS AS AT PRESENT.

DOUGLAS-HOME

DEPARTMENTAL
CRD
NED

CONFIDENTIAL

111

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT A
FM BAGHDAD 081530Z
CONFIDENTIAL
TO IMMEDIATE F.C.O. TELNO. 1259 OF 8/12.

TOP COPY

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
-9 DEC 1971
NEQ 3/5481

DESKBY 081700Z

109

STOCKHOLM TELNO 377 TO YOU : CYPHER FACILITIES FOR IPC

1. MY COMMENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:
PARA 1A. THE IRAQIS HAVE NO OFFICIAL KNOWLEDGE OF IT , BUT THEY CL HARDLY BE UNAWARE SINCE THERE IS NO OTHER WAY IN WHICH FOR INSTANCE, NEGOTIATORS SEEK AND RECEIVE RAPID INSTRUCTIONS DURING TALKS.
PARA 1B. ACCORDING TO SUCH RECORDS AS WE HAVE NOT YET DESTROYED, 366 TELEGRAMS WERE SENT ON IPC BEHALF IN 1971 TO DATE, A LARGE PROPORTION DURING BOUTS OF NEGOTIATION.
PARA 1C. IT IS NOT A RIGHT BUT COULD BE DESCRIBED AS A PRIVILEGE ACCORDED ON PAYMENT OF COMMERCIAL TELEGRAPH RATES. ALL THEIR TELEGRAMS ARE SEEN AND INITIALLED BY ME BEFORE TRANSMISSION.

2. PARA 2. ALL CONDITIONS APPEAR TO ME UNOBJECTIONABLE.

BALFOUR PAUL

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
NED
WED
OIL D
COMMS D
DWS
SECURITY D

mr 10/12

NO DISTRIBUTION

112

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. NO
10 DEC 1971

Rm 129 file in NEQ 3/5/48.

FCO 460/E048/09
LDQ NR478/09

PP D T I (COMMERCIAL RELATIONS AND EXPORT DEPTTS) Tel + 2 Sdf
EP)
TP)
(Arabist)

PP FCO

PP KUWAIT

GRS 75

EN CLAIR

FM DUBAI 080830Z

UNCLASSIFIED

TO PRIORITY D T I (COMMERCIAL RELATIONS AND EXPORT DEPTTS)
TELNO.CREDA 038 OF 8 DECEMBER..N INFO PRIORITY FCO AND KUWAIT.

OAKES OF KENNEDY AND DONKIN WISHES TO VISIT BAGHDAD ON BUSINESS AND HAS ASKED US WHETHER THERE IS ANY REASON WHY HE SOULD NOT DO SO. HE WILL CONTACT THE EMBASSY IN KUWAIT ON MONDAY 13 DECEMBER TO CHECK THE POSITION BUT WE WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY INFORMATION WE CAN PASS ON TO HIM.

2. WE ASSUME THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION WILL BE IN THE EMBASSY BUILDING.

WALKER

NNNN

Miss Beckett

It occurs to me that we shd. draft a circular? to all Posts (certainly to all ME posts) to go by routine Tel round the world say on 14/xii, setting out what arrangements for Int'l Secn's or who is in charge, or that cabt. a Commercial Section are affected, & that all are operating on a normal basis.

Mr Egerton

Draft submitted pmb 14/12

(2) W.S. you pl

Or briefly in due course? The circular should also be put round at the same time to the internal WH sections

10/xii

BRITISH EMBASSY

STOCKHOLM

8 December 1971

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
10 DEC 1971
NEQ 3/54/71

Miss Veronica Beckett
Near Eastern Department
FCO

Dear Veronica,

1. Herewith two copies of the memorandum of 15 June 1967 referred to in paragraph 1 of Stockholm telegram No 374. As you see it is concerned with repayment of costs incurred by the Swedes in relation to personnel and other activities on our behalf.

2. Presumably on this occastion the Swedes will charge us inter alia for the reinforcement of their Embassy in Baghdad.

Yours ever

Patricia Hutchinson.

Miss P M Hutchinson

Encs. 2

pmh
19/12

af Sillén/KG

ARKIVEXEMPLAR

Stockholm, June 15, 1967.

Nr 276	Antal bil
Ink dnr	
Avd HP	Grupp 19	Hkl Ba

Ang skyddsmaktsuppdrag i Irak

af Sillén/KG 15.6.67
a f kém t amb i Bagdad (42)
" , B-avd. (43)
Eu/von Celsing/af Sillén
a t polchefen
bitr polchefen
hr Halmeus
amb Tamm
Hr Bergman
chm pol II
hr af Sillén

exp 15.6.67

Your Excellency,

With reference to Your Excellency's letter of June 7, 1967, I have the honour to inform you that, the consent of the Government of Iraq having been obtained, the Swedish Government has agreed to undertake the protection of the persons, property and interests for which His Majesty's Embassy in Iraq is normally responsible.

I enclose a memorandum regarding the financial aspects and would be grateful to receive your confirmation that the terms contained therein are acceptable to the British Government.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

For the Minister

(Rolf Dalgren)

His Excellency
The Honourable Sir Archibald Ross K.C.M.G.
His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary, etc., etc., etc.,

Not attached, but presumably provided.
K. 24/12

Exp. 15.6.67

af Sillén/LG

KUNGL. UTRIKES DEPARTEMENTET

af Sillén/LG 15.6.67
a som bil t note britt. amb.

Memorandum.

The British Government should accept responsibility for all the costs which may arise on account of the additional activities in Iraq undertaken by the Swedish Embassy for the protection of British Interests. It would appear that the costs given below can be anticipated:

Travelling expenses, subsistence allowances, housing costs and other extra costs which may arise as result of Officers in the Swedish Foreign Service having to be specially sent to Iraq for service with the British Interests Dept. of the Swedish Embassy.

Costs for telegram and telephone traffic between the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the British Interests Department of the Swedish Embassy in Baghdad.

Costs which may arise in Iraq for the proper execution of the task of protection as, for exemple, costs for the maintenance of real estate, rents for dwellings and other premises for which contracts are running, salaries to the locally employed staff which may be required, customary expenses and financial assistance to distressed British subjects.

In order to cover the costs for the opening and operation of the British Interests Department it would seem appropriate that a certain sum, say Sw.Cr. 200,000, should be placed as a deposit at the disposal of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Stockholm.

The Protection Department established at the Swedish Embassy in Baghdad will be provided with funds from the letter of credit which is now at the disposal of the Embassy. It is intended that the account of the expenses and incomes which this department may incur and receive as a result of its commission shall be made in principal in the same manner as that which applies to the British Foreign Service. The accounts will be submitted monthly to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and forwarded to the British Embassy in Stockholm by the Ministry. Reimbursement of the net expenses, which have been accounted for by Baghdad, will be requested at the same time.

For the costs which arise at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the intention is to give an account of these when all the costs are known or - if the Swedish Government continues to act as Protecting Power for a considerable time - at periods which can be agreed upon at a later date. The costs in question would comprise salaries to the extra staff who - if found necessary - are to be recruited to the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Stockholm for conducting the task of protection.

Stockholm, June 15, 1967.

CONFIDENTIAL

BRITISH EMBASSY

STOCKHOLM

8 December 1971

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10
10 DEC 1971
NE23/548/1

Miss V Beckett
Near Eastern Department
FCO

Dear Monica,

1. This is to let you know that I have passed on to the MFA a list of the British Interests Section staff in Baghdad as set out in paragraph 4 of Baghdad telegram No 1239, confirmed in FCO telegram to Baghdad No 1303.

2. I am also informing the MFA that the British Council is to remain in Baghdad and giving them what we here think are the names of the UK-based staff. We take it that as the members of the British Council in Baghdad have no diplomatic status the Swedes will not have any particular responsibility for them. In brief they will be in the same kind of position as any British firm in Baghdad. Perhaps you could confirm.

3. We imagine that in any negotiations with the Iraqis there will be provision for replacement if a member of a section were to fall ill or had to be transferred for some other reason.

4. Paragraph 4 of Baghdad telegram No 1249 refers to a certain Mr Padyath in Basra. We were under the impression, which I thought I had checked with you (but probably not), that we had nobody in Basra. I see from the Ambassador's telegram that he is to be withdrawn but what offices are there in Basra? This was a specific point put to me by Marc Giron at rather an early stage and I fear I may have given him the wrong answer.

Yours ever

Patricia Hutchinson

Miss P M Hutchinson

CONFIDENTIAL

Reply sent per bag 14/12

Reference

Mr Rendall
(POD-CG006)

BAGHDAD : ACCOUNTS

It would be useful for Finance Department if we could talk with the Administration Officer or the Head of Chancery of the Embassy at Baghdad about the closing of the post's accounts if either of them returns directly to this country for posting. I should be grateful if you could bear this in mind and if, opportunity offers, ask one or other of them to get in touch with me.

E G White
Finance Dept-CH501
(Extension CH137)

9 December 1971

copy:
Miss Beckett (NED-W133)
XF file

NEQ 3/5041
115 A

TOP COPY

IMMEDIATE
CYPHER / CAT ' A'

(NED)

FROM F.C.O. 091110Z

CONFIDENTIAL.

DESKBY 091200Z (BOTH POSTS)

TO IMMEDIATE STOCKHOLM TELEGRAM NUMBER 212 OF 9 DECEMBER INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD.

YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 377 (109) AND BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NUMBER 1259: CYPHER FACILITIES FOR IPC.

1. YOUR PARAGRAPH 1. WE AGREE WITH MR BALFOUR PAUL'S COMMENTS. IT MIGHT BE WORTH POINTING OUT TO THE SWEDES THAT THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION WOULD HAVE POWER TO VETO ANY MESSAGE IF THEY SO WISHED, IN PRACTICE SO FAR THE EMBASSY HAVE NEVER DONE THIS, AS FAR AS WE ARE AWARE.

2. WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO THESE TERMS.

3. YOUR PARAGRPH 3. THIS SEEMS TO US REASONABLE. WE HAVE CONSULTED HM AMBASSADOR AT BAGHDAD ON THE QUESTION OF WHO SHOULD HEAD THE INTERESTS SECTION.

4. UNLESS YOU SEE OBJECTION (IN WHICH CASE PLEASE TELEGRAPH FLASH TO BAGHDAD) WOULD MR BALFOUR PAUL PLEASE NOW DISCUSS WITH THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR IN BAGHDAD THE ARRANGEMENTS ABOUT COMMUNICATIONS PROVISIONALLY AGREED WITH GIRON IN STOCKHOLM. IN PARTICULAR, IT WOULD BE AS WELL TO ESTABLISH PRECISELY WHAT GEERING UNDERSTANDS BY THE PHRASE QUOTE GENERALLY INFORMED UNQUOTE (PARAGRAPH 2 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE).

DOUGLAS-HOME.

DEPARTMENTAL DISTN
NED
OIL D
COMMS D
POD

14/12

116



EN CLAIR

FM BAGHDAD 090724Z

UNCLASSIFIED

TO ROUTINE BEIRUT TELNO 168 OF 9/12 INFO F.C.O.

(107)

YOUR TEL. 111: NUTS AND BOLTS.

MANY THANKS FOR YOUR OFFERS OF HELP. NO-ONE OTHER THAN THE DA'S PARTY NOW PROPOSES TO TRAVEL BY ROAD TO BEIRUT. (SILVESTER HAS NOW DECIDED TO FLY)

2. IF ANYONE DOES, WE WILL LET YOU KNOW.

BALFOUR PAUL

FILES
NED
POD
SECURITY D

9/12

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE
CYPHER CAT A
FM BAGHDAD Ø9Ø747Z
CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10
10 DEC 1971
NGR 3/54/1

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 1262 OF 9 DEC 71 INFO IMMEDIATE TO STOCKHOLM.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 1311 : SEVERANCE AND BRITISH COUNCIL.

1. LAST CLAUSE OF PARAGRAPH 1 OF YOUR TELEGRAM NO 1299 APPEARS TO CONFLICT MARGINALLY, BUT ONLY MARGINALLY, WITH LAST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 2 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REPLY.
ANYWAY I SPOKE YESTERDAY TO THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR IN ACCORDANCE WITH CLAUSE CONCERNED. HE SEEMED QUITE HAPPY ABOUT IT.

2. SECOND SENTENCE OF YOUR PARAGRAPH 2 CONFIRMED, THOUGH I WILL BE TELLING GERRING THAT THE COUNCIL STAFF ENJOY CERTAIN BAG PRIVILEGES, THAT WE OCCASIONALLY SEND TELEGRAMS ON COUNCIL BEHALF ON REPAYMENT, AND THAT THEIR BOOKS, FILMS AND OFFICE EQUIPMENT (SUCH AS TYPEWRITERS) ARE CONSIGNED TO US FOR CLEARANCE THROUGH CUSTOMS UNDER OUR FRANCHISE.

BALFOUR PAUL [REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
CRD
NED
COMMS D

COPIES TO:
MR PHILLIPS BRITISH COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Stewart CRD is informing the Brit Council
pm 14/12

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
10 DEC 1971
NEQ 3/348/1

FLASH
CYPHER CAT A

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FM STOCKHOLM 091415Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP COPY

TO FLASH BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NUMBER 3 OF 9 DECEMBER INFO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

FCO TELEGRAM NO 212 TO ME: PARAGRAPH 4: CYPHER FACILITIES FOR IPC.

1. WE CANNOT SEE GIRON UNTIL TOMORROW MORNING. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WHILE I SEE NO OBJECTION TO H M AMBASSADOR IN BAGHDAD TALKING TO THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR ABOUT THE GENERAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR COMMUNICATIONS I THINK THAT THE QUESTION OF IPC TRAFFIC SHOULD NOT (REPEAT NOT) BE MENTIONED UNTIL WE HAVE OBTAINED THE CONSIDERED VIEW OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS HERE.

MILLARD

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
NED
OIL D
COMMS D
PERS OPS D

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
14 DEC 1971
NEQ 1/54/1

RESTRICTED

Enter 118

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
DEC 1971

CYPHER CAT A
FM BAGHDAD 091020Z
RESTRICTED
TO ROUTINE F.C.O. TELNO 1266 OF 9/12.

102

YOUR TEL 1302: ACCOUNTS.

1. AS WE ARE RETAINING ELEVEN U K BASED STAFF INCLUDING THE ACCOUNTANT WE WOULD PREFER TO CARRY ON ACCOUNTING UNDER OUR PRESENT SYSTEM WITH THE BANK ACCOUNT CHANGED TO THE NAME OF THE ''BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION OF THE SWEDISH EMBASSY''. I HAVE CONSULTED AMBASSADOR GERRING ABOUT THIS AND HE SEES NO DIFFICULTY. SUBJECT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM STOCKHOLM ON PRECISE TITLE OF THE RESIDUAL SECTION.

2. WE WILL REPLY TO PARA 1(A) WHEN MAIN BODY OF STAFF HAVE LEFT ON 12 DEC.

3. WE WILL ANSWER YOU (C) WHEN WE KNOW FOR CERTAIN HOW MANY ADDITIONAL OFFICERS THE SWEDES ARE SENDING AND OF WHAT RANK. (AMBASSADOR GERRING'S LATEST INFORMATION IS THAT IT WILL BE ONE FIRST SECRETARY ONLY, WHO SHOULD ARRIVE AT THE BEGINNING OF NEXT WEEK.)

4. NO PARTICULAR ACCOUNTS PROBLEMS FORESEEN AT PRESENT.

BALFOUR PAUL

FILES
FINANCE D

COPIES TO:
MR PATERSON PSD
MISS BECKETT NED

RESTRICTED

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10
13 DEC 1971
NEQ 3/54/1

19

PRIORITY CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT A
FM BAGHDAD Ø91422Z
CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 1268 OF 9 DEC 71 INFO PRIORITY
STOCKHOLM.

YOUR TELNO 1309. : SEVERANCE.

AT MY SESSION WITH D.G. OF PROTOCOL THIS MORNING I ASKED
THE QUESTION IN YOUR FINAL SENTENCE, HAVING GIVEN HIM
THE GIST OF PARA 2.
HE SEEMED SURPRISED THAT NO FORMAL APPROACH HAD BEEN MADE TO
YOU BUT WAS (AS USUAL) UNABLE TO COMMIT HIMSELF TO ANY
DEFINITE REPLY WITHOUT ''MAKING ENQUIRIES''.
HE PROMISED TO DO SO URGENTLY AND GET IN TOUCT WITH ME.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

BALFOUR PAUL

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
NED
P & C D

CONFIDENTIAL

pm 14/12

FLASH CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 100715Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP COPY

120

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10
10 DEC 1971
NEQ 3/5481

TO FLASH F.C.O. TELNO 1272 OF 10/12 INFO FLASH TO STOCKHOLM.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 212 TO STOCKHOLM. SEVERANCE.

1. YOUR PARAGRAPH 4. I SPOKE TO GERRING AGAIN LAST NIGHT. DESPITE LAST SENTENCE OF STOCKHOLM TELEGRAM NO 377 TO YOU (109) HE MAINTAINS (SEE MIFT NO. 1 TO STOCKHOLM) THAT HE HAS RECEIVED INSUFFICIENT INSTRUCTIONS FROM STOCKHOLM REGARDING COMMUNICATIONS ARRANGEMENTS TO MAKE FURTHER DISCUSSION HERE AT PRESENT FRUITFUL. HE HAS CERTAINLY RECEIVED NO INSTRUCTIONS SINCE THE SUBJECT OF IPC TRAFFIC WAS BROACHED WITH GIRON AS DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF STOCKHOLM TELEGRAM NO 377 OF WHICH I TOLD HIM YESTERDAY MORNING, INCLUDING THE FACT THAT THE VIEWS OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE MFA WERE BEING SOUGHT. (109)

2. HE ASSURES ME THAT HE PERSONALLY IS IN FAVOUR OF THE INTERESTS SECTION CONTINUING TO COMMUNICATE, BOTH BY WIRELESS AND BY BAG, AS AT PRESENT, AND THAT IT IS HIS MFA WHICH SEEMS TO HAVE RESERVATIONS. HE INFORMED THEM THREE DAYS AGO OF THE SYSTEM OPERATED BY THE GERMAN INTERESTS SECTION OF THE FRENCH EMBASSY HNRE, UNDER WHICH THE GERMANS DESPATCH CYPHER TELEGRAMS UNMONITORED THROUGH THE FRENCH EMBASSY'S DWS TO THE GERMAN EMBASSY IN PARIS AND THE GERMAN BAGS ARE SEALED BY THE FRENCH EMBASSY WITHOUT INSPECTION. HIS RECOMMENDATION TO STOCKHOLM WAS THAT A SIMILAR SYSTEM SHOULD BE OPERATED IN OUR CASE, WITH THE ADDED ADVANTAGE THAT OUR WIRELESS MESSAGES SHOULD GO DIRECT. HE HAS HAD NO REPLY.

3. AS REGARDS BAG FACILITIES I TOLD THE DG OF PROTOCOL YESTERDAY OF PARAGRAPH 5 OF YOUR TELEGRAM NO 1309. HE CONFIRMED THAT HE SAW NO REASON WHY OUR INTERESTS SECTION SHOULD NOT EQUALLY ENJOY FULL BAG FACILITIES UNDER ARTICLE 27 - THOUGH I STILL COULD NOT GET A DEFINITE EXPRESSION OF OPINION FROM HIM ON THE CONTINUATION OF THE QM SERVICE. I TOLD GERRING OF THIS CONVERSATION. AS I SEE IT, THE QM QUESTION IS NOW ONE FOR THE SWEDES - THOUGH WE COULD HARDLY EXPECT THEM TO AGREE TO OUR RECEIVING (AND HOLDING FOR TWO DAYS) BAGS FOR AMMAN, KUWAIT AND GULF POSTS AS AT PRESENT. FURTHER TELEGRAM ON THIS SUBJECT FOLLOWS.

pah 14/12

4. I VERY MUCH HOPE SOMETHING MORE DEFINITE CAN REACH GERRING FROM STOCKHOLM (IF NECESSARY THROUGH THIS CHANNEL) BEFORE THE WEEKEND. IF THERE IS NO CLEAR UNDERSTANDING BY THEN ABOUT THE CONTINUATION OF THE IPC TRAFFIC, MILNE (CHIEF REPRESENTATIVE OF THE IPC) TELLS ME HE WILL HAVE TO DEFER GOING ON HOME LEAVE ON 13 DECEMBER.

5. I AM UNSIGHTED BY PARAGRAPH 3 OF YOU TELEGRAM NO 212 TO STOCKHOLM. IRAQIS INSIST THAT THE BRITISH PART OF THE INTEREST SECTION SHOULD BE HEADED BY SECOND SECRETARY AND YOU HAVE AGREED THAT THIS SHOULD BE LEWTY (YOUR TELEGRAM NO 1303). GERRING AND THE IRAQIS ARE ALREADY AWARE OF THIS. AS EXPLAINED IN MY TELEGRAM NO 1204, PARAGRAPH 5, THE FIRST SECRETARY COMMERCIAL MUST ACCEPT THAT HE WOULD ONLY BE IN CHARGE OF THE COMMERCIAL SECTION. GERRING HAS SUGGESTED THAT, TO AVOID ANY POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING, HE AND CARTWRIGHT SHOULD FIGURE SIMPLY ''COMMERCIAL SECRETARIES'' ON THE LOCAL DIPLOMATIC LIST. (60)

6. SINCE ABOVE WAS DICTATED, STOCKHOLM TELEGRAM NO 3 TO BAGHDAD, HAS REACHED ME. AS STATED IN PARAGRAPH 1, I TOLD GERRING YESTERDAY MORNING THAT WE CARRIED A GOOD DEAL OF IPC TRAFFIC (ON REPAYMENT AND ON MY SIGNATURE). I COULD NOT IN COMMON HONESTY WITHHOLD THIS (WHICH YOU HAVE AGREED TO BE THE MAIN POINT OF MAINTAINING OUR DWS) ANY LONGER. HE WAS NOT THE LEAST DISMAYED.

BALFOUR PAUL

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:
NED
W EUR DEPT
CIL DEPT
COMS DEPT
SECURITY DEPT

&&&&

A S H CONFIDENTIAL

TOP COPY

121.

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 100735Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FLASH STOCKHOLM TELNO 1 OF 10/12 INFO FLASH

TO F.C.O.

120

MY TELEGRAM NO 1272 TO FCO: SEVERANCE.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10
10 DEC 1971
NEQ 3/548/1

PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING FROM AMBASSADOR GERRING TO GIRON IN M.F.A.:

''GRATEFUL FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS URGENTLY ABOUT CODED MESSAGES AND CONFIDENTIAL BAG ARRANGEMENTS FOR BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION. I RECOMMEND ARRANGEMENTS SIMILAR TO THOSE OPERATED BY THE FRENCH FOR THE GERMAN INTERESTS SECTION.''

BALFOUR PAUL

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

NED

WED

OIL D

COMMS D

SECURITY D

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNN

p 14/12

(121)

IMMEDIATE

EN CLAIR

(NE)

FM FCO 101255Z

UNCLASSIFIED

DESKBY 11/0500Z

TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NUMBER 1319 OF 10 DECEMBER.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 1255: STAFF MOVEMENTS.

1. FOLLOWING ARE MEETING ARRANGEMENTS.

2. WE HAVE RESERVED THE ALCOCK AND BROWN SUITE FOR YOU. BOAC WILL ESCORT YOU THERE AND YOU WILL BE MET BY THE HEAD OF NEAR EASTERN DEPARTMENT. A CAR WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR YOU.

3. LONG OF POD WILL MEET THE OTHERS, AND TRANSPORT WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR THOSE NOT MET BY RELATIVES OR FRIENDS. PSD HAVE TELEGRAPHED ABOUT BAGGAGE ALREADY. HOTELS BOOKED AS REQUESTED.

4. MISS BECKETT WILL MEET HEAD OF CHANCERY AND FAMILY ON WEDNESDAY, WITH A CAR.

DOUGLAS-HOME

F I L E S

NED

POD

PSD

NNNNN

pc 14/12

Reference ..... Mr Lever

122

News Department Weekend Duty Officer

SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS WITH IRAQ

Background

1. The Iraq Government broke relations with HMG from 1 December. They gave HM Ambassador ten days (subsequently extended to eleven) and the Embassy staff not included in the British Interests Section a fortnight to leave.

2. Not to be used The Ambassador, Mr Glen Balfour Paul CMG, accompanied by 10 members of his staff and three Embassy children, will arrive at Heathrow Airport by BA 203 at 1405 hrs on Sunday, 12 December. They will be met by the Head of Near Eastern Department and by a member of Personnel Operations Department.

3. The Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires, accompanied by several members of his staff, left London on Thursday 9 December.

4. The British Interests Section in Baghdad will function as from 15 December under the flag of the protecting power, Sweden, from the British Embassy premises (ie the Chancery). The Commercial Section of the Embassy and also the British Council, both of which have separate premises elsewhere in the town, are unaffected by the breach, though our Commercial Section will technically be operating under the Swedish flag. The Head of the British Interests Section is a Second Secretary, Mr D I Lewty.

5. The Iraq Interests Section in Britain, which is likely to function from 15 December under a protecting power, will be headed by Mr H Abdul Sattar, a Second Secretary. The Commercial and Cultural Sections of the Iraq Embassy are similarly unaffected by the breach in relations.

Line to Take

6. If press enquiries result from the return of Mr Balfour Paul and some of his staff on Sunday, all the above, with the exception of paragraph 2, may be used freely on the record. The spokesman could also add that the structure of the two Interests Sections was suggested by the Iraqis. We regret the breach in relations since, as stated by the Secretary of State in Parliament on 6 December, we find it very difficult to understand the reasons for this action. We hope relations will be resumed.

pr 11 12/12

/[Note .....

[Note : The main reason given by the Iraqis was of course Anglo-Iranian collusion in the "occupation" of the Gulf Islands on 30 November]

S L Egerton
Near Eastern Department

10 December 1971

Copies to : Mr Laver ✓
Resident Clerk

<u>If needed, further information can be obtained over the weekend from</u>:

S Egerton : 050-843-253

V Beckett : 0-962[illegible]-2823

IMMEDIATE CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
14 DEC 1971
NEQJ/5481

1.22 A1
Enter

CYPHER/CAT A

FM F.C.O. 101610Z (COMMS D)

CONFIDENTIAL
TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NUMBER 1321 OF 10 DECEMBER INFO BEIRUT, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, MUSCAT, ABU DHABI, DOHA, DUBAI AND STOCKHOLM.

(123)

YOUR TELEGRAM 1275 OF 10 DECEMBER (NOT TO ALL), PARAGRAPH 1:

WE AGREE TO USE OF BOAC CARE-OF-PILOT. IN VIEW OF STAFF SHORTAGE, YOU MAY FIND IT DIFFICULT TO FREE STAFF TO PROVIDE CASUAL COURIER TO KUWAIT BUT PLEASE FEEL FREE TO DO SO SHOULD THE NEED ARISE.

2. WE SHALL ROUTE QM-18 TO FLY DIRECT BEIRUT TO KUWAIT W.E.F. FRIDAY, 17 DECEMBER. DETAILS FOLLOW.

3. WE SHALL, HOWEVER, KEEP YOUR QM SERVICE UNDER REVIEW IN THE LIGHT OF EVENTS.

DOUGLAS-HOME

FILES
COMMS D

COPIES TO:
MR SYDENHAM-CLARKE, SECURITY DEPT.
MISS BECKETT, NED

CONFIDENTIAL

123

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP COPY

PRIORITY
CYPHER CAT A
FM BAGHDAD 101015Z
CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
13DEC 1971
NEQ 3/5481

TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 1275 OF 10 DEC INFO PRIORITY
STOCKHOLM.

120

MY TELNO 1272 (PARA 3) : SEVERANCE.

1. ASSUMING THAT THE SWEDES AGREE TO OUR KEEPING A CONFIDENTIAL BAG SERVICE, BUT THAT FOR THE REASONS GIVEN IN PARA 3 OF MY TEL UNDER REFERENCE MAINTENANCE OF THE QM SERVICE IN ITS PRESENT BASIS IS IMPRACTICAL, THERE APPEAR TO BE TWO ALTERNATIVES :

A. CARE OF BOAC PILOT. WE COULD RECEIVE A BAG FROM LONDON ON THE SATURDAY FLIGHT AND HAND OVER A BAG FOR THE PILOT TO DELIVER TO KUWAIT (IF WE HAVE MATERIAL FOR GULF POSTS).
WE WOULD THEN PUT OUR LONDON BAG ON THE SUNDAY MORNING NON-STOP BOAC FLIGHT TO LONDON.

B. WEEKLY CASUAL COURIER SERVICE TO KUWAIT, PREFERABLY TIMED TO TIE IN WITH THE QM ON HIS WAY BACK TO LONDON FROM THE GULF.

2. GRATEFUL FOR YOUR VIEWS ON ACCEPTABILITY OF (A). COST OF (B) WOULD BE ID 29/700 FOR EACH RETURN FARE (ASSUMING 2 SEATS WERE REQUIRED, AND SUBSISTENCE AS NECESSARY.

BALFOUR PAUL

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
NED
WED
OIL D
COMMS D
SEC D

FFFFF

CONFIDENTIAL

Replycent
pls
11/12

CONFIDENTIAL

124

F L A S H
CIPHER/CAT A
FM STOCKHOLM 101200Z
CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
10 DEC 1971
NEQ 3/548

TOP COPY

TO FLASH FCO TEL NO 380 OF 10 DECEMBER INFO FLASH BAGHDAD.

MY TELEGRAM NO 3 (118) TO BAGHDAD AND BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NO 1272. (120)

1. HEAD OF CHANCERY SAW GIRON THIS MORNING AND HANDED OVER THE MESSAGE IN BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NO 1 TO ME. GIRON SEEMED SURPRISED THAT AMBASSADOR GERRING NEEDED FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS BUT HE UNDERTOOK TO SEND A FURTHER MESSAGE THIS AFTERNOON PROBABLY THROUGH OUR CHANNELS.

2. GIRON ALSO SAID THAT THE SWEDES HAD NO OBJECTION TO IPC TRAFFIC SUBJECT TO THE GENERAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR CYPHER TRAFFIC. HE EMPHASISED YET AGAIN THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR BEING INFORMED MUST BE MAINTAINED BUT THAT A MODUS VIVENDI COULD BE WORKED OUT ON THE GROUND. WHEN HEAD OF CHANCERY ASKED HIM POINT BLANK WHETHER THIS MEANT THAT THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR MIGHT REQUEST TO SEE THE TEXT OF A CERTAIN MESSAGE HE SAID THA T THIS WAS THE ISSUE HE HAD TRIED TO BLUR.

3. ON BAG FACILITIES GIRON SAID THAT HE WOULD AGAIN HAVE TO CONSULT THE SECRETARY GENERAL BUT COMMENTED THAT IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE IRAQIS HAD GIVEN THEIR CONCURRENCE UNDER ARTICLE 27 OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION HE DID NOT THINK THERE WOULD BE MUCH OF A PROBLEM. HEAD OF CHANCERY EXPLAINED THAT THE SITUATION ABOUT OUR QM SERVICE WAS UNCLEAR AND GIRON THEN ENQUIRED ABOUT THE FREQUENCY AND VOLUME OF BAG TRAFFIC.

/4.

CONFIDENTIAL

pdk
14/12

4. PERSSON, HEAD OF FOREIGN INTERESTS SECTION IN THE MFA AND BOJONSSON, A MEMBER OF THE SWEDISH DIPLOMATIC SERVICE WHO WAS IN BAGHDAD IN 1967 WERE ALSO PRESENT AND RAISED A NUMBER OF DETAILED AND SOMEWHAT LEGALISTIC POINTS. THEY SEEMED TO THINK THAT A MEMBER OF THE SWEDISH EMBASSY SHOULD SIT IN THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION PARTLY FOR PROTECTION PURPOSES GIVEN THE DISTANCE BETWEEN THE BRITISH CHANCERY AND THE SWEDISH EMBASSY. THEY ADDED THAT THEY UNDERSTOOD A MEMBER OF THE FRENCH EMBASSY SAT IN THE GERMAN INTERESTS /SECTION/ IN BAGHDAD. HEAD OF CHANCERY COMMENTED THAT SHE DID NOT THINK THIS WAS ENVISAGED IN LONDON BUT TOOK NOTE OF THE PRACTICAL POINT RAISED. IT LOOKS AS THOUGH THE REASON BEHIND THIS SWEDISH REQUEST MAY BE THAT THEY DOUBT WHETHER THEY CAN BE KEPT GENERALLY INFORMED UNLESS THEY HAVE SOMEBODY SITTING IN OUR OFFICES.

5. ON DOCUMENTATION THE SWEDES ASEEMED TO HAVE MORE INTEREST IN A MEMORANDUM SETTING OUT ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCIAL ATTERS BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS THAT ANYTHING ELSE. HEAD OF CHANCERY SAID THAT SHE THOUGHT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO ESTABLISH THE STATUS OF THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION VIS-A-VIS THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES AS HAD BEEN DONE IN ALGIERS IN 1965/66.

MILLARD

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
NED
WED
OIL D
COMMS D
SEC D
POD

FFFFF

FLASH

CYPHER CAT A

STOCKHOLM 131345Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP COPY

HD.NED
.. Comms
.. W.E.D
Typists

(Depth) (8)

TO FLASH BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NUMBER 4 OF 10 DECEMBER INFO FLASH FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10
13 DEC 1971

PARAGRAPH 1 OF MY TELEGRAM NO 380 TO FCO. (126)

NEQ 3/5/41

PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR GERRING.

BEGINS. .

GERRING FROM GIRON REFERRING YOUR CABLE RECEIVED TODAY FRIDAY THROUGH BRITISH EMBASSY.

PRIMO. REGARDING CODED MESSAGES I REFER TO MY CABLE 6 DECEMBER AND CONFIRM THAT WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO SUCH MESSAGES BEING SENT DIRECTLY BY BRITISH INTEREST SECTION TO FCO.

SECUNDO. LIKEWISE WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO CONFIDENTIAL BAG ARRANGEMENTS FOR BRITISH INTEREST SECTION.

TERTIO. OUR CONSENT TO CODE MESSAGES AND CONFIDENTIAL-BAGS IS OF COURSE CONDITIONED TO APPROVAL BY IRAQI GOVERNMENT WHICH WE UNDERSTAND HAS ALREADY BEEN GIVEN. CONSENT ALSO SUBJECT TO PROTECTING POWER BEING INFORMED QUOTE AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE UNQUOTE OF ACTIVITIES WHICH THUS WILL BE RESTRICTED TO ADMINIST-RATIVE COMMERCIAL CONSULAR CULTURAL MATTERS, PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR INFORMATION OF PROTECTING POWER TO BE WORKED OUT LOCALLY.

/QUARTO

Pub 19/12

QUARTO. WE HAVE ALSO NO OBJECTION MESSAGES OF A COMMERCIAL CHARACTER BEING TRANSMITTED FOR IPC SUBJECT TO PROTECTING POWER BEING INFORMED QUOTE AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE UNQUOTE AS MENTIONED UNDER TERTIO.

QUINTO. WE SUGGEST THAT QUOTE ROYAL SWEDISH EMBASSY, BRITISH INTEREST SECTION UNQUOTE BE OFFICIAL NAME OF PROTECTING POWER ACTIVITIES.

SEXTO. IT SEEMS TO BE NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH SOME KIND OF WRITTEN AGREEMENT BETWEEN SWEDEN AND IRAQ TO DEFINE RESPONSIBILITIES AND RIGHTS OF PROTECTING POWER. IN THIS REGARD WE HAVE BEEN SHOWN TEXT OF AGREEMENT BEWTEEN SWITZERLAND AND ALGERIA REFERRING TO SWITZERLAND'S ASSUMPTION OF THE PROTECTION OF BRITISH INTERESTS IN ALGERIA 1966. WE HAVE BEEN INFORMED BY BRITISH HERE THAT THIS TEXT WILL BE AVAILABLE SHORTLY IN BAGHDAD. IT IS OUR IMPRESSION THAT THIS TEXT CAN BE USED AS A MODEL FOR OUR OWN AGREEMENT WITH THE IRAQIS. THEREFORE WE WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD WORK OUT TOGETHER WITH THE BRITISH A DRAFT TEXT WHICH IN YOUR OPINION CAN BE USED IN THE PRESENT CASE. I WOULD ASK YOU TO SUBMIT THIS DRAFT TO US FOR CONSIDERATION AND APPROVAL BEFORE IT BEING OFFICIALLY HANDED OVER TO THE IRAQIS.

ENDS.

MILLARD /REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
NED
WED
COMMS D
SEC D
POD
PSD
DWS
N AF D
ARAB D
OIL D
ASD

IMMEDIATE
CYPHER CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

126

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
10 DEC 1971
NEQ 3/548/1

STOCKHOLM 101700Z

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 101000Z FCO

TO IMMEDIATE F C O TELNO 384 OF 10 DECEMBER INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD

(124)

MY TELEGRAM NO 380: SEVERANCE

(125)

1. WE ARE RELIEVED TO SEE FROM THE SIXTH PARAGRAPH OF GIRON'S MESSATE TO AMBASSADOR GERRING (MY TELEGRAM NO 4 TO BAGHDAD) THAT THE SWEDES PROPOSE THAT THE TEXT OF THE NOTES TO BE EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE SWEDISH EMBASSY AND THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE WORKED OUT IN BAGHDAD. THIS MORNING GIRON INDICATED THAT THE M F A HERE WOULD DRAFT. THIS WOULD HAVE LED TO DIFFICULTIES AS PERSSON AND BOJONSSON (PARAGRAPH 4 OF MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE) SHOWED A DISCONCERTING INCLINATION TO HARK BACK TO THE 1967 PRECEDENT WHEN SWEDEN PROTECTED OUR INTERESTS IN IRAQ. HEAD OF CHANCERY HAD TO STRESS REPEATEDLY THAT THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES WITH THE EXISTANCE OF A BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION ARE QUITE DIFFERENT.

2. PERSSON AND BOJONSSON BETWEEN THEM RAISED THE FOLLOWING POINTS OF DETAIL:
(A) WOULD VISAS TO BE ISSUED BY THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION ALSO HAVE TO HAVE THE STAMP OF THE SWEDISH EMBASSY? HEAD OF CHANCERY COMMENTED THAT THIS WAS UNLIKELY.
(B) WHY WAS THERE A DISTINCTION IN ALGIERS IN 1966 IN THE PROTOCOLE DE REPRISE BETWEEN THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE AND QUOTE OR OTHER PROPERTY UNQUOTE OWNED BY THE BRITISH EMBASSY?
(C) HOW WOULD THE M F A FOREIGN INTERESTS SECTION IN STOCKHOLM BE KEPT IN THE PICTURE AS THERE WOULD BE DIRECT COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION AND THE F C O? HEAD OF CHANCERY COMMENTED THAT PRESUMABLY THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR IN BAGHDAD WOULD KEEP THE M F A GENERALLY INFORMED. GIRON THEN INTERJECTED TO SAY THAT PERHAPS FROM TIME TO TEME THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION WOULF PROVIDE THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR WITH A WRITTEN REPORT. HEAD OF CHANCERY DID NOT COMMENT.

Reply Secret
pl
14/12

/(D)

(D) SWEDISH EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD IS BEING REINFORCED BY A MR KAERRLANDER FROM THE SWEDISH EMBASSY IN BEIRUT.

MILLARD

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
NED
ARAB D
WED
PCD
OIL D
POD
CRD
ASD
PSD
SECURITY D
COMMS D
CONS D

NEQ 3/5481.

126 A

IMMEDIATE
CYPHER/CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

FM F.C.O. 102020Z

(NED)

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 110500Z

TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TEL NO 1325 OF 10 DECEMBER INFO STOCKHOLM.

STOCKHOLM TELEGRAM NO 380 TO FCO AND NO. 4 TO BAGHDAD.

1. YOU WILL NOW NO DOUBT WISH TO HAVE A FINAL DISCUSSION WITH GERRING ABOUT COMMUNICATIONS AND WORK OUT A MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENT WITH HIM. HIS INSTRUCTIONS AS SET OUT IN STOCKHOLM TEL NO. 4 TO YOU ARE BROADLY SATISFACTORY TO US (SUBJECT TO 3 BELOW), PARTICULARLY GIVEN GIRON'S RESPONSE TO THE HEAD OF CHANCERY'S QUESTION REPORTED AT THE END OF PARA 2 OF STOCKHOLM TEL NO. 380.

2. PARAGRAPH 3 OF STOCKHOLM TEL NO. 380. YOU WILL HAVE SEEN OUR TELEGRAM SUGGESTING THAT IN FUTURE BAGS SHOULD BE SENT BY HAND OF BOAC PILOT. COMMUNICATIONS DEPARTMENT'S ASSESSMENT IS THAT UNDER THE NEW REGIME A BAG OF ABOUT 10 TO 20 KILOS WILL GO ONCE A WEEK.

3. PARAGRAPH 4 OF STOCKHOLM NO. 380. THERE WOULD BE NO (NO) OBJECTION TO A MEMBER OF THE SWEDISH EMBASSY SITTING IN ONE OF THE CONFIDENTIAL OFFICES OF THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION, PROVIDED HE DID NOT (NOT) HAVE ACCESS TO THE REGISTRY AREA BEHIND THE SECURITY GRILLE. YOU SHOULD THEREFORE ARRANGE FOR HIM TO SIT IN AN OFFICE NOT IMMEDIATELY ADJOINING THE REGISTRY.

4. DOCUMENTATION (FINAL PARAS OF BOTH TELS UNDER REFERENCE). WE AGREE THAT A TEXT SHOULD BE WORKED OUT BETWEEN THE SWEDISH AMBASS-ADOR AND THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION IN BAGHDAD. THIS TEXT SHOULD

/BE

CONFIDENTIAL

pls 14/12

BE AD REFERENDUM IN BOTH STOCKHOLM AND LONDON BEFORE IT IS SHOWN TO THE IRAQIS. WE DOUBT IF THE SWEDES WILL FIND IT EITHER QUICK OR EASY TO CLINCH AGREEMENT WITH THEM.

5. WE HAVE JUST SEEN STOCKHOLM TELEGRAM NO 384 AND WILL REPLY TO THE QUESTIONS IN PARA 2. AS SOON AS WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO OBTAIN NECESSARY ADVICE.

DOUGLAS-HOME

FILES
NED
OIL D
COMMS D
POD
SECURITY D

127

ADVANCE COPY

N.E.D.

FCO 913 E 804/12

LKS 236/12

RR FCO

GR 38

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
13 DEC 1971
NEQ 3/5481/1

Mr Sunderland informed
(836-1207 x 1854)

pm 13/12

EN CLAIR
FM BAGHDAD 120958Z
UNCLASSIFIED
TO ROUTINE F.C.O. TELNO 1278 OF 12/12.

(73)

YOURTEL NO 1278: SHIPPING.

AT LEAST TWO BRITISH FLAG VESSELS HAVE ARRIVED NORMALLY SINCE 1 DECEMBER. NO CASE OF DIFFICULTY HAS BEEN REPORTED.

BALFOUR PAUL

NNNN

Mrs B

Pl. inform DTI
(? Mr Sutherland or
perhaps Sunderland).

IMMEDIATE CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 120850Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE F.C.O. TELNO 1279 OF 12/12 INFO PRIORITY STOCKHOLM.

TOP COPY 128

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
13 DEC 1971
NEAD/Sec/

DESKBY FCO 130990ØZ. 119

MY TELEGRAM NO 1268: SEVERANCE.

1. HAVING HEARD NO MORE FROM DG OF PROTOCOL ABOUT TH
AFGHANS, I REPEATED MY ENQUIRY AT FINAL SESSION YESTERDAY MORNING.

2. ABDUL WUDOOD EVENTUALLY ADMITTED THAT HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT ACTION HIS GOVERNMENT HAD TAKEN: IT WAS NOT (HE CLAIMED) HIS PROVINCE.

3. I EXPRESSED ASTONISHMENT. HE REPEATED HIS USUAL FORMULA THAT HE WOULD FIND OUT AND LET ME KNOW (BEFORE MY DEPARTURE), BUT DID NOT DO SO.

BALFOUR PAUL

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
NED
P & C D

CONFIDENTIAL

pm 14/12

129

BRITISH EMBASSY

STOCKHOLM

UNCLASSIFIED

7 December 1971

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
13DEC1971
NEQ 3/5461/1

Miss Veronica Beckett
Near Eastern Department
FCO

Dear Veronica,

SWEDEN TO ACT AS PROTECTING POWER IN IRAQ

The text of the Swedish Press Release issued on 6 December is as follows:

> "It is announced by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the Swedish Government have undertaken to protect British interests in Iraq at the request of the British Government."

Yours ever

Patricia Hutchinson

Miss P M Hutchinson

IMMEDIATE CONFIDENTIAL

130

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 120855Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE F.C.O. TELNO 1280 OF 12/12 INFO PRIORITY STOCKHOLM

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
13 DEC 1971
NEQ 3/548/1

DESKBY FCO 130900Z.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 1325: SEVERANCE.

1. PARAGRAPH 1. ARRANGEMENTS AGREED WITH GERRING AT FINAL SESSION TODAY (SATURDAY). HE WILL NOT (NOT) REQUIRE TO INSPECT OR MONITOR COMMUNICATIONS BY BAG OR WIRELESS ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THEY CONTAIN NO POLITICAL CONTENT OTHER THAN
(A) WHAT IS INSEPARABLE FROM REPORTS UNDER OTHER APPROVED HEADINGS AND
(B) UNCLASSIFIED MATERIAL TRANSMITTED WITHOUT COMMENT.
HE OR HIS REPRESENTATIVE IS TO RECEIVE VERBALLY FROM THE SECOND SECRETARY IN THE INTERESTS SECTION A GENERAL IDEA OF ALL ACTIVITIES AND ALL COMMUNICATIONS SENT OR RECEIVED. HE PREFERRED TO AVOID ANY MORE SPECIFIC FORMULATION AND IS CLEARLY OUT TO BE HELPFUL.

2. PARAGRAPH 2 NOTED. FOR WHAT THIS IS NOW WORTH, DG OF PROTOCOL CONFIRMED THIS MORNING THAT THERE WAS NO IRAQI OBJECTION TO USE OF QM'S OR OTHER COURIERS.

3. PARAGRAPH 3. GERRING INTENDS TO SIT IN MY OFFICE HIMSELF FOR PART OF THE DAY TO BEGIN WITH, PENDING ARRIVAL OF A SWEDISH FIRST SECRETARY (IF ONE COMES). KAERRLANDER (PARAGRAPH 2 (D) OF STOCKHOLM TELEGRAM NO 384 TO YOU) WHO ARRIVES TOMORROW, IS A SUBORDINATE ATTACHE. NONE OF THEM WILL ENTER SECURITY ZONE.

4. PARAGRAPH 4. LEWTY IS COMPILING AT GERRING'S REQUEST A DRAFT IRAQI/SWEDISH AGREEMENT AD REFERENDUM, BASED ROUGHLY ON SWISS / ALGERIAN MODEL OF WHICH I GAVE HIM A COPY. HE SEES NO NEED FOR AN ANGLO/SWEDISH MEMORANDUM (PARAGRAPH 4 OF STOCKHOLM TELEGRAM NO 380 TO YOU) UNLESS BOTH OUR GOVERNMENTS INSIST.

pm 14/12/15.

5. PARAGRAPH 2 OF STOCKHOLM TELEGRAM NO 384 TO YOU:

(A) GERRING HAS ALREADY INSISTED ON SWEDISH EMBASSY STAMP WITH BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION ADDED. ARRANGEMENTS ARE BEING MADE ACCORDINGLY.
(B) IRRELEVANT ANYWAY, SINCE THE RESIDENCE IS BEING SHORTLY RETURNED TO IPC.
(C) GERRING AGREES WITH COMMENTS OF H OF C STOCKHOLM.

BALFOUR PAUL

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
NED
WED
OIL D
COMMS D
SECURITY D
POD
CONS D
PCD
NEWS D

131

IMMEDIATE
EN CLAIR
FM BAGHDAD 120915Z
UNCLASSIFIED
TO IMMEDIATE F.C.O. TELNO 1281 OF 12/12 INFO PRIORITY STOCKHOLM
ROUTINE KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, AMMAN , BEIRUT, CAIRO, ABU DHABI,
DUBAI, DOHA, MUSCAT, TRIPOLI, TEHRAN, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK,
MOSCOW, PARIS.

DESKBY FCO AND STOCKHOLM 130900Z.

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
13 DEC 1971
NEQ 8/548/1

130

HMA'S TELNO 1280 (NOT TO ALL): SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS.

1. THE AMBASSADOR, TOGETHER WITH THE MAIN PARTY OF EVACUEES, LEFT BAGHDAD BY AIR AT 11.00 TODAY.

2. THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR HAS NOW FORMALLY ASSUMED PROTECTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES, AND I HAVE TAKEN CHARGE OF THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION OF THE ROYAL SWEDISH EMBASSY. (HEAD OF CHANCERY STAYS ON UNTIL WEDNESDAY 15 DECEMBER, IN CAPACITY OF ''SUPERNUMERARY ADVISER'').

3. DEFENCE ATTACHE'S CONVOY IS DUE TO LEAVE AT 1400 TODAY.

4. PLEASE SEE M.I.F.T.

LEWTY

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
NED
WED
OIL D
COMMS D
SECURITY D
POD
CONS D
PCD
NEWS D

pah 14/12

132

IMMEDIATE CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 120925Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE F.C.O. TELNO 1282 OF 12/12 AND PRIORITY TO KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, DOHA, MUSCAT, TRIPOLI, TEHRAN, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW, PARIS, INFO TO STOCKHOLM.

DESKBY FCO 130900Z

(131)

M.I.P.T. SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10
13 DEC 1971
NEQ 3/548/1

(130)

1. I AM REPEATING TO OTHER ADDRESSEES THE RELEVANT PART OF HMA'S TELNO 1280 ABOUT OUR UNDERSTANDING WITH THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR ON THE CONTENTS OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL SENT TO AND FROM HERE. GRATEFUL IF OTHER ADDRESSEES WOULD BEAR THIS IN MIND WHEN REPEATING OR COPYING MATERIAL TO US.

2. HE (THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR) WILL NOT (NOT) REQUIRE TO INSPECT OR MONITOR COMMUNICATIONS BY BAG OR WIRELESS ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THEY CONTAIN NO POLITICAL CONTENT OTHER THAN (A) WHAT IS INSEPARABLE FROM REPORTS UNDER OTHER APPROVED HEADINGS (I.E. ECONOMIC, COMMERCIAL, CONSULAR, CULTURAL, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND ADMINISTRATIVE) AND (B) UNCLASSIFIED MATERIAL TRANSMITTED WITHOUT COMMENT (E.G. PRESS SUMMARIES)

LEWTY

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
NED
WED
OIL D
COMMS D
SECURITY D
POD
CONS D
PCD
NEWS D

CONFIDENTIAL

14/12

RESTRICTED

TOP COPY 133

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10
14 DEC 1971
NEQ 3/54

MEDIATE
CYPHER CAT A
FM BAGHDAD 13Ø545Z
RESTRICTED

(LAST PAPER)

DESKBY 13Ø93ØZ

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 1283 OF 13 DEC 71 INFO IMMEDIATE MOD ((FOR DI4) (FOH)) , DS6 (LDF) , ATI (RAP, SAAS (FXA) ADT (FIC) (RAF) (RNK). DEFCOMCEN PASS ALL INFO ADDRESSEES.

SEVERANCE / MILITARY ATTACHES.

1. THE DEFENCE ATTACHE WAS CALLED TO THE FOREIGN LIAISON SECTION OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE ON THE AFTERNOON OF 11 DECEMBER, ON THE EVE OF HIS DEPARTURE.

2. HE WAS ASKED :

A. THAT ASSISTANCE OVER COURSES SHOULD CONTINUE AND THAT VACANCIES SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE ALLOTTED. COL HARROD REPLIED THAT UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES OFFERS OF EXISTING COURSE VACANCIES WOULD BE HONOURED IF IRAQ WISHED, BUT THAT NEGOTIATIONS FOR FUTURE VACANCIES WOULD INEVITABLY BE MORE DIFFICULT AND THAT THEY COULD SCARCELY EXPECT THE INCREASED NUMBER OF COURSE VACANCIES FOR WHICH WE HAD BOTH HOPED.

B. THAT THE IRAQ ATTACHES WHO WERE MOVING TO BRUSSELS SHOULD CONTINUE TO OPERATE FROM THERE. COL HARROD EXPLAINED THAT THIS WAS CLEARLY OUTSIDE HIS PROVINCE BUT THAT THEY WOULD APPEAR TO HAVE NO STATUS IN UK WHERE ONLY THE RESIDUAL INTERESTS SECTION THROUGH THEIR PROTECTING POWER COULD WORK ON THEIR BEHALF.

Def Dept arrangements
Rule 14(c)

C. THAT THEY SHOULD MAINTAIN AN ASSISTANT MILITARY ATTACHE IN LONDON. COL HARROD AGAIN SAID THAT THIS WAS NOTHING TO DO WITH HIM BUT THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO NEGOTIATE SOMETHING ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS. IT WAS A SUBJECT WHICH THE HEAD OF PROTOCOL IN THE IRAQI MFA MIGHT DISCUSS /WITH THE

RESTRICTED

WITH THE HEAD OF CHANCERY (WHO WOULD BE REMAINING IN BAGHDAD UNTIL 15 DECEMBER) BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE. COL HARROD ADDED THAT EVEN ASSUMING THAT ASSISTANT ATTACHES WERE AGREED, THE IRAQI SERVICES COULD SCARCELY EXPECT THE SAME HELP THAT THEY HAD COME TO EXPECT FROM A NORMAL TEAM OF DEFENCE ATTACHE, AIR ATTACHE AND ASSISTANT MILITARY ATTACHE.

3. COL HARROD WAS THEN TOLD THAT A DECISION ON WHAT WAS DESCRIBED AS ''OUR DEMAND FOR AN ASSISTANT MILITARY ATTACHE'' WOULD BE MADE ON SUNDAY MORNING, 12 DECEMBER. HE EXPLAINED THAT WE HAD NOT MADE ANY ''DEMAND'' : RATHER THE AMBASSADOR HAD TRIED TO DRAW ATTENTION TO SOME OF THE PROBLEMS AHEAD IF TRAINING ASSISTANCE IN UK WAS TO CONTINUE WITHOUT ANY PROFESSIONAL ATTACHE CONTACT BETWEEN OUR SERVICES.

4. COL HARROD HAD THE CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT THERE WAS LIKELY TO BE AN EARLY REQUEST FOR EXCHANGE OF ASSISTANT MILITARY ATTACHES. HE WOULD CERTAINLY SUPPORT THIS PROVIDED THAT IT WAS CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD BY IRAQ THAT IT COULD ONLY BE A POOR SECOND BEST TO PROPER REPRESENTATION.

5. THIS CAN BEST BE DISCUSSED ON THE RETURN OF THE AMBASSADOR AND COL HARROD. BUT MEANWHILE WE AND COL HARROD WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF HIS PROMISE IN PARAGRAPH 2A THAT OFFERS OF EXISTING COURSE VACANCIES WOULD BE HONOURED, COULD BE MET BY ALL CONCERNED.

LEWTY

/SENT TO D C C/

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
NED
DEF D
POD
SEC D
ASD
MOD INTERNAL

FFFFF

SECURITY GRADING

N.B. The
UPGRADE

(N.B. The grading of this jacket must be the same as that of the highest graded document contained in it. The appropriate upgrading slip must be affixed when ever necessary.)

CONFIDENTIAL

Contents checked for transfer to D.R.O.

(Sgd.) .....

Date 22/3/72

H.M. DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

DEPT. or POST NEAR EASTERN

FILE No. NEQ 3/548/1 (Part B) (52-133)

TITLE: POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED KINGDOM AND IRAQ.

REFER TO			REFER TO			REFER TO		
NAME (and dept. when necessary)	TO SEE:	DATE	NAME (and dept. when necessary)	TO SEE:	DATE	NAME (and dept. when necessary)	TO SEE:	DATE
Registry.		8/12						
V.D	PUS	26/1						

FCO 17/1540

[redacted]

Registry Address

Room No. 115
F.O. Building,
Downing Street.

SECURITY GRADING

N.B. The
UPGRADE

(N.B. The grading of this jacket must be the same as that of the highest graded document contained in it. The appropriate upgrading slip must be affixed when ever necessary.)

CONFIDENTIAL

YEAR STAMP

1971

AS NECESSARY USING APPROPRIATELY COLOURED LABELS

D/d 737504 HPW

Severance Of Anglo-Iraqi Relations; Swedish Embassy Agrees To Protect British Interests In Iraq. Political Relations Between Iraq And UK. 1 Dec. 1971. MS Middle East Online: Iraq, 1914-1974: Selected files from series AIR, CAB, CO, FCO, FO, PREM, T, WO, The National Archives, Kew, UK FCO 17/1540. Newspaper Cutting. The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom). Archives Unbound, link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107477088/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=9ed48893&pg=1. Accessed 11 Apr. 2022.